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U.S. multinational companies: Empirical investigation of the shares 
of Sales and exports attributable to affiliated and unaffiliated firms 
Mohitur Rahman 
Major Professor: John Schroeter 
Iowa State University 
This dissertation examines the choices of production/marketing strategies used by U.S. 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in selling and exporting to foreign markets. The varying 
degree of control a U.S. MNC possesses over its affiliates translates to a varying degree of 
control it retains over a transaction. A transaction with an unaffiliated firm represents a 
transaction over which the U.S. MNC has no control; while a transaction with a MOFA 
represents one over which it has complete control. Transactions with JVs fall in between. Using 
the shares for unaffiliated parties, MOFAs, and JVs as the three dependent variables, this study 
tested the empirical relevance of the internalization hypotheses, using both the sales share and 
the export share model. 
The "'Amemiya-Tobin" approach of Wales and Woodland was used to estimate the system of 
share equations. This procedure explicitly builds in the adding-up restriction on shares and 
allows for the occurrence of zero values for one or two shares in a three-share system. The log 
likelihood function for the Amemiya-Tobin model was maximized by numerical methods. 
Data was collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Census, the World 
Bank and the Internet (http://www.eiit.org). The final data set was for country-industry pairs, at 
the lowest level of industry aggregation available. 
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The results for the sales share and the export share models show the importance of the 
internalization hypothesis: R&D expenditure, which served as a proxy for the specialized 
knowledge of U.S. parent, had a significantly positive impact on MOFA sales and exports to 
MOFAs. It had a negative impact on the sales and exports to unaffiliated parties. 
Complementary knowledge of foreign enterprises, which was measured by the number of patent 
applications filed by the residents of a country, was positively related to the share of sales by 
joint ventures, and negatively related to the share of sales by MOFAs. However, patent 
applications did not play a significant role in this model. Importantly, these two results together 
show the influence of the "ownership of knowledge" in determining the organizational form 
chosen by U.S. MNCs. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 What are Multinational Corporations? 
Travelling in a foreign country is never "too foreign." It is easy to find products 
that one is used to buying at home. Consumer products like Mac-Donalds, Coke, Pepsi 
and Nike, just to name a few, are available all over the world. The Economist even 
compares the currency exchange rate with a "Mac exchange rate;" that is, using the price 
of a Big Mac in the U.S. as the numeraire. Products of some companies are so widely 
available that one confuses the home country of the parent corporation with ones own 
country. These companies, which span the entire globe, are called "multinational 
corporations" (MNC). 
"Multinational corporations" has been variously defined. Dymsza (1967) defines 
multinational companies as companies: 
1 ) whose decision-makers consider opportunity globally 
2) for which a considerable portion of the firm's assets are invested 
internationally ( at least 20%) 
3) that engage in international production and operate plants in several countries 
4) for which managerial decision making is based on a world-wide perspective. 
Caves (1996, pg. 26) defines a multinational company as " an enterprise that controls and 
manages production establishments- plants- located in at least two countries. It is simply 
a subspecies of multi-plant firm." 
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The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BE A) definition is more technical, but 
broadly speaking it defines U.S. multinationals as U.S. parents and all their foreign 
affiliates. A U.S. firm is considered a "parent" of a foreign affiliate if it has more than 
10% of the voting security in the foreign business enterprise. The U.S. parent could be 
any individual, branch, partnership, associated group, association, estate etc. 
1.2 The World of Multinational Corporations 
1.2.1 Changing attitudes towards MNCs 
A quarter of a century ago people feared multinational corporations. Ideas 
propagated by Lenin and Marx, among others, terrified the politicians and pundits alike 
about these huge, ruthless, and stateless enterprises. Lenin called the MNCs a distinctive 
feature of the final stages of capitalism. Thus it is ironic that the dying years of 
Communism saw the biggest boom in cross-border investment worldwide. Multinational 
corporations' investment grew four times faster than world output and three times faster 
than world trade (Multinational Back in Fashion, March 27,1993). Estimates have also 
shown that the largest 500 MNCs account for over half the world's trade flow and one 
fifth of the world's GDP (Brainard, 1997). 
Today, many governments have bureaus dedicated to seducing MNCs to opening 
operations in their countries. What changed the politicians' point of view? One of the 
reasons that has been put forward is that the fear of domination by the MNCs did not 
materialize. It is estimated that the top 300 MNCs, responsible for approximately 40-
50% of all cross-border assets, account for only about 25% of worldwide productive 
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assets (Multinational Back in Fashion, March 27,1993). In addition, there is no single 
country that controls the majority of these companies. In the 70s, of the 7000 MNCs 
identified by the United Nation (UN), more than half were from the UK and the U.S. 
Now there are 35,000 firms and only half of them are from the four leading parent 
countries: America, Japan, Germany and Switzerland, with the UK now occupying the 
seventh position. Thus the fear of American or British "Imperialism" turned out to be 
misplaced. The U.S., the most "feared capitalist country" had only 2667 non-bank parent 
MNCs in 1994 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1998). 
One of the other reasons for fewer criticisms of MNCs is that countries have less 
to fear from MNCs per-se, and more to fear from the global movement of short-term 
investment capital. Flows of short-term investment capital, moving in and out of 
currency and securities markets, are many times bigger than direct corporate investment. 
Noted economist Jeffrey Sachs (Sachs, 1998, pg. 23), commenting on the financial 
turmoil in Asia said " It was the financial market 'reform' that allowed Thai and South 
Korean banks to tap into short-term international loans in the early 1990s,.. ..Now, the 
panicked flight of such loans is at the root of the emerging market debacle." Furthermore 
there is an increased realization that economic sovereignty is a myth. Central banks of 
various countries now act together as a team, rather than individually. This limitation of 
economic sovereignty was powerfully revealed by the sterling's turmoil before and after 
leaving Europe's exchange rate mechanism in September 1992 (Sachs, 1998). 
1.2.2 Unequal distribution of MNC investment 
The integration of world markets is increasing but is not yet perfect. Labor is not 
mobile and countries don't treat all industries equally. Tariffs, quotas, and other non-
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tariff barriers introduce imperfections. But countries are friendlier to capital movements. 
Here the most rapid progress was made since the most liberal capital markets were those 
of Britain and the U.S., followed by the rest of the developed world. This resulted in an 
interesting feature: A disproportionate amount of international capital flows were from a 
developed country to a developed country. In 1961 about half of the foreign direct 
investment from the five largest industrialized countries was absorbed by other 
industrialized countries. This proportion rose to 70% by the year 1998 (Brainard, 1998). 
1.2.3 Formation of alliances or joint ventures 
Operating outside ones geographical boundaries puts pressure on the resources of 
a company. Some MNCs overcome these geographical and cultural boundaries by taking 
on partners or forming joint ventures. MNCs also form joint ventures (JV) to overcome 
their own limitations in terms of technology, geography, and in other areas. In a survey 
done by Maastricht Economic Research Institute in Innovation and Technology, part of 
the University of Limburg in Holland, it was found that such alliances or joint ventures 
were most common in biotechnology and information technology industries (The Case 
for Corporate Alliances, 1999). The three most common reasons for joint ventures cited 
by the survey were to gain access to markets, to exploit complementary technology, and 
to reduce the time taken for an innovation. The study estimated the number of alliances 
to be approximately 20,000 for 1996-1998. 
As stated above, firms form alliances to learn the local customs and gain access to 
the market. This is especially important in retailing. Wal-Mart started its expansion in 
Mexico with Cifra in 1991 and then acquired it in 1997. The British retailing giant, 
Tesco, started its operation in South Korea with Samsung. Turner Broadcasting Services 
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(TBS), which is part of Time Warner, has recently completed a deal with Philips, a Dutch 
company. The big reason for this alliance is so that TBS can learn about European 
consumers and about the digital communications hardware that is Phillips stock in trade 
(The Case for Corporate Alliances, 1999). 
The two most important things that are pushing alliances or joint ventures are 
human resources and the speed of technological change. Sometimes the brainpower 
needed by the large pharmaceutical firm may not be willing to work for them, partly 
because the sense of excitement and control found in a small start-up company is not 
found in a large firm (The Case for Corporate Alliances, 1999). Drug research firms now 
set aside nearly 20 % of their research budget for joint ventures with bio-tech firms. The 
number of such alliances with biotech firms has risen from 152 in 1988-90 to 375 in 
1997-98 (The Case for Corporate Alliances, 1999). The speed of technological change 
also forces firms to try forming multiple alliances or joint ventures. 
Sometimes the alliances are motivated, not so much by commercial logic, as by 
government regulations. An example would be the airline industry in which most 
countries have national barriers to foreign ownership. Here the number of alliances was 
up by 38% to 500 in the year 1998 (The Case for Corporate Alliances, 1999). The huge 
"Star" alliance that includes Lufthansa and United Airlines started as a loose arrangement 
to direct passengers to each other and to share booking codes. It is now turning into a 
quasi-merger with pooled maintenance facilities. 
1.2.4 Full control over affiliates 
The incentive to economize on transportation costs will tend to encourage a firm 
to establish a foreign affiliate but the internal organizational structure will depend on the 
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product and the production process. With everything else constant, the choice of internal 
organization of a firm is dependent on the need of the firm to control conflicting 
investment decisions. Integration takes care of that by replacing external markets with 
"internal markets." One of the advantages of integration is that it avoids the "holdup 
problem." For example, once a contract between partners is signed, due to the product 
specificity of their investments, they are locked into each other. Thus production will 
cease if either of them decides to "hold up" production. It is also possible that there 
might be an incompatibility between the individual profit maximizing incentives of the 
joint venture partners and the joint profit maximizing incentives of the combined entity. 
There could also be a clash of management styles. To avoid such problems, firms might 
decide to integrate. 
There have also been studies, which show that joint ventures are inherently 
unstable; they are merely "experiments" that are transformed into wholly-owned 
subsidiaries after a period of learning (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988). The recent 
failures of two joint ventures between U.S. firms and Indian firms (Proctor and Gamble 
with Godrej, and Unisys with Tata and Sons) illustrate this point. 
"American Consumer products giant Procter and Gamble has announced it will 
buy out its once celebrated toilet soap venture with Godrej Soaps. Faced with declining 
market share, Godrej felt its own soap brands were not being marketed aggressively 
enough. It also demanded compensation from Proctor and Gamble for unused capacity. 
Stung by the rising bills, Proctor and Gamble felt it was the victim of over-charging by 
Godrej, which controlled manufacturing cost " (U.S. Multinationals in India, 1996, pg. 
102). 
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"American computer company Unisys says it will sell out its union with Tata 
Sons, the holding company of India's largest Industrial house" (U.S. Multinationals in 
India, 1996, pg. 104). 
But integration also suffers from problems. They are the problems of incentives; 
that is, since trade is internal, there might be less incentive on the part of managers to 
undertake cost cutting measures. This is especially the case with unverifiable effort. 
The importance of intangible assets such as brainpower and cross-border cultural 
differences makes international operations difficult to manage. Cross-border cultural 
differences lead to many problems as in the merger of Sweden's Pharmacia and the U.S. 
firm Upjohn, in which conflict arose over "American" practices such as not serving 
alcohol during lunch (After the Deal, 1999). 
The question that arises, therefore, is what are the advantages of integration or 
mergers of firms? To restate the question more specifically, if a MNC wants to have a 
presence in a foreign market, under what circumstances will it choose to establish a 
majority owned affiliate (MOFA), to enter a joint venture with a local partner, or to 
export directly to unaffiliated parties in the foreign country? This dissertation addresses 
these questions. 
1.3. Research Proposal 
Products of U.S. MNCs are found ali over the world. These commodities are 
sometimes manufactured abroad and sometimes exported from the U.S. A MNCs choice 
can be thought of as a special case of the choice facing a multi-plant firm. It will choose 
the production level of each plant on the basis of costs associated with each plant. For 
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the purpose of this dissertation it is assumed that the MNC has three means of supplying 
a foreign market:1 
(i) Produce at home and sell in a foreign market through an unaffiliated downstream firm. 
(ii) Meet foreign demand by producing the good abroad in a majority owned subsidiary. 
(iii) Meet foreign demand by producing the good abroad in a joint venture. 
If a MNC establishes a production facility abroad then that facility could be a 
"majority owned foreign affiliate" (MOFA) or a "joint venture." Following the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BE A), MOFA is defined as "A foreign affiliate in which the 
combined ownership of all U.S. parents exceeds 50 %." MOFAs comprise the foreign 
operations of U.S. MNCs over which the parents have unambiguous control. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, following the literature, a joint venture is defined as a firm in 
which the combined share of all U.S. parents is below 50 % but greater than 10% (Desai 
and Hines, 1999). 
This dissertation tries to answer two questions (i) What are the factors which 
affect the division of a MNC's total foreign sales among exports (sales to unaffiliated 
firms/individuals), joint venture sales, and MOFÀ sales? and (ii) How do U.S. exports to 
MOFAs, joint ventures, and unaffiliated parties differ? Thus the choice of ownership 
structure is central to this study of MNCs. 
The first question that this dissertation will investigate is what factors affect the 
production and sales choices of the MNC? In other words, the paper will attempt to 
answer the question of the degree of integration the MNC would prefer. Selling a good 
1 Other means of supplying the market, such as licensing, is not considered in this dissertation because of 
data constraints. 
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through an unaffiliated party represents the lowest degree of integration while 
concentrating the production in a MOFA represents the highest degree of integration. 
Joint ventures fall in between. The second question that is dealt with here, is how 
integration affects exports? 
In answering the above questions, the dissertation will shed light on what a 
foreign government needs to do to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and what 
policy the U.S. government should adopt to keep production facilities from moving out of 
the country. Affiliate production of U.S. MNCs can be a significant amount of the GDP 
of a host country. For example in 1991, U.S. MNCs' affiliate production was 14 % of 
Ireland's GDP, 9 % of Canada's, 8 % of Singapore's, and 7 % of the UK's. Affiliate 
production of U.S. MNCs accounted for more than 1 % of the GDP for 36 countries. So, 
for policy purposes, factors affecting these shares are important. 
For intra-firm exports, as opposed to arms-length trade between unaffiliated 
parties, the market does not set a price, but the integrated firm sets a transfer price for 
accounting purposes. MNCs may manipulate this transfer price to shift their tax liability 
from the home country to the host country, or vice-versa. The Wall Street Journal cites 
an example of a foreign corporation charging $250 to its affiliates while charging $150 to 
unaffiliated parties for the same product (Stout, 1990). Such practices are illegal in the 
U.S.- This dissertation will look at how U.S. and foreign taxes affect intra-firm and 
2 Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code Allocation of Income and Deductions among Tax Payers: In 
any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not 
organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by 
the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or 
allowances between or among such organizations, trades or businesses if he determines that such 
distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to 
reflect the income of any such organizations, trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license) of 
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arms-length exports. 
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 deals 
with the theoretical literature on organization, which forms the background on which the 
answers to both the questions are based. Chapter 3 summarizes the relevant empirical 
literature. Chapter 4 outlines the empirical model and chapter 5 will explain the 
estimation technique. Chapter 6 will present information about the data set, results, and 
conclusions. 
Before we discuss the theoretical literature a brief overview of U.S. MNCs' 
foreign affiliates is provided in the final section of this chapter. 
1.4. Survey of U.S. MNCs and their Affiliates 
The following survey, based on the data in (USDIA, 1998), of U.S. parent owned 
foreign affiliates brings out some key characteristics of U.S. affiliates, both MOFAs and 
JVs, by country. 
Table 1 clearly shows the skewed pattern of locational choices made by U.S. 
MNCs: 48% of the affiliates of U.S. MNCs were located in Europe. There were 8960 
affiliates in the European Union, these twelve countries accounted for 40% of all U.S. 
affiliates in the world. Canada had four times as many affiliates as Africa. Nearly half of 
the 516 African affiliates were located in three countries: Egypt, Nigeria, and South 
Africa. Among the 1173 Central American affiliates, 72% were located in Mexico while, 
in South America, 75% of the affiliates were concentrated in just four countries: 
intangible property (within the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer 
or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible. 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela. Among the Asian and Pacific nations, the bulk 
of the affiliates were located in Australia (864), Japan (1042) and Hong Kong (600). 
Thus the most preferred continent for locating affiliates was Europe with Africa being the 
least favorite continent. 
Table 1: Distribution of affiliates of U.S. MNCs by country 
Countries Number of Affiliates % of Total Affiliates 
Canada 2094 9.37 
Europe 10781 48.27 
Germany 1403 6.28 
United Kingdom 2546 11.40 
South America 1504 6.73 
Central America 1173 5.25 
Mexico 846 3.79 
Africa 516 2.31 
Middle East 354 1.58 
Asia and Pacific 4877 21.84 
Australia 864 3.87 
Japan 1042 4.67 
Total 22332 100 
Table 2 reproduces the first two columns of Table 1 and adds information about 
the breakdown of affiliates between MOFAs and JVs. We can see that U.S. MNCs 
preferred majority owned foreign affiliates to joint ventures 84.8% to 15.2% overall. 
Finland and Ireland had the highest percentage of MOFAs, at 96.4% and 95.6% 
respectively, while Bahamas and India had the lowest percentages of MOFAs, at 42% 
and 40% respectively. Among the OECD countries, Japan and Luxembourg had the 
lowest percentages of MOFAs, at only 62% and 66 % respectively. But there is no clear 
pattern of ownership; there is a wide variance even among the OECD countries. The 
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OECD included the country with the highest percentage of MOFAs (Finland) as well as 
the one with one of the lowest percentage (Japan). 
One fact that is clearly evident in Table 3 below is that the average value of a 
joint venture was unambiguously larger than that of a MOFA. The worldwide average 
asset value, for all U.S. affiliates, was SI51 million, while the average asset value of 
Table 2. Types of affiliates by countries 
Countries Number of Number of MOFA Number of Joint 
Affiliates (% of Affiliates Ventures 
that are MOFA.) (% of Affiliates that are 
Joint Venture.) 
Canada 2094 1939 (92.6) 155 (7.4) 
Europe 10781 9691 (89.9) 1090(10.1) 
Germany 1403 1249(89) 154 (11) 
United 2546 2278 (89.5) 268 (10.5) 
Kingdom 
South America 1504 1187(78.9) 317(20.1) 
Central America 1173 965 (82.3) 208 (17.7) 
Mexico 846 670 (79.2) 176 (20.8) 
Africa 516 421 (81.6) 95 (18.4) 
Middle East 354 218(61.6) 136 (38.4) 
Asia and Pacific 4877 3740(76.7) 1137(23.3) 
Australia 864 751 (86.9) 113(13.1) 
Japan 1042 653 (62.7) 389 (37.3) 
Total 22332 18929 (84.8) 3403 (15.2) 
MOFAs was $107 million. Joint ventures, on the average, were nearly three times larger 
(in terms of asset value) than MOFAs. In only a handful of countries (namely Finland, 
Norway, and Indonesia), was the pattern violated. Interestingly enough, the average size 
(in terms of assets) of affiliates in these countries was small, in Finland the average 
affiliate size was only $21 million, for Norway it was $79 million and for Indonesia it 
was $90 million. 
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Table 3: Distribution of affiliate assets by country (Millions of $) 
Countries Total Assets Average Average Average asset 
(In Million $) asset per asset per per Joint 
Affiliate MOFA Venture 
Canada 237490 113 107 247 
Europe 1837846 170 123 590 
Germany 225964 161 124 464 
United Kingdom 913546 359 229 1463 
South America 117951 78 56 161 
Central America 79708 68 47 167 
Mexico 59905 71 40 186 
Africa 23708 46 41 68 
Middle East 66486 188 58 397 
Asia and Pacific 731380 150 101 312 
Australia 98585 114 77 363 
Japan 291922 280 254 324 
Total 3380983 151 107 399 
Table 4, below shows U.S. MNCs had majority control over 84.8% of their 
affiliates, and their combined sales accounted for 78.43% of the worldwide affiliate sales. 
For Europe, 90% of the U.S. affiliates were MOFAs, accounting for 86% of the affiliate 
sales there. Interestingly, for Japan approximately 49% of the affiliate sales were by 
MOFAs even though 62.7 % of the affiliates were MOFAs. 
Table 5, below shows sales per affiliate, were larger for joint ventures than for 
MOFAs. In Japan, sales per MOFA is the highest in the world at $149.5 million, 
followed by Germany with sales per MOFA at $129 million. Singapore and Switzerland 
were next with $113 and $102 million respectively. For Guatemala, Saudi Arabia, China, 
Panama, and Ecuador average MOFA sales were below $18 million. Joint ventures of 
Brazil, Netherlands, Japan, and Germany, in that order, had the highest sales. Guatemala, 
India and Honduras had the lowest sales per joint venture. 
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Table 4. Sales of MNCs' Affiliates (in millions of $) 
Countries Total Sales of Sales of % of Sales % of Sales 
Sales of MOFA Joint by MOFA by Joint 
all Venture Venture 
Affiliates 
Canada 212308 194004 18304 91.38 8.62 
Europe 925001 796816 128185 86.14 13.86 
Germany 200681 160943 39738 80.20 19.80 
United Kingdom 242023 209091 32732 86.48 13.52 
South America 105897 65446 40451 61.80 38.20 
Central America 70330 45911 24419 65.28 34.72 
Mexico 63454 39421 24033 62.13 37.87 
Africa 17767 14866 2901 83.67 16.33 
Middle East 20544 8070 12474 39.28 60.72 
Asia and Pacific 438426 281080 157346 64.11 35.89 
Australia 62175 42553 19622 68.44 31.56 
Japan 200470 97604 102866 48.69 51.31 
Total 1830744 1435901 394843 78.43 21.57 
Table 5. Sales per Affiliate (in Millions of S) 
Countries Sales per Sales per MOFA Sales per Joint 
Affiliates Venture 
Canada 101.39 100.05 118.09 
Europe 85.80 82 117.6 
Germany 143.04 128.86 258.04 
United Kingdom 95.06 91.87 122.13 
South America 70.41 55.14 127.61 
Central America 59.96 47.58 117.4 
Mexico 75.00 58.84 136.55 
Africa 34.43 35.32 30.54 
Middle East 58.03 37.01 91.72 
Asia and Pacific 89.90 75.16 138.39 
Australia 71.96 56.66 173.64 
Japan 192.39 149.47 264.43 
Total 81.98 75.85 116.3 
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CHAPTER 2: SURVEY OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
2.1. Introduction 
A relatively recent development in the literature on multinational enterprises has 
been the attempt to explain the existence of MNCs in terms of the ownership, location 
and internalization, or OLI, framework (Ethier, 1986 and Caves, 1996). Ownership of 
proprietary assets, such as patents or the ability to organize some specific endeavor, 
allows the MNC to benefit from certain (usually cost) advantages. Locational 
considerations that affect MNC behavior include the proximity to customers, factor 
specialization, and scale economies. Internalization of transactions is the choice of a firm 
to replace a market transaction with an activity within the firm. 
The factor and proximity hypothesis, or the locational choice hypothesis, which 
focuses on the locational component of the OLI framework, has been rigorously tested in 
a recent paper by Brainard (1997).3 The effect of internalization and ownership of 
proprietary assets on the production strategy of an MNC or on intra-firm trade have not 
yet, however, been investigated with the same degree of empirical formalization. The 
main aim of this paper is to fill a gap in the existing literature on MNCs by providing an 
empirical framework to investigate how ownership and internalization affect the 
production choices of an MNC. In doing so, we shall also attempt to throw some light on 
the determinants of intra-firm trade. The natural starting point for a discussion on 
internalization of transaction is the literature on the theory of the firm. 
3Brainard's working paper by the same name was described by Caves ( 1996 pg 32) as providing ".. a 
capstone to this line of research " 
16 
2.2. An Introduction to the Literature on the Theory of the Firm 
The standard neoclassical theory describes the firm as a collection or set of feasible 
production plans with a manager who maximizes profits or expected profits by buying 
inputs and selling outputs in a spot market. In spite of the widespread acceptance of the 
neoclassical theory in the past, there is a growing realization among economists that the 
neoclassical theory suffers from a number of drawbacks. The theory does not explain, for 
example, how production is organized within a firm or how conflicts of interest within a 
firm are resolved. The firm is treated, in effect, as a "black box." Little insight is 
provided about the structure of the firm. 
To understand the structure of the firm we turn to a paper by (Coase, 1937) which 
is generally considered to be the seminal contribution in this area (Cheung, 1983), Hart 
and Moore, 1990). Coase's paper raised the important question of why firms exist at all, 
inspiring a number of economists over the years to attempt to come up with a satisfactory 
answer. Coase's own explanation was that a firm comes into existence if it is profitable 
to organize a transaction within a firm as opposed to using the market to carry out the 
transaction. But Coase did not specifically explain what affects this cost of transaction, 
or, what are the different types of transactions that are likely to be organized within a 
firm. Williamson then developed Coase's ideas, giving them rigor. Williamson's (1979) 
explanation of transaction costs on the basis of investments has proved to be particularly 
influential in explaining why firms (or hierarchies) and markets co-exist. The main focus 
of Williamson's work was the effect of transactions on costs and the optimal 
organizational form for different types of transactions. Williamson recognized that there 
are costs in setting up firms, like the cost of decision-making delays due to "internal 
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bureaucracy," but he ignored other costs that might be associated with setting up firms. 
In particular he, ignored the effect integration will have on the incentives of 
managers/owners. The incentives of managers could play an important part in the 
success of an enterprise: Grossman and Hart (1986) developed models using an 
incomplete contract formulation to show how integration impacts the incentives of 
managers and analyzed the conditions under which integration would be optimal. Hart 
and Moore (1990) carried the analysis further to show conditions under which joint 
ownership will be optimal. 
The remainder of this chapter explores the theoretical basis for the empirical 
analysis that follows in subsequent chapters. Section 2 takes a look at various 
internalization issues, section 3 weighs the pros and cons of ownership, and section 4 
delves into the factors that determine the locational choice of new plants. 
2.3. Why Do Firms Exist? 
Coase's (1937) seminal paper pointed out that firms integrate in order to minimize 
transaction costs.4 Reliance on the market forces a firm to negotiate with external 
suppliers for its production needs and this dependence on other agents is often costly. If 
the firm chooses to internalize these market transactions, long term contracts with 
employees replace a series of short-term contracts with other suppliers, and this serves to 
decrease transaction costs. 
Coase's (1937) paper argued that the views prevailing at that time about firms 
4 Insdtutionalists were concerned with the idea of transaction costs some 40 years ago. Their ideas have 
been revived by economists recognizing the importance of transactions cost (Williamson, 1975) 
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were deficient. He believed that the common view that the firm exists due to the extreme 
complexity of the division of labor is not a tenable one, since advances in economic 
theory have indicated that an increase in the degree of specialization does not lead to 
chaos. Moreover it does not explain why coordination by the market should be replaced 
with coordination by the firm. 
The most popular view at that time about the existence of firms was that of 
Knight (Coase, 1937). Knight espoused the view that firms existed because of 
uncertainty. In the absence of uncertainty, when every individual in the economy has 
perfect knowledge, there are no reasons for any one to coordinate productive activities. 
With perfect knowledge, flows of raw input into the production process are automatic. 
Agents, after a period of adjustment in which they learn by "trial-and-error," will be able 
to carry on all transactions without a second thought. The whole production process 
becomes automated, with very minor imperfections in coordination. Knight believed that 
under certainty there might be managers who would be performing purely routine work 
devoid of any responsibility, but in the presence of uncertainty there would be a separate 
group of managers who would coordinate production. Because decisions would have to 
be made about what to produce and how to produce it, these coordinators would then 
direct the actions of others, which Professor Knight believed would not happen unless the 
individuals gave their consent to the coordinator/manager to control their actions. In this 
manner, according to Knight a firm emerges. 
Coase's paper argued that there were two flaws with this argument. First, 
managers could just work as advisors or consultants without taking part in production. A 
second, and a more serious, flaw with this argument was that there was nothing in it that 
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indicates why a firm is a better alternative than the price system. Coase also disagreed 
with the premise that to guarantee a definite result one agent must give directions to 
another. For example, in most contracted jobs it is normal to guarantee a certain amount 
of money for specified work without any directions on how the work should be done. 
According to Coase, the main reason why the firm exists is because it is often 
more profitable to establish a firm than to use the price mechanism. The most obvious 
cost of organizing production through the price mechanism is the cost of discovering 
relevant prices.5 The emergence of a specialist who can sell information relating to 
prices may reduce, but not eliminate, the cost of discovering the price. The cost of 
negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each transaction between the owners of 
various factors of production employed in the production process will further increase 
costs. The establishment of a firm reduces the cost of contracting, as each owner of a 
factor of production would then have to enter into a single contract with the 
owner/manager of the firm instead of a multitude of contracts with other owners of 
factors. A firm therefore enhances cooperation between the owners of factors by 
employing them. 
Risk attitudes of agents may also play a part in the formation of firms. Agents 
may prefer entering into a long-term contract rather than many short term contracts. This 
would especially be true if the future demand and changes of the state of nature cannot be 
predicted with certainty and hence there would be costs associated with each mistake. To 
smooth out the fluctuations in their payoffs, agents may prefer a long-term contract to 
5 It is important to note that Coase is implicitly assuming that the prices are not known to all agents in the 
economy. Coase cites the work of N. Kaldor ( 1934) for this assumption. 
20 
many short-term contracts. When a long-term contract is preferable, and the services to 
be provided are expressed in general terms with remaining details left to be determined 
by the buyer at a later date, then essentially the supplier of the resource is agreeing to be 
directed by the buyer, within the limits of the contract, and a firm emerges.6 
The size of the firm is directly related to the number of transactions organized 
within the firm: As the entrepreneur directs more transactions the firm becomes larger 
and as he organizes fewer transactions the firm becomes smaller. This raises the question 
of what limits the size of the firm or, in other words, what prevents the existence of only 
one big firm with all transactions being carried out internally. Coase discusses several 
factors that determine the size of the firm. The first relates to the possibility that there are 
diminishing marginal returns to entrepreneurial functions. Diminishing marginal returns 
would imply that as the number of transactions internalized by the entrepreneur increases 
the cost savings decrease. Thus, there will exist a point at which the entrepreneur will be 
indifferent between organizing one more transaction internally and conducting the same 
transaction in the market. So a firm will tend to expand until the cost of organizing an 
extra transaction within the firm is equal to the cost of a market transaction. A second 
factor limiting the size is the likelihood of mistakes and how this likelihood is affected by 
the increase in the number of transactions. As the number and dissimilarity of 
transactions increases, the entrepreneur becomes less familiar with the production 
process, and hence the probability of mistakes increases as well, which places additional 
limits on the firm size. Thirdly, as an entrepreneur organizes more and more transactions 
6 
" A fiim, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction 
of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur." Coase (1937) pg. 393. 
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internally, transactions may be less alike and geographically more separated. This may 
contribute a reason why inefficiency could creep in and limit the size of the firm. 
Innovations that decrease the spatial dispersion of transactions, such as improvements in 
managerial skill and the speed of telecommunication, will tend to increase the size of the 
firm. 
2.4. Some Other Factors 
Coase's paper offers an answer to the question of why firms exist, but he never 
explains the type of transactions that are likely to be organized in a firm or what factors 
might affect transaction cost. Coase also never considered the effects of informational 
asymmetries among agents. Williamson (1979) develops Coase's ideas to further explain 
why a firm might exist on the basis of factors that affect transactions cost. Before we 
delve into Williamson's paper it would be helpful to explain some broad factors that are 
used by economists to explain why firms come into existence and integrate with other 
firms. 
Williamson (1975) points out some factors that explain why firms (MNCs in our 
context) would like to internalize transactions. The factors can be broadly classified 
under three separate headings: 
1) Bounded Rationality and Uncertainty/Complexity 
2) Opportunism and Small Numbers 
3) Information. 
These factors are discussed below in order to provide an understanding of the key 
elements of a firm viewed as a hierarchical structure. 
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2.4.1 Bounded Rationality and Uncertainty/Complexity 
Bounded rationality has been defined as behavior that is 'intendedly rational, but 
only limitedly so' (Simon, 1957). Bounded rationality places two limits on decision 
making: (a) 'neurophysical' limits, which refer to the physical limits of humans to store, 
retrieve, and process information and (b) limits arising from the problems associated with 
communication. Simon observes that "it is because individual human beings are limited 
in knowledge, foresight, skill, and time that organizations are useful instruments for 
achievements of human purpose", Simon (1957, pg 199). 
If the market environment is very complex then decision making becomes 
difficult. The costs of a wrong decision become impossible to compute and risks are hard 
to distinguish making it impossible to write a meaningful contract among parties. In such 
a case, internal organization would be favorable. Bounded rationality has not been 
formally analyzed in the case of the firm because of the difficulty associated in modeling 
(Tirole, (1994), Hart and Moore (1988)). 
Communication problems could develop due to the inability of individuals to 
successfully communicate ideas by words, graphs or pictures (as a result of problems of 
the language itself rather than the receiver's failure to comprehend). In such a case, the 
parties may develop other means of communication such as through demonstration and 
learning by doing. By working together, the parties involved might be able to summarize 
complex events in an informal way, making internal organization more attractive. 
2.4.2. Opportunism and Small Numbers 
Opportunism deals with the conventional assumption that individual agents are 
guided by self-interest and not group interests. Opportunism arises especially in the case 
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in which there are informational asymmetries that permit one of the parties to selectively 
distort information. This problem of opportunism is further aggravated in the case in 
which performance is not verifiable in a court of law. 
Since there are problems in making an ex-ante determination of who is truthful, 
relying on (external market) contracts exposes firms to principal-agent problems during 
the period between the signing of a contract and contract renewal. If there are incentives 
for the agent to be ineffectual in contract execution then the agent has to be monitored by 
the principal to ensure the successful completion of the terms of the contract. If the cost 
of monitoring the agent's work is high, the firm might prefer an internal organization. 
If there were a competitive market for contracts; that is, if there were a large 
number of bidders; opportunistic behavior will be ineffectual especially in the case in 
which the firm can costlessly award the contract to a competitor at the time of contract 
renewal. The fear of losing the contract will then discourage opportunistic behavior. 
There may be fewer temptations to behave in an opportunistic manner within an 
organization, where a system of incentives could be designed to promote the interests of 
the firm. With an appropriate system of employee rewards, a firm can better handle the 
conflict arising between the firm and individual agents. 
2.4.3. Information 
An issue that has received a lot of attention in the past few years, is the 
application of information economics to the study of contracts. It is generally conceded 
that if there are informational asymmetries between contracting parties then the exchange 
between them is subject to hazards. Williamson (1975, pg. 31) believes that it is not 
informational asymmetry alone that is important, but it is the interplay with opportunistic 
24 
behavior and the high cost of achieving informational parity. In other words if one agent 
has less information than the other, he can never be sure that the latter is not selectively 
disclosing information or distorting the information. Even with identical information 
among parties, there could be disputes since there may be a problem in conveying this 
information to a court due to its unobservability, that is, the information is unverifiable in 
a court of law. In the event that information is symmetric and verifiable, conflict 
between contracting parties may arise if the contract was incomplete (it did not specify 
the action to be taken in all possible eventualities). Below we discuss Williamson's 
(1979) paper, which explains how the above factors interplay in the formation of firms. 
2.5. Frequency of Transaction. Investment and Governance Structure 
Williamson (1979) develops the ideas of Coase to explicitly describe the 
transactions that should be internalized. In this paper Williamson shows the least cost, or 
optimal, institutional framework within which to reliably complete a transaction. This 
institutional framework, which governs a transaction, is described as a governance 
structure and it could be either a firm or a market. To undertake a particular transaction, 
an investment is usually required. The characteristic of the investment depends on the 
nature of the item to be transacted. And, as Williamson shows, the nature of the 
investment, along with the frequency of transaction, determines the type of governance 
structure that is optimal. 
A firm trying to minimize cost has one goal: to minimize the sum of production 
and transactions cost. The governance structure can thus be looked upon as an 
optimization problem. Changes in the governance structure can affect the cost of writing 
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complex contracts as well as the cost of their execution (e.g. the monitoring costs and 
other costs associated with opportunism). Therefore understanding governance structure, 
and factors which affect it, may better help a firm in minimizing its cost. 
To help us better understand the different types of transactions, a brief digression 
into the legal background of contracts, or the laws governing contracts, is attempted here. 
Contract law of the U.S., according to Williamson (1979)7, may be classified into three 
different categories: the classical, neoclassical, and relational contracting law. The laws 
that fall under classical contract law emphasize legal rules and formal documentation; the 
nature of the agreements is clearly written without any ambiguity. Not all transactions 
can be optimally undertaken via contracts based on classical contracting law. This is 
especially true for long-term contracts in an uncertain environment. A problem that 
could arise is that a detailed description of all the actions to be taken at every eventuality 
may be prohibitively expensive if not impossible to write. Secondly, the solution to a 
problem might not be evident until the problem manifests itself. Finally, if the state of 
the world is unverifiable then the settlement of the problem becomes even more difficult. 
There are three possible solutions to the problems associated with the use of 
classical contracts to govern the types of transactions described above. 
(1) Forgo all transactions all together. 
(2) Organize all transactions internally. 
(3) Introduce a different contracting relation that preserves trading but 
provides for additional governance structure like third party arbitration. 
' Williamson (1979) cites the work of Ian McNeil, "The Many Futures of Contracts", 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
691,783 (1974) for the discussion on the contracting background. 
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The third solution is what Williamson refers to as neo-classical contracting. In 
neo-classical contracts not all possible eventualities are stated; that is, there are "gaps" in 
the contract. Contract planners might give a range of choices to the agents in lieu of 
leaving gaps in the contract but they are never as rigid and as comprehensive as in 
classical contracts. To resolve problems arising out of these gaps, or unplanned 
eventualities, additional governance, like third party arbitration, may be provided for. 
According to Williamson, third party arbitration is less final than litigation, and leaves 
the parties less resentful, hence is beneficial for the completion of the contract. Thus the 
law of neo-classical (or incomplete) contracts, recognizes the following features: (a) the 
world is complex, (b) agreements are often incomplete, and (c) some contracts will never 
be reached unless both parties have confidence in the settlement machinery. 
The requirement of maintaining an ongoing relationship has resulted in a 
modification of neo-classical and classical contracts referred to as a relational contract. 
Contracts allowing for collective bargaining would fall in this genre. The main 
difference between relational and neo-classical contracts is the reference point. In neo­
classical contracts the reference point in a dispute is always the original contract. For the 
relational contract the reference point is the relationship as it has evolved over time, and 
any reference to the original contract may be only in passing. 
With that digression into the different categories of contract law we move to a 
discussion of the characteristics of investment. As we shall see below, the characteristics 
of investment play a key role in the choice of the optimal governance structure. 
Investments are characterized by varying degrees of transaction specificity (or non-
marketability, since very specialized products might have few buyers). When the buyer 
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or seller makes a transaction specific investment they are "locked into" the relation in the 
sense that an alternative buyer and seller cannot be found easily. Transactions or 
investments with a very high degree of relationship specificity are referred to as 
idiosyncratic transactions or investments. At the other end of the spectrum is the non­
specific investment: an investment which can costlessly be transformed to suit another 
transaction. Mixed investments fall in between. An example of an idiosyncratic 
investment would be the location of a specialized plant in close proximity to a 
downstream processing unit. With the additional assumption that there are no other 
firms, of either type, in the vicinity, there would be strong incentives, on both the buyer's 
and the seller's part, to continue the relationship. If trade were not consummated 
between them, then both the buyer and seller would lose their investment since the return 
from alternate use is approximately zero. A nonspecific investment would be any 
investment in which the return is nearly the same as in the next best alternative. While 
for a mixed investment the return from the next best investment hes somewhere in 
between the idiosyncratic and the non-specific type. 
The three essential dimensions for any contract are (1) uncertainty, (2) frequency of 
transaction and (3) the characteristics of the investment or the degree to which 
investments are idiosyncratic. To simplify the analysis below, the level of uncertainty is 
held fixed and only the frequency of transactions and type of investments are analyzed. 
The frequency of transactions is categorized into occasional and recurrent transactions. 
The investment characteristics are broken up into 3 types: nonspecific investment, 
investments that can be readily adapted to suit any transactions; idiosyncratic investment, 
investments that are transaction specific; and the intermediate case, mixed investment. 
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Figure 1 diagrammatically shows the transaction cases determined by the 
frequency of the buyer's purchase (rows) and the characteristic of the seller's investment 
(columns). The entry in the cell at the intersection of a row and a column gives an 
example of the particular type of transaction. When the frequency of purchase by the 
buyer is recurrent then the item purchased would normally be an intermediate good or 
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Figure 1. Illustrative Commercial Transactions (Williamson (1979) pg. 243) 
raw material. When the purchase is occasional, then the purchase could be a machine or 
durable equipment. If the investment characteristic of the seller's investment is non­
specific then the product is a generic (standard) commodity available from the market. 
While if the seller's investment is idiosyncratic, then converting the investment to 
another use will be prohibitively expensive. The construction of a steel plant is an 
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example. Mixed investments fall in between a non-specific and highly specific 
investment. 
Figure 2 shows the type of governance structure that we could expect to emerge in 
each of the cases categorized in figure 1. 
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Figure 2. Matching Governance Structure with Commercial Transactions 
(Williamson (1979) pg. 247). 
Four types of governance structure are considered (a) market, (b) bilateral, (c) unified, 
and (d) trilateral. 
A market is the main governance structure when the frequency of transactions is 
occasional or recurrent for nonspecific investments. Since nonspecific investments are 
also standardized, alternate supplies are not difficult to find. Buyers can rely on word of 
mouth or rating agencies to safeguard against opportunism. Thus, for standardized goods 
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irrespective of the frequency of transactions, market governance is optimal. 
Investment of a non-standardized nature will make reliance on the market 
inappropriate however. If, in addition, transactions are recurrent, it might be possible to 
build a more specialized governance structure. Two specialized structures designed to 
handle such transactions are unified governance, in which the transactions are removed 
from the market and organized within a firm, and bilateral governance, in which the 
organizational structure falls in between a unified governance and a market; for example, 
a joint venture. 
Bilateral governance is preferred for cases in which the assets, human and 
physical, are not extensively specialized. In this case, the trading firms would want to 
maintain the relationship with each other, since by definition the buyer will not be able to 
procure specialized goods from the open market, and the sellers return from internal trade 
is greater than the return from market sales. The recurrent nature of the transactions then 
allows the firms to form a centralized governance structure, in which the identities of the 
individual firms are maintained, but to a lesser extent than in a market transaction. 
However, if there are disagreements between contracting parties or if there is some 
persistent issue about adaptability, then a bilateral governance structure is no longer 
efficient and a unified governance structure may be preferred. 
Unified governance, or internal organization, is optimal when incentives for trade 
weaken. This usually happens as assets become more idiosyncratic. As assets become 
more specialized to a single use, and hence less transferable to other uses, economies of 
scale can be achieved by the buyer as well as the seller. The advantage of vertical 
integration is that adaptations to the product can be enforced by fiat. Internal adaptation 
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can be ensured by an order from the central office within a firm but this is not possible 
when the governance structure is a market or bilateral governance. 
If specific investments of either idiosyncratic or mixed variety have to be made 
for the project, then the interest of the agents to sustain the relation is great. The market 
is an inappropriate governance structure in this case since alternate suppliers for custom 
goods are not easy to find. Additionally, if the transactions are occasional, the set up of a 
specialized governance structure, like unified or bilateral governance, may not be 
justified. In this case, there is a need for an intermediate governance structure, between 
unified or bilateral governance, on the one hand, and a market, on the other. 
The trilateral governance structure, a neo-classical invention, was introduced to 
resolve crises among agents who would prefer a continuing relationship due to having 
transaction specific investments in place. In a trilateral governance structure, an 
arbitrator's service is utilized to resolve disputes without the contractual breakdown that 
litigation may cause. Examples of trilateral governance include federal mediation 
between the workers' union and management to prevent a breakdown in negotiations, and 
independent architect evaluating construction work for a client to see if all specifications 
of the contract have been followed by the builder.8 Thus for these occasional transactions, 
involving semi-transaction specific investments or idiosyncratic investments, a trilateral 
governance structure is optimal. 
The introduction of uncertainty will have no effect on market transactions since new 
trading relations can easily be arranged. But in the case of bilateral relationships, 
8 Williamson (1979) distinguishes between arbitration and litigation, the former being described as 
informal and less severe. 
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uncertainty requires that there be a machinery to resolve the crisis and to mitigate the cost 
increases as the degree of uncertainty rises. Two things can happen in such cases: The 
specific design of the item transacted may be sacrificed in favor of a standardized form or 
there may be movement toward a more unified governance structure. 
2.6. The Effect of Integration on the Incentives of Managers 
Coase and Williamson suggest that, through integration, the firm reduces its 
transaction cost, costs of re-contracting, etc. But they do not consider the effect of 
integration on the incentives of managers. If an agent does not enjoy the benefits of his 
innovations, or has to share the benefits of innovations with others, then he will have no 
incentive, or a lower incentive, to innovate. If the cost of innovation (say the cost of the 
innovator's effort) can be assigned a monetary value, then the optimal effort by an agent 
is characterized by equality between the agent's marginal cost and marginal benefit or 
payoff. If other agents in a multi-unit plant share part of the benefit then the effort by the 
innovating agent will be lower than if he were the sole beneficiary. Thus there are costs 
to integration. 
Grossman and Hart (1986) forcefully argue this case. They contend that the 
analysis of Coase and Williamson is too simplistic. They argue that if integration always 
reduces transactions cost then a buyer and a seller who have a contractual relationship 
could make themselves better off by taking the following steps. 
(1) (Firm) A buys (firm) B and makes the previous owner of B the manager of a new 
subsidiary. 
(2) A sets a transfer price between the subsidiary and itself equal to the contract price that 
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existed when the firms were separate enterprises and 
(3) A gives the manager of B a compensation package equal to the profits of the 
subsidiary. 
Given the above design, integration can never be strictly worse than non-integration. 
Grossman and Hart (1986) also question the definition of integration " .. (F)or 
example, is a firm that calls its retail force employees more integrated than one that calls 
its retail force independent but exclusive sales agents?" They define integration in terms 
of ownership of assets. Ownership is an important issue, as Hart (1989) points out: 
"Ownership of assets goes together with the possession of residual right of control over 
assets; the owner has the right to use the asset in any way that is not inconsistent with 
prior contract, customs, or law." 
The ownership of residual control rights is important since, in general, contracts 
cannot specify all contingencies. When some contingencies are left out, the contract is 
incomplete. A contract will therefore typically assign property rights to one of the firms 
which then determines who can act and what sort of actions can be taken under these 
contingencies. 
The paper by Grossman and Hart (1986) models the incentives of the 
owners/managers of firms and shows conditions under which ownership of one firm by 
the other is optimal. This paper uses incomplete contracts (or "neo-classical contracts," 
as described above) in which not all eventualities can be explicitly stated in advance. We 
discuss the paper in detail because it, along with Hart and Moore (1990), forms the basis 
on which we build several of the hypothesis that are to be tested. 
There are two firms involved in a joint production that lasts for two periods. At 
date zero, the ex-ante period, the firms (1 and 2) sign a contract and they immediately 
make product specific investments a, and a2 respectively. At date 1, the ex-post period, 
some further actions qx and q2 are undertaken and gains from trade are realized. The 
initial contract at period zero assigns property rights to one of the firms to choose actions 
qx and q2. It is assumed that ql, q2 and ax,a2, and hence the payoffs, are not 
contractible ex-ante, but qx and q2 are ex-post contractible. That is to say that the firms 
cannot credibly pre-commit to choices <y,, q2, ax or a2, but once the state of the world is 
discovered in period 1, the parties can then costlessly negotiate over the values qx and 
q2. The managers of the firms are also assumed to receive the full return. 
The benefits earned by the managers net of investment costs are denoted 
B. [a i, $ (qx,q2 )] for the managers of firm i = 1,2. It is assumed that Bt is increasing in 
<ff i . An optimal business decision would maximize the joint benefits of the managers 
max S1 [a,. & (9,.9: )] + [«2 > A fa,.02 )]• 
The first best values for q x ,  q2 ,  a x  and a2 , the values that maximize 5, + 5,, are 
denoted by ax,a\,q\ and q\. The paper shows that the first best solution is possible if 
q x  and q2  are ex-ante contractible,  even if  a , ,  a2  are not.  By assumption,  however,  q {  
and q2 are not ex-ante contractible hence we would expect inefficiency. 
There are three possible types of organizational forms that are considered (i ) non-
integration, (ii) firm 1 control, and (iii) firm 2 control. If the firms are not integrated then 
the initial period zero contract will assign the rights to choose qx and q2 to firm 1 and 
firm 2 respectively. If the firms are integrated with firm 1 control, then the contract will 
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specify that firm 1, at date 1, will choose both q x  and q2 .  Integration with firm 2 control 
results in the choice of qx and q2 being left to the discretion of the manager of firm 2. 
The paper proposes the following conditions for non-integration to have the 
highest possible sum of benefits among the three forms of organization: 
&(9,,9:) = a(9,) + f,A(9:) and MMi) -a(q2)  + e2 f i2(q x)  
where s x ,s2  are "small." In this case, firms will choose approximately the optimal q\ 
and q\, since the benefit from choosing q\ accrues mainly to firm 1 while the benefit 
from choosing q\ accrues mainly to firm 2. 
Alternatively consider the case in which <j>2 hardly depends on <?, and q2 : 
<t>ii<l\ ,qi)  = <*2+£zô2(q x ,q2)  
where e2  is "small." In this case, firm 1 control yields the approximate best result. 
Similarly if <f>x hardly depends on qx and q2 then we have that: 
A(9i,9:)  = *,  +e xS x(q x ,q2)  
where sx is "small." In this case, firm 2 control yields approximately the best result. 
The above results follow since in each case all benefits of efficient choices accrue 
to the firm making the choice. The paper then shows that if marginal and total benefit of 
investment move together, then under firm 1 control, firm 1 will over-invest and firm 2 
will under-invest relative to the first best choice of investments: ax and a'2. Similarly, 
under firm 2 control, firm 2 will over-invest relative to the first best and firm 1 will 
under-invest. This happens since, under firm 1 control, firm 1 will have vast ex-post 
power and hence will over invest to receive added benefit in date I renegotiations. Firm 
2 conversely will have low total and hence marginal benefit so it's investment will be 
low. Under non-integration the results are dependent on the relation between the first 
best choice of qt's and the non-integrated choice of <7, 's . 
To summarize the conclusions of the paper: Firm 1 (2) control is desirable when 
firm 1 (2's) investment is more important than firm 2 (1 's) and the over investment by 
firm 1 (2) is less severe than the under investment by firm 1 (2) in any other form of 
integration. Non-integration is desirable when the investment's of both firms are 
approximately equally important. 
Hart and Moore (1990) build on the previous paper. They extend the arguments 
of the previous model to a multi-asset and multi-individual economy to analyze the effect 
of joint ownership. While the Grossman and Hart (1986) paper dealt solely with the 
incentives of the top management, Hart and Moore remove that restriction and allow 
multiple people to combine their labor with the services of a particular productive asset. 
Some of the workers, who are in effect employers, will have ownership rights while 
others, the employees, will not. The definition of ownership in this paper includes the 
right to exclude others from the use of an asset. Thus controlling a physical asset will 
lead to control over human assets. This happens because the workers who need the asset 
to be productive may be excluded from it if the owners decide to selectively fire workers. 
Therefore, if we view the firm as a collection of assets, the owner/owners of the firm will 
have more control over the workers than if they have an arms-length contract with 
another owner of an asset (firm). 
Some key points of this model can be illustrated by a simple example. There is 
one asset, a luxury yacht along with two workers and one tycoon. Worker 1 is a chef; 
worker 2 is a skipper. They combine to provide a service, a dinner cruise (on the yacht) 
to agent 3 (a consumer) who is a business tycoon. The value of this dinner cruise is 240 
to the tycoon and there are no other tycoons in the vicinity. There is, however, a spot 
market for skippers; that is, the skipper can be costlessly replaced. At period 0, the chef 
has to take an asset specific action (learning how to cook on a yacht) at an un-reimbursed 
cost of 100, gains from which are realized in period 1. This skill is non-transferable 
(there is no other yacht nearby), and it is assumed that no long-term contract can be 
written in period 0. In period 1, the agents bargain over the benefits; the bargaining 
solution is a symmetric bargaining solution in which the agents involved equally split the 
benefits from their investments. This means that agent X who has made an investment in 
period 0, will share his contribution to the total benefit in period 1 with agents who were 
required for this benefit to be realized. Required agents can be thought of as agents 
without whose help the return to agent X's investment would be zero. The model rules 
out profit sharing agreements, or any other agreements that share period 0 investment 
cost or period 1 revenue. 
The ownership of the yacht will determine whether the chef will undertake the 
asset specific action (investment), or not. If the skipper owns the yacht the chef will not 
undertake the investment. Looking ahead, the chef knows that at period 1 the gains are 
split equally (as a symmetric bargaining solution would predict). The return on his 
investment, equal to y(240) = 80, is less than his investment of 100.9 In contrast, if the 
tycoon or the chef owns the yacht then the chef will invest since now the gains are going 
9 The chef has to bargain with the tycoon and the skipper; the tycoon since he is indispensable and the 
skipper since he owns the asset 
to be split only two ways (because the skipper will not have to be a part of the bargain) 
and the chefs investment cost will be covered; that is ? (240) =120 > 100 (investment 
cost). 
Now assume that the skipper also has to undertake an action in period 0, at an un­
reimbursed cost of 100, which will increase the tycoon's valuation of the cruise by 240 in 
period 1 (so now the total valuation is 240+240= 480). If both the skipper and the chef 
have to take actions, specific to the tycoon, then it is better that the tycoon owns the asset. 
Since the skipper (chef) will have to bargain with only one other person, the tycoon. Let 
the skipper own the asset (the argument is analogous in the case in which the chef owns 
the yacht). To realize any benefit from his period 0 investment, the chef will have to 
reach an agreement with the skipper in period 1, since he owns the yacht, and the tycoon, 
since he is the only consumer. The chef, in period 0, expects his period 1 return under a 
symmetric bargaining solution to be y (240) = 80, less than his investment cost of 100, so 
he does not invest. If on the other hand the tycoon owned the asset, then the chef 
(skipper) will have to bargain with the tycoon only, equally sharing profits and getting a 
return of j- (240) =120 which is greater than his investment cost of 100. With the tycoon 
owning the yacht, both the chef and the skipper will invest, and total benefits will be 480. 
Thus it may be efficient to give ownership of the asset to the agent who is indispensable 
even though he makes no investment decision. 
Another conclusion that can be derived from the example is that assets that are 
highly complementary should be owned together. Assume now that there are other 
consumers who can use the yacht and that the tycoon must also undertake an investment. 
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Let the benefit from each agent's action be 240 and the cost to each agent be c, (thus the 
maximum benefit to the tycoon is 720). Now suppose the yacht consists of 2 parts: the 
hull and the galley. Then the optimal ownership structure is for a single agent to own 
both parts of the yacht. To see this, first assume that the chef and the skipper owned one 
part each. The skipper's and the chefs investments each increase total benefit by 240, 
but they need an asset (jointly owned yacht) to work on, thus the chef has to reach an 
understanding with the skipper and vice versa to get any benefit from their investment. 
Looking forward, they know that once they reach an agreement with each other the 
returns from their investment would be split equally. Thus they would invest if y (240) > 
c, for the chef and y (240) > c2 for the skipper. In this case the tycoon is no longer 
indispensable, he has to come to an agreement with both the chef and the skipper to enjoy 
the cruise, hence he would invest if y (240) > c3, since the tycoon's investment also 
increases total benefit by 240. If on the other hand the chef owned both the hull and the 
galley then he has to reach an agreement with neither the tycoon (there are other 
consumer/tycoons around) nor the skipper. Hence he would invest if 240 > c,. The 
skipper's incentive is unaffected since he still will have to reach an agreement with the 
chef to use his (the chefs) asset. The tycoon will now have to reach an agreement with 
only the chef so he would invest if y (240) > c3. Thus giving both pieces of the asset to 
one individual leads to greater efficiency and fewer hold up problems. 
In the context of a general model of asset ownership and investment the paper 
shows that integration with firm 1 controlling firm 2's assets will increase efficiency 
under any of the following conditions 
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(a) the assets are strongly complementary, 
(b) 1 is an important trading partner for 2, 
(c) firm 2 is dispensable, 
(d) firm 1 has important investments. 
On the other hand, it will decrease efficiency if 
(a) the assets are economically independent, 
(b) firm 2 is an important trading partner, 
(c) firm l's investment is not important, 
(d) firm 2 has important investments. 
2.7. Informational Asymmetry 
The final paper reviewed here is by Horstman and Markusen (1996). This paper 
is not based on incomplete contracts but based on informational asymmetry. The paper 
deals with the choices that MNCs make while planning their foreign operations. 
Horstman and Markusen (1996) ask the question why does the MNC make a large 
investment in a sales operation in a foreign country instead of contracting sales to a local 
entrepreneur? As discussed above, firms choose internal organization to avoid agency 
costs that will plague any arms-length transactions. The agency costs could be a local 
partner's learning from the MNC and then becoming a competitor, as in Ethier and 
Markusen (1991). Or it could be that the local licensee might not be as conscientious 
about maintaining the brand reputation as the MNC, as in Horstman and Markusen 
(1987). 
Horstman and Markusen (1996) assume the existence of informational asymmetry 
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between the agent and the MNC. If the agent has more information than the MNC, the 
agent has the ability to appropriate some of the rent of the MNC. In this paper the agent 
is able to appropriate some of the returns since the agent has better knowledge about the 
size of the market. 
The paper considers the situation of a MNC entering a new market. Since the 
market is new, the MNC is unsure of the revenue it is going to get. It has a choice of 
setting up its own sales operation or using a local agent to sell its product. The local 
agent knows the market size but the MNC does not. The MNC knows the distribution of 
the size of the market;  that  is ,  i t  knows that  the market will  be "big" with probabil i ty p 
and "small" with probability (1 - p). The actual number of consumers for the MNC's 
product is assumed to be a fraction of the total market. The constant of proportionality 
depends on the effectiveness of the sales force of either the local agent or the MNC. 
Thus the model implies that there is a tradeoff associated with the MNC's decision to 
have the local firm sell its product or to have a wholly-owned subsidiary. The local sales 
agent has better information and lower setup cost than the MNC, which favors a tie-up 
with the local firm. On the other hand, the local agent may not truthfully reveal the size 
of the market, or the sales force of the local agent may be less efficient in procuring 
customers than the MNC, which favors a wholly-owned operation. The tradeoff is 
analyzed under two frameworks: a one period and a multi-period choice model. 
In the one period case, if the MNC does not know the market size, then the local 
firm may be less than truthful about the market size. This agency cost has to be weighed 
by the MNC against its own setup costs before it makes a decision on entry. The MNC 
also has to weigh the sales efficiency of the local agent, vis-à-vis its own sales force. 
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Thus if the MNC's sales force is more efficient than the local agent, the MNC might be 
more likely to invest in an owned operation, other things being constant. 
The authors show that in the multi-period model the MNC could choose owned 
operations when the expected market size is large and the variability in the profit is low. 
It could also temporarily enter into a sales tie-up if entry costs are high and the market 
size is unknown and there is a high probability that it could be small. This sales tie-up 
will be permanent if it is found out that the market is actually small and temporary if the 
market size turns out to be big, in which case it will set up its own operation. 
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CHAPTER 3: SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
3.1. Introduction 
Most of the empirical research related to MNCs has focused on their foreign 
investment decisions: 
" Empirical research on multinationals has focused mainly on flows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). By and large, this literature does not address the relationship between 
exporting and producing abroad as alternative modes of market penetration" (Brainard, 
1997, pg. 520). 
Two other aspects of MNC behavior; namely, intra-firm trade (IFT), and the choice of 
mode of entry, or organizational form, for foreign affiliates; comes a distant second and 
third respectively. (See Caves (1997) for a survey.) These decisions may be entwined 
and equally important for the MNC. Thus the popularity of one over the other, as a 
research topic, is not apriori justified. The most neglected area however, is the choice of 
affiliate organizational form and how this aspect impacts production in the U.S. and 
abroad. 
The following sections look at some of the empirical literature on MNCs. The 
papers can be broadly classified into the following three categories, (i) production and 
trade, discussed in section 2; (ii) organizational form of U.S. MNCs' foreign affiliates, in 
section 3; and (iii) intra-firm trade, presented in section 4. The firm's choice between 
exporting from the U.S. versus locating plants abroad is discussed in Brainard (1997). 
Grubert and Mutti (1991) analyze the impact of taxes on various aspects of MNC 
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behavior, namely production, trade, and FDI. Choices of affiliates' organizational form 
by U.S. MNCs are investigated in two excellent papers. The first is by Benjamin Gomes-
Casseras (1989), which investigates the factors causing a firm to choose between a joint 
venture and a majority owned foreign affiliate as an optimal ownership structure. The 
second by Gatignon and Anderson (1988), categorizes ownership on the basis of U.S. 
MNCs' equity holdings into four categories, ranging from minority ownership to 100% 
(equity) owned subsidiary, then, using multinomial logit, it investigates the degree of 
integration adopted by U.S. MNCs. Intra-firm trade is discussed in the following papers: 
Kimberley Claussing uses Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data and Anita 
Benvignati (1990) uses confidential data from the Federal Trade Commission to look at 
intra-firm exports. Lall (1979) investigates how industry characteristics affect intra-firm 
exports while Balassa (1986) analyzes country impacts on intra-industry trade. 
3.2. Produce in the U.S. or Abroad? 
Brainard's (1997) paper empirically tests the proximity-concentration tradeoff. 
The question is to what extent a firm would like to concentrate production in a plant to 
achieve plant scale economies at the expense of closeness to consumers? The paper uses 
MNC data to examine the percentage of foreign sales that can be accounted for by 
affiliate sales versus exports from the U.S. The data set used is very comprehensive and 
includes 27 countries and 63 manufacturing and primary industries.10 
10 The paper analyses both the U.S. sales share of the U.S. affiliates of foreign owned MNCs, and the 
foreign sales share of foreign affiliates of U.S. owned MNCs. For the foreign sales share, only the majority 
owned foreign affiliates are used in the analysis. 
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U.S. MNCs in industry j can satisfy the demand for their products by foreign 
country i through either of two means: (1) exports to country i of some of industry j's 
U.S. production or (2) production and sales by industry j's foreign affiliates in country i. 
Brainard's paper investigates the factors that influence the shares of total sales, by 
industry j to country i, attributable to each of these sources. The paper develops new 
methods to measure several key explanatory variables. Plant scale economies are 
measured by the number of production workers in the industry's median plant ranked by 
value added. The data for transport cost, which is a major driving force behind the 
MNC's decision to locate plants overseas, is derived from the freight and insurance 
charges reported by importers to the U.S. Bureau of Census. According to Brainard, this 
series is a significant improvement over those that were used in previous papers. The 
following list of Brainards' explanatory variables gives the hypothesis connecting each to 
the dependent variable and, where appropriate, comments briefly on data sources. 
FREIGHT: This variable is the log of the freight cost for transporting product j to 
country i from the U.S. This series is taken from the data reported to the Bureau of 
Census by importers. It is assumed that the higher the freight charge the greater will be 
the share of sales attributable to affiliates and the lower will be the export share. 
TARIFF: The tariff value used here is the log of the ad valorem tariff imposed by 
country i on good j. These data were obtained from the 1988/89 database of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The tariff data were at the 10-digit harmonized trade 
classification level and were converted to the appropriate SIC industry category by using 
a concordance provided by the Bureau of Census. It is hypothesized that an increase in 
the tariff will result in an increase in affiliates sales share and therefore a decline in the 
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export share. 
TAX: The tax rate is measured as the log of the absolute effective tax rate of a 
country. The data were taken from a Price Waterhouse publication. It is assumed that an 
increase in tax rate will result in a decline in the affiliate share and a corresponding 
increase in the export share. This is because the U.S. MNC's affiliate's profit is going to 
be taxed at the higher rate while the export is going to be taxed at the relatively lower 
U.S. rate. Thus it might be optimal for the U.S. parent to export from the U.S. 
PWGDP: This variable is the log of the absolute value of the difference between 
per worker GDP in the U.S. and per worker GDP in country i. This variable is designed 
to capture the difference in factor proportions between countries; that is, the difference in 
the capital/labor ratios. Most of affiliate sales are in capital intensive industries. Thus 
the MNC will concentrate production in the U.S. if capital is less abundant in country i, 
hence it is conjectured that there will be a negative relation between the per-worker 
income differential and affiliate sales. 
TRADE and FDI: Indices of the openness to trade and foreign direct investment 
were taken from survey data from the World Competitiveness Report (1992). The survey 
ranks countries according to their openness to trade and FDI. In the survey data, Brazil is 
the least open to trade followed by Japan, Switzerland, and South Korea. With regard to 
the openness to foreign direct investment (FDI), Japan and South Korea are the least open 
while Hong Kong, Ireland, and the United Kingdom were the most open. The openness 
to trade is supposed to be positively correlated to the export share and openness to FDI 
will be positively correlated with the share of affiliate sales. 
PSCALE: This variable is defined as the log of the index of plant scale economies 
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for industry j. The plant scale economy index is defined as the number of production 
employees in the industry's median U.S. plant ranked by value added. The higher the 
scale economy index, the greater will be the export share. 
CSC ALE: This variable is defined as the log of the corporate scale economy index, 
where the corporate scale economy index is measured as the number of non-production 
workers in an average U.S. firm in industry j. Corporate scale economies are supposed to 
measure the internalization advantage. It is hypothesized that it will have a positive 
coefficient in the regression with affiliate sales share as the dependent variable. 
There are four dummy variables that are used. 
LANG: The dummy LANG takes a value of one if the country's major language is 
English and 0 otherwise. LANG was used to capture similarities in culture: Dissimilar 
cultures might make it difficult for U.S. firms to operate an affiliate and hence encourage 
exports. 
COUP: The second dummy, COUP, equaled 1 if the country had a coup in the 
previous decade and zero otherwise. Political risk, which is supposed to discourage 
foreign investment, is proxied by COUP. 
ADJ: The dummy variable ADJ equaled 1 if the country is adjacent to the U.S. 
(Canada and Mexico) and 0 otherwise. ADJ is used to capture the saving in freight costs 
to adjacent countries not already captured by the FREIGHT variable. 
EC: The fourth dummy was used to signify membership in the European Union: It 
equaled 1 if the country was a member and 0 otherwise. The European Union has 
preferential laws for goods produced in member countries hence it is surmised that this 
would discourage exports from the U.S. and correspondingly encourage production in 
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member countries. 
The estimation results support the hypotheses associated with FREIGHT, 
TARIFF, openness to TRADE and FDI, PSCALE, CSCALE and the four dummy 
variables. The only variable for which the sign was not as expected was TAX. 
Brainard (1997) then uses the same set of independent variables to estimate a 
model explaining the sales share of U.S. based affiliates of foreign MNCs. That is not 
important for the purpose of this dissertation and hence the results are not reported here. 
She then uses two stage least squares to analyze the exports of U.S. MNCs in level, rather 
than share, form. There is no significant difference between these results and the results 
obtained for the share equation and hence the results are not reported here. 
The second paper that looks at the production strategy of U.S. MNCs is by 
Grubert and Mutti (1991). This paper 11 mainly focuses on the impact of taxation on 
MNC strategy: It looks at three different avenues through which tax can affect MNCs' 
decisions. First, the paper investigates whether MNCs take advantage of differential tax 
rates by shifting profits to a lower tax jurisdiction. Second, the paper endeavors to 
determine whether the tax policy of the host country affects the investment and 
production patterns of U.S. MNCs. Finally, the paper looks at how U.S. exports and 
imports are affected by foreign governments' tax policies. 
MNCs can theoretically increase their after tax profits by shifting incomes to their 
affiliates in low tax countries. There are two strategies that the MNC can use to shift 
income: (i) debt financing of their plants and equipment (since interest payments on 
11 All variables used in this paper are country specific. No industry specific variables are used in the 
analysis. 
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loans are tax deductible) instead of internal financing (with retained earnings) and (ii) 
manipulation of transfer prices. 
The first part of the paper investigates whether there is a negative relation 
between host country tax rates and profits reported by affiliates located there. Two 
measures of profitability are used as dependent variables (with similar results): (i) the 
ratio of book income to sales and (ii) the ratio of book income to equity. Two different 
measures of tax rate are used: the statutory tax rate and the effective tax rate. The 
statutory tax rate is the published tax rate of country i, and the effective tax rate is the 
statutory rate adjusted by investment tax credits and other tax credits that the MNC might 
have received. To control for the possibility that some countries may be more profitable 
than others, GDP growth rate is used as a proxy on the assumption that a faster growing 
country implies more profitable operations. The results indicate that the tax rate has 
significant explanatory power.12 As an example, assuming the host country GDP growth 
is at its sample average level of 3.94%, the results predict a firm would report profits of 
5.6%, at a tax rate of 40%, compared to 12.6%, for a tax rate of 20%. 
In the second part of the paper, Grubert and Mutti (1991) analyze how taxes affect 
the allocation of capital. They base their model on economic theory, which suggests that 
firms will allocate capital globally to equalize risk-adjusted marginal after-tax return. 
This ability to shift income out of a country might influence the MNC to establish an 
affiliate in a low tax jurisdiction. Trade barriers are also assumed to encourage foreign 
investments since they might be the only way to penetrate the market. The average tariff 
12 The regression using the statutory tax rate had a higher R-square. 
rates on manufacturers were used as a measure of the tariff barrier.13 Other independent 
variables used in the regression are GDP and the GDP growth rate. The authors reasoned 
that a large GDP means a large market making the MNC more interested in setting up an 
affiliate in the country. The dependent variable used is the net stock of plant and capital 
of U.S. affiliates in country i. The results of the estimation bear out the theoretical 
hypothesis. The results indicate that a reduction in the host country tax rate from 20% to 
10% increases U.S. affiliates' net plant and equipment by 65%. 
The third effect of taxation examined by the paper is the extent to which taxes 
abroad displace U.S. exports. To take advantage of lower foreign taxes, U.S. MNCs may 
locate production facilities abroad instead of exporting from the U.S. This could result in 
the U.S. economy losing output and employment especially if the plants created abroad 
are used to service U.S. markets. However, in the event that affiliate production abroad 
creates a demand for U.S. made intermediate goods, then U.S. output and employment 
may rise. So there is no clear-cut relation between U.S. trade and foreign direct 
investment, though there is some evidence that there may be a complementarity between 
U.S. exports and U.S. foreign direct investment Lipsey and Weiss (1984). 
Using taxes, tariffs, and GDP per capita as independent variables, the paper runs 
two regressions. In the first regression, total exports to MOFAs was used as the 
dependent variable; in the second regression total U.S. exports was used. For the first 
equation, the tax variable is highly significant indicating that a disproportionate amount 
of trade is carried out with affiliates in low tax countries. In the second regression, the 
tax variable coefficients are smaller but significant. The paper also finds that there is 
Ij The authors tried some measures of non-tariff barriers too, but they did not have much success. 
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some support for the complementarity hypothesis and that affiliates in low tax countries 
export more than those in high tax countries. 
3.3. Mode of Foreign Entry Preferred bv U.S. MNCs 
The main purpose of the paper by Benjamin Gomes-Casseres (1984) is to shed light 
on why a MNC might prefer to form an equity joint venture in one case and a MOFA in 
another. Gomes-Casseres (G-C) cites three reasons for the choice of any particular form 
of organization: (1) motivation for cooperation or the need for resources, (2) transaction 
cost of cooperating through contractual means, and (3) organizational costs of equity 
joint venture. 
The organizational form preferred by the MNC would depend on whether the 
MNC has all the required capability to "go it alone" (form a MOFA). If the MNC lacks 
some of the capability, and a chosen local firm can provide the requisite knowledge, then 
there are benefits to cooperation and the MNC might choose a joint venture. If a joint 
venture is the chosen organizational form, then both the MNC and the local partner will 
be required to transfer some of the capability to this joint venture.14 There are costs in 
sharing control; the two main costs of sharing control being shirking and management 
conflicts. Shirking arises because the incentives of either firm to contribute to a joint 
venture decrease due to joint sharing of control. Managerial conflicts may arise due to 
conflict of interest among partners. This conflict of interest arises especially when 
partners' perceptions of cost and benefit differ. Thus when the cost of managerial 
14 If a MNC X, and a local finn Y, form a joint venture Z, then they transfer the know-how to the joint 
venture firm Z. The equity of the firm Z is held by the MNC and the local firm. 
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conflicts and the cost of shirking outweigh the costs of cooperation, the MNC forms a 
MOFA. G-C's explanatory variables reflect the MNC's business capabilities and the 
costs of transferring them. 
G-C identifies five types of capability. The first is geographic experience: local 
firms are likely to have more experience with domestic (local) customs than the MNC. In 
the case of the MNC, it will most likely be more familiar with some countries than with 
others, thus preferring joint ventures in some while not in others. The second factor is 
industry experience. Here the MNC is likely to have a very big edge over the local firm. 
It has also been argued that MNCs, due to their worldwide experience may even be able 
to overcome their geographical inexperience. The third point concerns privileged access 
to inputs. Here the local firms may be in a better position, since governments are more 
likely to give local firms the control to mining rights of natural resources. This factor 
may be mitigated, however, by the MNC's control of the export market of intermediate 
and final goods. The fourth factor is marketing skill: Marketing skills are considered to 
be one of the most important competitive advantages for U.S. MNCs. At times they (the 
MNCs) are able to use mass advertising to their benefit overcoming some of their other 
perceived disadvantages. The fifth capability, technological know-how, gives MNCs an 
industry specific advantage. These differing capabilities of the MNC and local firms 
form the basis of the analysis in this paper. 
Using a database from the Harvard University Multinational Enterprise Project, 
the paper applies the binomial logit model of the dicotomous choice, MOFA vs. joint 
venture, to test the theoretical predictions. Using proxy variables to measure the costs 
discussed above, G-C finds support for transactions cost theory. The variables used in 
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the estimation process are discussed below. 
The dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the MNC controled equity of more 
than 95% in the foreign affiliate in 1975. The following independent variables are used 
by G-C to test the above mentioned theories. 
Restrictive host government: This is a dummy variable, equal to I if the subsidiary 
is in a country where the government restricted foreign ownership. It is hypothesized that 
restrictive foreign governments are likely to encourage joint ventures. 
To capture the effect of industry and geographic experience the following 
variables are used. 
Industry experience: The number of subsidiaries in the U.S. parent's principal 
industry measures the industry experience of an MNC (by 3 digit SIC code). A greater 
number of subsidiaries in the MNC's line of business translates into more experience in 
managing them and, with greater experience, the MNC is hypothesized to prefer MOFA 
to joint venture. The results of the estimation were in line with this hypothesis. 
A dummy variable was defined to equal 1 if the subsidiary and the MNC were in 
different lines of business, and 0 otherwise. If a subsidiary's product was not the 
principal business of the MNC then it is conjectured that the MNC would require the help 
of a joint venture partner to overcome its perceived handicap. This variable did not have 
significant explanatory power. 
The paper used the following variable to proxy for geographic experience: 
Familiarity with Host: An index was created to categorize the familiarity of a MNC with 
a host country. The index was based on how often the MNC entered a particular country 
between 1900-1976. Theory would predict, based on the discussion above, that the less 
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familiar a country is to the MNC, the more likely it is to form joint ventures. The 
estimation results showed that the effect of familiarity with a country is the most 
important predictor of joint venture formation. 
As we discussed above, a MNC might form joint ventures to gain access to the 
knowledge of the local firm. The industrial GNP of the host country is used as a proxy 
measure for the industry experience of the local firm. This variable had a significantly 
positive impact on the probability of forming a joint venture. 
Two variables were used to measure the effect of access to markets and inputs: 
A dummy variable was used to identify industries in the resource-based sector. Since it 
is assumed that local industry will have better access to agricultural and mineral 
resources, it is hypothesized that businesses in these sectors would prefer joint ventures. 
The results of the estimation support this hypothesis. A second variable was used to 
proxy the MNC's marketing requirements: intra-firm sales. It is hypothesized that high 
intra-firm sales by an MNC are symptomatic of the firm's need to assure itself of an 
uninterrupted supply of a crucial (or "idiosyncratic," as in Williamson (1979)) input. To 
avoid hazards with suppliers or joint venture partners, the MNC might prefer to have a 
MOFA.15 The results of the estimation bear this out. 
The final set of variables reflects the MNC's marketing and technology skills. If 
the MNC has superior marketing skills and the product is R&D intensive then it can be 
expected that the MNC will prefer a MOFA as it will not want to transfer its technical 
know-how to a joint venture. The marketing intensity was calculated as the ratio of 
15 See chapter 2 of this dissertation or Williamson (1979) for a discussion on the reasons for internalizing 
recurrent transactions, especially of the idiosyncratic (as defined by Williamson (1979)) type. 
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marketing expenditure to revenue. Research intensity was measured as the ratio of 
research expenditure to revenue. The estimated coefficient of market intensity was as 
predicted but the R&D intensity did not have significant explanatory power, contradicting 
theory and the above hypothesis. G-C then incorporate separate measures of R&D 
intensity for subsidiaries outside the core business of the MNC and for subsidiaries in the 
core industry of the MNC. The results showed that, when the subsidiary was outside the 
core business of the MNC, R&D intensity encouraged joint ventures, but if it was inside 
the core business, then R&D intensity discouraged joint ventures. This result is very 
interesting since, as discussed before, MNCs form joint ventures when they need to tap 
into the knowledge base of the local firm. When the MNC is functioning outside its core 
competency/business it needs skills and knowledge developed by others. Thus the MNC 
will form a joint venture when R&D of the local firm is a substitute for the MNC's R&D. 
When the MNC is in its own core business then it prefers to form a MOFA since it does 
not require the technical know-how of the local firm. 
The transaction cost literature suggests factors which should affect the optimal 
governance structure. The paper by Gatignon and Anderson (1988) is concerned with the 
degree of integration, or the governance structure, preferred by the U.S. MNC based on 
the transactions cost literature. The paper starts by classifying the continuum of equity 
holdings into the following four types of governance structure. 
(a) Wholly or 100% owned subsidiary. 
(b) MNC holds a dominant share of the equity (the MNC equity holding is greater 
than the largest partner). 
(c) Balanced partnership (the MNC holds equity roughly equal to that of the 
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largest partner). 
(d) MNC is a minority shareholder (the MNC holds less equity than the largest 
partner). 
It should be noted that the implications of transactions cost theory for governance 
structure do not specifically apply to firms in the international context; they apply to all 
firms. One important difference is that, in the international context, there are more 
complications than in a domestic setting: host country cultural differences, and 
government regulations and restrictions, just to name a few. The paper tests the 
following eight hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory applied to an 
international context. 
Hypothesis 1 : A proprietary, or specialized, nature of product and process will 
increase the degree of integration preferred by the MNC. There are three reasons why a 
firm might prefer a unified governance structure when proprietary products, knowledge, 
or processes are involved. First, when a firm possesses proprietary knowledge, using 
contracts might result in the firm getting less than full benefit from the knowledge. This 
happens because there is no market for specialized goods hence the determination of the 
price is difficult. If the proprietary knowledge is revealed to others (for valuation) and if 
it is easy to copy, it may become valueless to the MNC. The second reason is that 
proprietary knowledge may be difficult to transmit without unified governance because 
of communication problems. Thirdly, because of its transaction specific nature, 
proprietary knowledge, if shared, might result in an increased bilateral dependency and 
hence raise the possibility of the holdup problem. Thus, it is hypothesized that an 
increase in proprietary knowledge will result in a more unified or integrated governance 
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structure. The measure of the proprietary content of the firm's activity is the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to sales. 
Hypothesis 2: Transaction specific assets tie parties together in a bilateral 
relationship. In this situation, if contracts are incomplete, constant changes in external 
conditions and adaptations to these changes lead to deterioration in the working 
relationship. The problem will be exacerbated if the adaptations result in unverifiable 
increases in cost. If there is disagreement about the actual increase, then trade may not 
even be consummated. Thus it is hypothesized that the presence of transaction specific 
assets, accompanied by external uncertainty, will promote an integrated form. 
Transaction specificity is assumed to increase with R&D content and hence is measured 
in the same way as proprietary content. To measure uncertainty, countries were 
separated into three groups: low, high, and moderate risk countries. Gatignon and 
Anderson base the classification system on a study by Goodnow and Hanz (1972). A set 
of two dummy variables was created: If a country was considered a high-risk country, 
the first dummy variable took a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. The second dummy variable 
took a value of 1 if the country was in the moderate risk category, and 0 otherwise. The 
two proxy variables used to measure both asset specificity and external uncertainty are 
thus the product of the R&D intensity with each of the two country risk dummies. In the 
estimation these variables were not significant. 
Hypothesis 3. Country risk will decrease the degree of control. The paper 
hypothesizes that if the MNC fears that its investment might be appropriated by the 
national government then it might take on a partner to spread the risk. Again, country 
risk is captured by the same dummy variables discussed above. The hypothesis is that a 
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higher control mode will be less likely in the presence of country risk. 
Hypothesis 4. Advertising intensity increases the degree of control. If a firm 
invests money to create brand name loyalty, then the firm would prefer to have a high 
degree of control to protect the value of the brand name from degradation. It is assumed 
that the affiliate firm has less to lose from degrading the value of the brand name than the 
MNC, thus a high degree of control might be more efficient. 
Hypothesis 5. Company experience increases the degree of control. Firms might be 
inexperienced in dealing with unaffiliated supplier incentives. Therefore complete 
control might be desirable when there are only imperfect measures of the upstream 
supplier's performance. Dealing in a foreign setting will magnify these imperfections. 
Firms inexperienced in dealing in an international setting might use an integrated 
structure. The number of foreign entries made by the MNC measures company 
experience. It is hypothesized that company experience will have a positive impact on 
integration. 
Hypothesis 6. Socio-cultural distance decreases the degree of control. It has been 
argued that differences in cultures between the host country, where the affiliate is located, 
and the home country, where the MNC is based, lower the incentive to use an integrated 
structure. This is because executives of the MNC may not be comfortable in a foreign 
culture. Other problems, attributed to socio-cultural distance are high information needs 
and the difficulty in transferring home management. Proxy dummy variables developed 
in a paper by Ronen and Shenker (1985) are used to measure the socio-cultural distance. 
Ronen and Shenker (1985), conducted a study on work-related attitudes of the citizens of 
various countries. On the basis of factors such as attitudes towards success, sharing of 
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information etc., they classify countries into nine categories. The present paper 
(Gatignon and Anderson) uses the same classification but reduces the number of 
categories to four. The hypothesis, stemming from the discussion above, is that the 
greater the socio-cultural distance, the more likely is the MNC to choose a low level of 
control. 
Hypothesis 7: Increased size of a foreign operation will decrease the degree of 
integration. The larger the size of the operation abroad, the greater is the risk undertaken 
by the MNC. Thus it has been argued that the larger is the operation, the greater is the 
probability of utilizing a joint venture partner. The number of employees in a firm is 
used as a measure of firm size. 
Hypothesis 8: Legal restrictions will decrease the degree of integration. Legal 
restrictions imposed by a country might constrain the behavior of a firm. Some countries 
might have laws which prevent a foreign firm from establishing a wholly-owned 
subsidiary. The paper uses a dummy variable identifying six countries which have laws 
preventing majority control of firms by foreigners. 
The results indicate that the transactions cost explanation discussed above is 
relevant for ownership and can successfully explain why an MNC prefers 100% control 
to being a minority shareholder. The transaction cost explanation, however, does not 
satisfactorily explain the other choices of integration (dominant shareholding or nearly 
equal ownership), in the sense that most of the explanatory variables were not statistically 
significant explainers of those choices. 
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3.4. Intra-Firm Export and Intra-Industrv Trade 
In the paper by Lall (1979), the author attempts to explain inter-industry differences 
in the pattern of intra-firm exports (exports from parent MNCs to affiliates abroad) for 
US manufacturers. According to Lall, there is little theory that specifically deals with 
this problem. He argues that the international trade literature does not distinguish 
between inter-firm and intra-firm trade, and that the literature of vertical integration 
comes closest to explaining intra-firm trade. 
The phenomenon this paper is trying to explain is the variation in U.S. intra-firm 
exports by industry. The variation across industries is substantial: In industries like 
soaps, plastics, chemicals, and scientific instruments, intra-firm exports account for over 
half of total exports by MNCs. For other industries like beverages, industrial chemicals, 
and wood products, intra-firm exports account for less than 20%. 
This paper uses the data set made available by the U.S. Tariff Commission 
(1973).16 Using a sample of industries, it estimates a model with dependent variable: 
IFX = intra-firm exports as a percentage of total exports by all MNCs in the industry. 
Using a sample of U.S. MNCs' majority owned foreign affiliates, it estimates a model 
with dependent variable: 
IFP = intra-firm exports as a percentage of production of the MOFA receiving the 
exports. 
The paper tests the following hypotheses about intra-firm exports: 
Hypothesis 1 : There is a positive relationship among marketing requirements and 
16 The data sources for this paper are described in appendix 2 of Lall (1979). 
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the establishment of affiliates and, hence, intra-firm exports to serve the needs of these 
affiliates. The MNC might rely on an affiliate if after-sales service is extremely 
profitable. It could also be that there is need for assimilating and communicating 
information with clients, thus a direct presence of the MNC, in the form of an affiliate, is 
required. Maintaining contacts with government to monitor and influence policy is 
another reason why the MNC might prefer a direct presence. The author uses the 
variable advertisement, as a further, but a negative, indicator of the need for after sales 
service. It is hypothesized that highly advertised goods are mass produced goods which 
require no after-sales service, and that products that need a great deal of design and 
information exchange between buyer and seller have less advertising. Notice that this 
hypothesis is opposite that of Gatignon and Anderson. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a positive relationship between specificity of products 
and intra-firm exports. The more specific is the input the more likely is the MNC to 
internalize the transaction. This will alleviate the hold-up problem that would plague the 
operation in the case of any disagreement. 
Hypothesis 3: If supply of an input in the foreign location is uncertain, then firms 
will rely more on intra-firm exports. Even for non-specific assets there could be 
variations in the quality, supply, and price that could lead a firm to rely more on internal 
markets. Thus uncertainty will increase intra-firm export. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between unexploited capacity 
and/or scale economies, on the one hand, and intra-firm exports, on the other. A parent 
which, has scale economies or unused capacity might want to use the spare capacity to 
export to the affiliate. This could also happen for non-economic reasons like trade union 
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pressure to produce a certain percentage of the good in the home country. 
Hypothesis 5: If the production process is divisible, then it will encourage intra-
firm exports. Certain production processes might have a component which can be shifted 
to a different country to save cost. An example would be the shifting of the labor-
intensive part of a production process to a cheap labor country like India. 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relationship between government policy 
encouraging foreign production and intra-firm exports. The host (foreign) government 
could provide economic incentives to attract foreign investments. 
Hypothesis 7: There will be a positive relation between a MNC's ability to 
manipulate transfer prices and intra-firm exports. There is always the possibility that 
MNCs might use the offshore production facility to evade taxes in the home country. In 
a two-country framework, a MNC, located in a high tax country, might declare a low 
price for intra-firm exports of goods, decreasing its profitability and hence taxes. The 
purchasing affiliate, located in a low tax country, will make a higher profit due to the 
artificially low price it paid. But because profits have been shifted from a high-tax to a 
low tax regime, after tax profits for the combined firm will increase. If the MNC is able 
to manipulate the transfer price to shift profit as described above, it will resort to greater 
intra-firm exports to shift profit to the lower tax country. The author uses the percentage 
of the MNC's assets that are in a foreign country as a proxy for its ability to manipulate 
transfer prices. Hypothesizing that the greater the foreign exposure of the MNC, the 
more likely it is able to resort to such practices. 
The results generally agreed with the hypotheses. The paper concludes by saying 
that to better explain intra-firm exports there is a need to look at other factors, such as 
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risk, and to get better proxies for variables like scale economies, capacity utilization, and 
host government policies. 
A paper by Bela Balassa (1986) tries to analyze the country effects on intra-industry 
trade (HT). This, according to the author, is a neglected area since most papers 
concentrate on commodity characteristics. This study looks at the effect of size of 
domestic markets, the level of economic development, transportation costs, common 
market borders, the level of trade restrictions, and participation in international 
integration arrangements. 
This paper tests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The volume of HT is inversely related to economic development. 
This is because, if a country is underdeveloped, it will not be able to supply key inputs in 
a timely fashion. Hence the MNC will tend to export inputs from home. The per-capita 
GNP of a country is used as a proxy for the level of development. 
Hypothesis 2: The volume of HT is directly related to the size of the downstream 
market. The larger is the market, the greater will be the demand for goods. Market size 
is proxied by the GNP of a country. 
Hypothesis 3: The volume of DT is negatively correlated with the average distance 
from the trading partner. If the market is very far, this will increase transportation cost 
hence the MNC will export less. The paper uses a complex measure of distance, which is 
defined as the weighted inverse of geographical distance between the U.S. and the partner 
country, the weight being the GNP of the partner country. 
Hypothesis 4: The volume of HT is greatest when the parent and affiliate are 
located in countries sharing a common border. A dummy variable is introduced which 
64 
takes a value of 1 if there are common borders and 0 otherwise. 
Hypothesis 5: The volume of HT varies inversely with tariffs. Tariffs increase the 
cost of imported goods and the MNC will export less to a country that has high tariffs. 
The investigation covered the manufacturing exports of 38 countries. All the 
hypotheses were confirmed except the one pertaining to economic development. The 
author also splits the countries into two groups of developed and developing countries 
and conducts the analysis separately for each group. The estimates of the parameters for 
the developing countries were significant, while those for the developed countries had 
low precision due to collinearity among the variables. 
The final paper reviewed here is by Anita Benvignati (1990). She discusses how 
intra-firm exports are different from arms-length exports. The paper analyzes 
confidential data from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business Program 
for the years 1975-1977. 
Trade theory predicts that relative factor proportions can explain bilateral trade. 
In a two-country framework, the country with the higher capital/labor ratio will export 
capital-intensive goods and import labor intensive products and vice-versa. Other factors 
that can affect bilateral trade are tariffs, patents, and other imperfections in the market. It 
has been argued for the case of intra-firm trade, however, that international trade theory 
explanations are incomplete and some other explanation is required, since there is the 
additional question of why transactions are internalized. Arms-length exports may be as 
profitable as intra-firm exports unless: 
"(1) information needed to consummate production and sale of a certain quality 
product is too complex or extensive for an efficient or profit maximizing 
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transaction outside a firm, or 
(2) if information is a public good and firms can only cover costs they incurred to 
develop a proprietary advantage (such as technical knowledge) by keeping the 
information internal and a closely held secret (Benvignati (1990))." 
Factors like patents and R&D expenditure, that give a MNC competitive advantages over 
other firms, will encourage trade but these factors are hypothesized to have a greater 
impact on intra-firm trade. 
Trade theory and the findings of the empirical trade literature suggest the 
independent variables used in the paper. They include industry specific measures of 
capital intensity, human capital, technology, scale economies, and advertising. The 
dependent variable is the value of exports (both intra-firm and inter-firm) from the U.S. 
in each of the FTC's 249 Line of Business (LB) industry classifications. 
To test whether intra-firm exports and arms-length exports differ, the paper uses the 
following general methodology. The methodology is explained below for a dependent 
variable X, which contains pooled observations for both intra-firm and non intra-firm 
exports, and a single independent variable I. A dummy variable D is defined which takes 
the value of 1 for observations corresponding to intra-firm exports and 0 otherwise. The 
following equation is estimated. 
X= al + a2 (I) + a3 (I*D) + e. 
Under such a formulation the additional impact of I on intra-firm trade will be captured 
by a3. 
The paper hypothesizes that R&D and advertising expenditures will encourage 
intra-firm trade to a greater degree than arms-length trade. The result of the weighted 
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least square estimation show that there is no difference between the inter-firm and intra-
firm exports: In most cases, the coefficient measuring the additional impact (analogous 
to a3) was not significant. Thus the paper concludes that the internalization hypothesis is 
deficient. This appears to be the only empirical paper in the literature on intra-firm trade 
which fails to support the internalization hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL MODEL 
4.1. Introduction 
The hypotheses developed here are loosely based on the theory of the firm, 
outlined in chapter 2 of this dissertation. The discussions of Coase (1937) and 
Williamson (1975,1979) clarified why, in certain cases, the formation of a firm may be 
superior to transactions in the market. Coase reasoned that firms exist because there are 
cost savings in carrying out the transaction internally, rather than through the market. 
Williamson then postulated that the cost savings are dependent on general uncertainty 
(for example, the uncertainty associated with predictions of future demand), the 
frequency of transactions, and the specificity of the investments required for the 
transaction. Williamson then went on to show how transaction specificity of investment 
and frequency of transactions affect the optimal governance structure and how the 
governance structure may adapt to uncertainty. 
Grossman and Hart (1986) added an additional element into the analysis of the 
firm: the incentives of managers. They proceeded to derive conditions, under which 
integration, or the establishment of unified governance, is better than bilateral 
governance, where each unit maintains its independence. Hart and Moore (1990) carried 
this analysis further and explored the conditions required for joint ownership of assets. 
The hypotheses, developed from the discussion in chapter 2, are called the 
"internalization hypotheses." The internalization hypotheses are generally viewed as the 
"Caesar of the 'OLI' Triumvirate" (Ethier (1986 pg. 805.)). This dissertation is primarily 
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concerned with empirically testing the validity of the internalization hypotheses in the 
context of multinational firms in the manufacturing sector, and essentially attempts to 
answer two questions: 
(1) Are the internalization hypotheses consistent with the foreign marketing 
strategies of U.S. MNCs (as reflected in the breakdown among foreign sales to 
unaffiliated parties, sales by majority owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs), and 
sales by joint ventures (JVs))? 
(2) Are the internalization hypotheses consistent with the export patterns of U.S. 
MNCs (as reflected in the breakdown of MNC exports among exports to 
unaffiliated parties, exports to MOFAs, and exports to JVs)? 
Variables measuring ownership and locational considerations, the O and L of the "OLI" 
triumvirate, will be used as control variables. 
Below, in section 2, we explain how the MNCs' degree of control will be 
measured in our tests of the internalization hypothesis. Section 3 defines the study's 
dependent variables. In section 4 we discuss the hypotheses. 
4.2. Degree of Control 
The degree of integration, or control a U.S. parent firm or U.S. MNC has over its 
affiliates located abroad, is measured by the percentage of voting securities that the 
parent owns. This method of measuring the degree of control may be imperfect, since 
even with a minority holding of equity shares the U.S. parent may be able to control all 
the key decisions taken by an affiliate, because of contracts or understandings with other 
shareholders. It is an internationally accepted method of measuring control (pg. M-4, 
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USDIA, 1998), however, and is therefore employed in the analysis in this dissertation as 
well. 
The Bureau of Economic analysis considers an affiliate to be a majority-owned 
foreign affiliate if the parent company controls more than 50% of its equity, the same 
classification is used here. In what follows, we classify an affiliate in which the U.S. 
parent (MNC) controls more than 10% but less than 50% of the voting equity as a joint 
venture. Foreign firms in which U.S. firms have no equity (or less than 10% equity) 
holdings are considered to be unaffiliated entities. In a majority-owned foreign affiliate 
(MOFA), the U.S. parent controls over 50% of the voting security, and it is assumed that 
the U.S. MNC has complete control over all the affiliate's decisions. For a joint venture 
(JV), a U.S. parent controls less than 50% but more than 10% of the equity of the 
affiliate. In this case the U.S. MNC is assumed to have less than full control. The U.S. 
MNC is assumed to exercise no control over unaffiliated parties. Thus MOFAs and 
unaffiliated parties represent opposite ends of the integration spectrum with JVs lying in 
between. Figure 3 below represents the discussion diagrammatically. The numbers 
below the line indicate equity ownership while the control structure is described above 
the line. 
No Control Moderate Control Complete Control 
0 10% 50% 100% 
Figure 3. Degree of Control Exercised by the MNC. 
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4.3. Sales and Exports Associated with U.S. Firms and their Affiliates 
The various kinds of sales in country X of products associated with U.S. firms in 
industry j, are illustrated in figure 4, below. Sales in any country can be broadly 
classified into two-categories: (i) sales of goods produced in country X and (ii) sales of 
goods produced in the U.S. and exported to country X. Production in country X can be 
further broken down as: production by a joint venture or production by a MOFA. 
The dissertation investigates the breakdown of U.S. industry j's sales in country X 
among three components: (i) exports from the U.S. to unaffiliated parties in country X, 
(ii) production in country X in a MOFA or, (iii) production in a JV. We define the three 
sales components as: 
S*M = Sales, in country X, by MOFAs of U.S. MNCs in industry j. 
S'Jjy = Sales, in country X, by joint ventures of U.S. MNCs by industry j. 
S*UF = Unaffiliated sales (exports by U.S. firms to unaffiliated parties) in country 
X by U.S. firms in industry j. 
T S f  =  S f M  +  S f j y  +  S * M F  = Total sales in country X associated with U.S. firms 
in industry j. 
The three sales shares can thus be defined as follows. 
Sx 




Sales by firms in country 
X that are joint ventures 
with U.S. firms in 
industry j 
Sales by firms in country X 
that are MOFAs of U.S. 
firms in industry j. 
Sales by U.S. firms in 
industry j to unaffiliated 
parties in country X. 
Final Consumers or Firms in Country X 
Figure 4. Sales in country X of products associated with U.S. firms in industry j. 
Sx 
sfjy = J"nx = Share of sales, in country X, of joint ventures of U.S. MNCs in 
TS j  
industry j. 
S x ,  
s
'luF ~ J'L'x = Unaffiliated sales share, in country X, of U.S. firm in industry j. 
TS j  
The second issue dealt with in this dissertation is the breakdown of exports by 
U.S. firms. Exports could be internal or arms-length. Internal exports, for the purpose of 
this dissertation, are defined as U.S. exports to affiliates of U.S. MNCs.17 Internal 
1 
' Internal trade should be defined as trade carried out between U.S. MNCs and their affiliates but, due to 
the unavailability of this data, U.S. exports to affiliates of U.S. MNCs are used instead. U.S. parents 
account for 85% of the exports to their own affiliates. Thus this omission is not expected to have a serious 
impact 
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exports, or intra-firm exports, have two components; exports to MOFAs and exports to 
JVs. Arms-length exports are defined as U.S. exports to unaffiliated parties. Arms-
length exports are, thus, all U.S. exports which are not carried out with affiliates of U.S. 
MNCs. This is illustrated in Figure 5. 
We define the three export components as: 
E j M = Exports by U.S. firms in industry j to MOFAs in country X. 
E 'I jv " Exports by U.S. firms in industry j to joint ventures in country X. 
E 'I uf " Exports by U.S. firms in industry j to unaffiliated parties in country X.18 
TEf = E*m + E*jy+ EXUF = Total exports of U.S. firms in industry j. 
The three export shares can then be defined as: 
E x  f  
e 
'jM ~ ' S'x = Share of U.S. industry j exports to MOFAs in country X. 
TE) 
E X  
e Jjy ~ J Jx ~ Share of U.S. industry j exports to joint ventures in country X. 
TEj  
Y E,  up 
e'j UF = —= Share of U.S. industry j exports to unaffiliated parties in country X. 
TEj  
18 Thus, in our formulation SXUF 
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U.S. multinational companies 
in industry j 
Non-multinational U.S. 
companies in industry j. 
Majority owned 
foreign affiliates in 
country X, associated 
with U.S. firms in 
industry j. 
Joint ventures in 
country X, 
associated with U.S. 
firms in industry j. 
Unaffiliated parties 
in country X. 
Figure 5. Exports to country X by U.S. firms in industry j. 
4.4. Hypotheses 
The dissertation investigates the importance of the internalization hypothesis in 
explaining exports and sales patterns of U.S. firms. The two sets of hypotheses that are 
presented below, one for export shares and one for sales shares, are based on the same 
theory. To avoid repetition of the theory behind the hypotheses, the hypotheses are stated 
together; those relevant for exports are denoted by EX and those relevant for sales are 
denoted by SA. The hypotheses are followed by explanations of the underlying theory 
and the intuition on which they are based. Generally speaking, the connection between 
the sales share hypothesis and the export share hypothesis derives from the assumption 
74 
that most manufacturing MNC exports to affiliates are intermediate goods, to which the 
affiliate adds value in producing the final product. Therefore sales by affiliates will tend 
to be positively correlated with exports to affiliates. 
Hypothesis 1 (SA). Specialized or proprietary knowledge will promote a more 
integrated organizational form. MOFA sales will be encouraged and sales to unaffiliated 
parties will be discouraged. Sales by JVs will also be discouraged but not to the same 
degree as sales to unaffiliated parties. 
Hypothesis 1 (EX). Specialized or proprietary knowledge will promote exports to 
MOFAs and discourage exports to unaffiliated parties and JVs. In the case of JVs, the 
negative effect will be smaller in magnitude than the effect on unaffiliated parties. 
Specialized knowledge for an industry is measured as the ratio of R&D 
expenditure to exports for U.S. MNCs in that industry (Gatignon and Anderson (1984), 
Benjamin Gomes-Casseres (1989), and Benvingati (1990)). 
Various terms are used in the literature to capture the essence of specialized 
knowledge - proprietary assets, intangible assets, firm-specific assets, and monopolistic 
advantage are some examples - and all of these have nearly the same meaning, Caves 
(1997). Specialized knowledge possesses the following characteristics: 
(a) The price or the value of such knowledge may not be known. To discover the 
relevant price, the knowledge must be revealed, and this allows other firms to have access 
to the knowledge. Once the information is copied (and often mass-produced), the firm 
will not get the full benefit from its specialized knowledge. Thus, it may be optimal to 
internalize transactions which involve specialized knowledge. 
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(b) The knowledge might not be easily transferable to other firms. This could be because 
the knowledge is too complex to describe, or because of communication problems. 
Hence specialized knowledge must often be kept within a firm, promoting a unified 
governance structure. 
(c) Specialized knowledge may make the investment of a firm more productive and hence 
more important. The discussion of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore 
(1990), in chapter 2, shows that firm 1 should integrate with firm 2 (firm 1 buys firm 2) 
if the investment of firm 1 is important relative to the investment of firm 2. Therefore, 
this attribute of specialized knowledge would encourage complete control and promote 
MOFA sales at the expense of both unaffiliated and JV sales. 
Specialized knowledge will, in a similar manner, decrease exports to both 
unaffiliated parties as well as to JVs, and increase exports to MOFAs. This happens 
because specialized knowledge will increase the desire of the MNC to have complete 
control over the production process and, by assumption, MNCs have complete control 
over MOFAs. As discussed earlier, a U.S. MNC is assumed to have no control over 
unaffiliated parties and only partial control over JVs. Hence it is hypothesized that 
specialized knowledge will have a positive impact on exports to MOFAs and a negative 
impact on exports to unaffiliated parties and JVs. 
Hypothesis 2 (SA). Investments, knowledge, or technology controlled by local 
firms that complement the MNCs investment should discourage MOFA sales and 
increase the sales of JVs and sales to unaffiliated parties. 
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Hypothesis 2 (EX). Investments, knowledge, or technology controlled by the 
local firms that complement the investments of U.S. MNCs should encourage exports to 
JVs and discourage exports to MOFAs. 
The number of patents applied for, by the residents of that country, across all 
industries, serves as a measure of the complementary investments of local firms. 
If a MNC does not have the required knowledge for operation in country X, then 
it might form a joint venture with a local firm to complement its knowledge. Grossman 
and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Aghion and Tirole (1994) show that if the 
investment of firm 2 (the local firm) is important then firm 1 (the MNC) should not 
integrate with firm 2. Firm 1 's integration with firm 2 would take away the incentives of 
the managers of firm 2 to innovate. Hart and Moore (1990), however, show that 
complementary investments must be owned together. If firm 1 and firm 2 make equally 
important complementary investments, then firm 1 control will decrease firm 2's 
incentives to invest and vice-versa. In such a situation an intermediate control structure 
such as a joint venture could be optimal. The joint venture firm, firm 3 (say) will now 
own the complementary investment, with the equity of firm 3 being owned by firms 1 
and 2| 
Complementary investments are a difficult concept to measure. Patent 
applications may be considered to be a measure of important discoveries or inventions. 
But it is not necessary that an important investment will also be a complementary 
investment. A discovery or invention, if it complements the U.S. MNCs investment in 
the sense that it increases their profitability, is hypothesized to promote JV formation and 
discourage the formation of MOFAs. If the investment is important and not 
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complementary in nature, then it will increase sales to unaffiliated parties. Considering 
the breadth of U.S. MNCs, however, it is difficult to envision a patent which would not 
be complementary to at least one MNC industry. 
A similar argument holds for exports: Export shares will decline for MOFAs as 
U.S. MNCs form more joint ventures. The share of exports to JVs will rise. 
Hypothesis 3 (SA). A strategically important or profitable market will encourage 
the formation of MOFAs as opposed to JVs. An important or profitable market will also 
decrease sales to unaffiliated parties. 
Hypothesis 3 (EX). A strategically important or profitable market will decrease 
exports from the U.S. to unaffiliated parties and to JVs, while increasing exports to 
MOFAs. 
GDP growth rate for 1994, and the ratio of R&D expenditure undertaken in a 
country by U.S. MNCs as a proportion of MNC exports to that country, are used to 
measure profitability and strategic importance of a market. 
This hypothesis follows from Horstman and Markusen (1987, chapter 2). If the 
MNC expects a foreign country's market to be large and profitable, then it will prefer to 
have a MOFA located in that country, instead of sharing the profits with a joint venture 
partner. Large and profitable markets will encourage the MNC to set up owned 
operations, so as to be able to control all aspects of production and marketing. To 
measure profitability of a market, this dissertation follows Grubert and Mutti (1991) in 
using GDP growth rate as a measure of profitability. The use of GDP growth rate is 
based on the assumption that a faster growing economy is more profitable. 
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A market that is profitable, or strategically important for the MNC because of its 
profitability, its size, or for other reasons, will further encourage the formation of MOFAs 
and discourage both JVs and unaffiliated sales. The importance of the market to U.S. 
MNCs would force them to learn more about the market. Market research to keep abreast 
with the developments in the local economy and R&D expenditures focussed on adapting 
their products to suit the taste and preference of the market would then be natural 
strategies. R&D expenditure by the MNCs in a foreign country would therefore be 
indicative of the MNCs' subjective beliefs about the importance of such a market. Thus 
another variable used to measure the importance of a country's market is the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to exports of U.S. MNCs for that country. The R&D expenditure is the 
sum of all R&D undertaken in a particular country by U.S owned MOFAs, irrespective of 
industry. 
Exports from the U.S. to unaffiliated parties and JVs will decline with higher 
profitability or greater importance of the market because MNCs would be encouraged to 
establish a local presence in the form of MOFAs. Exports to MOFAs should therefore 
increase due to the additional need to supply the increased foreign presence. 
Hypothesis 4 (SA). Tariffs will encourage affiliate production and discourage 
sales to unaffiliated parties in country X. 
Hypothesis 4 (SA). Tariffs will encourage exports to affiliates and discourage 
exports to unaffiliated parties in country X. 
The average weighted tariff charged by country X on manufactures is used as an 
explanatory variable. 
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Tariffs impose additional costs on imports into a country, which increase the price 
of goods being exported from the U.S. and hence discourage exports in general. High 
tariffs may encourage the export of low priced intermediate products relative to high 
priced final products. The MNC could then ship the low priced intermediate input abroad 
and complete the final stages of the production process in affiliates located in the host 
country, thereby escaping most of the tariff. Thus, we hypothesize that sales to 
unaffiliated parties will decline while affiliate sales by both MOFAs and JVs will 
increase. 
While all U.S. exports will decline in general due to tariff barriers, U.S. exports to 
affiliates will decline less than exports to unaffiliated bodies, as U.S. MNCs supply low 
priced intermediate goods to affiliates located abroad. Thus it is hypothesized that the 
share of exports to affiliates will increase, and the share of exports to unaffiliated bodies 
will decline. 
Hypothesis 5 (SA). Production scale economies will increase sales to unaffiliated 
parties and decrease sales by both MOFAs and JVs. 
Hypothesis 5 (EX). Production scale economies will promote exports to 
unaffiliated parties and decrease exports to MOFAs and JVs. 
Production scale economies for an industry are measured by the average number 
of workers in U.S. plants with more than 20 employees. 
Firms may want to concentrate production in one plant, as opposed to having 
multiple plants, in order to achieve economies of scale. Increasing the plant size in the 
U.S. may also result in the firm remaining domestic, rather than becoming a 
multinational, and meeting its worldwide demand through U.S. production. Thus, there 
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would be a negative relationship between the share of affiliate sales and the potential for 
scale economies. 
Exports to unaffiliated parties will increase, with an increase in scale economies, 
since most of the production will be carried out in the U.S., while exports to both MOFAs 
and JVs will decline, since the number/size of affiliates abroad will decline. 
Hypothesis 6 (SA). Foreign corporate income taxes that are high relative to U.S. 
corporate income taxes discourage affiliate production and encourage sales to unaffiliated 
parties. 
Hypothesis 6 (EX). Foreign taxes that are high relative to U.S. taxes will 
discourage exports to MOFAs and to JVs, and increase the share of exports to 
unaffiliated parties. 
Foreign tax is measured by the ratio of the tax paid to income for all affiliates in a 
country. For U.S. taxes, the proxy is the ratio of taxes paid to income by U.S. parents in 
an industry. 
Economic theory predicts that firms will want to maximize their after-tax profits. 
One way to achieve that is to minimize its worldwide tax burden for a given level of 
revenue. If foreign taxes are higher than U.S. taxes, then the MNC can increase its after­
tax profit by decreasing affiliate production in the high tax country, and increasing 
exports from the U.S. Thus high foreign taxes would discourage affiliate production, 
while encouraging sales to unaffiliated parties, so that the profits are taxed at the lower 
U.S. rate. 
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High foreign taxes would discourage exports to affiliates, both MOFAs and JVs, 
as MNCs complete the value-added portion of the production process in the U.S. rather 
than in a foreign country. Thus, the share of exports to unaffiliated parties should rise. 
Taxation is a very complex issue and the international dimension makes it even 
more complex. One significant problem is that of ascertaining a unique tax rate measure, 
because of various bilateral treaties (some of which are specific to industries from a 
particular country), and the progressive nature of corporate tax rate for some countries. 
The arguments used here, though intuitive, are merely the proverbial "tip of the iceberg" 
and in some sense incomplete. But the impact of taxation on U.S. and foreign 
employment and output is significant and needs to be researched further. 
Hypothesis 7 (SA). Average affiliate size is positively related to sales by JVs. 
Hypothesis 7 (EX). An increase in the average size of affiliates will encourage 
exports to JVs. 
Average size of an affiliate is measured by the total foreign investment by an 
industry divided by the number of the industry's affiliates, irrespective of country. 
As the average size of affiliates increases there are two effects: First, as affiliate 
plant sizes grow, financial constraints may force a MNC to take a joint venture partner. 
Second, the size of investment in a representative affiliate may also increase the MNCs 
exposure to risk, and hence it might prefer a joint venture partner to spread the risk. 
Thus, we can expect that an increase in the average size of foreign affiliates will 
encourage JV sales. 
Exports to JVs will increase since the MNCs have larger operations abroad. 
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Hypothesis 8 (SA). High U.S. labor costs relative to foreign labor costs will 
increase foreign sales by both MOFAs and JVs, and decrease the sales to unaffiliated 
parties. 
Hypothesis 8 (EX). High U.S. labor costs relative to foreign labor costs will 
increase the export share of MOFAs and JVs, but decrease the share of unaffiliated 
parties. 
The U.S. cost of labor is measured as the hourly wages of employees of U.S. 
multinational enterprises by industry. Foreign labor cost is measured as the average 
hourly wage of employees in affiliates of U.S. MNCs. 
As the U.S. labor cost rises, the U.S. multinational firms might move operations 
overseas to take advantage of cheaper labor abroad. Hence it is hypothesized that the 
high U.S. labor cost will increase foreign production and decrease the share of sales to 
unaffiliated parties. 
As the cost of U.S. labor rises, U.S. MNCs will find it more profitable to produce 
abroad rather than at home. This will increase the share of exports to affiliates, both 
MOFAs and JVs, as MNCs supply intermediate inputs to their foreign affiliates. High 
cost of U.S. labor will also make the domestically produced goods uncompetitive, 
thereby decreasing the share of exports to unaffiliated parties. Hence we make the 
hypothesis that the increase in U.S. labor cost will increase the share of exports to 
affiliated firms, but decrease the export share to parties not affiliated with U.S. MNCs. 
Hypothesis 9 (SA). Sales to unaffiliated parties will be encouraged by the destination 
country's adjacency to the U.S. 
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Hypothesis 9 (EX). Exports to unaffiliated parties will increase if the destination country 
is adjacent to the U.S. 
A dummy variable was created which took a value of 1 for countries adjacent to 
the U.S., namely Canada and Mexico (Brainard (1997)). 
A country's adjacency to the U.S. will make it easier for exporters to export from 
the U.S. Travelling cost and other administrative cost will also decrease, due to the 
country's proximity to the U.S., opening the door for many small exporters who 
otherwise would not have found it profitable to export. Decreases in transport cost and 
the existence of roadways making truck transport feasible, might also mean that even a 
small quantity could be profitably exported by producers, further increasing the shares of 
unaffiliated sales and exports. 
Hypothesis 10 (SA). An increase in the sociocultural distance between the U.S. and the 
destination country will increase sales to unaffiliated parties and promote JV formation, 
but will cause a decline in MOFA sales. 
Hypothesis 10 (EX). An increase in the sociocultural distance between the U.S. and the 
destination country will increase exports from the U.S. to unaffiliated parties and to JV's 
and will decrease MOFA exports. 
A dummy variable was created based on work done by Gatignon and Anderson 
(1988). Countries "similar" to the U.S. were assigned a value of 1, others were assigned 
a value of 0.19 Dissimilar culture is hypothesized to encourage a lower degree of control. 
Thus sales to unaffiliated parties will increase, as will sales by JVs, but there will be a 
19 The countries which fall in the category of those considered socially and culturally "similar" to the U S. 
are: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. 
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decline in MOFA sales. 
Dissimilar culture will encourage exports to unaffiliated parties and to joint 
ventures and will discourage exports to MOFA, as MNCs move towards a lower degree 
of control. 
Hypothesis 11 (SA). Familiarity with a country will promote affiliate formation and 
decrease sales to unaffiliated parties. 
Hypothesis 11 (EX). Familiarity with a country will promote exports to MOFAs and JVs 
but discourage exports to unaffiliated parties. 
Country familiarity is measured by the number of foreign affiliates that U.S. 
MNCs have in a particular country. 
This hypothesis follows from the paper by Benjamin Gomes-Casseres (1989). 
Familiarity with a country will promote formation of affiliates, especially MOFAs. Once 
the U.S. MNCs become familiar with a country, and learn the market characteristics, they 
may no longer need to depend on sales to unaffiliated parties and prefer to set up 
affiliates to take advantage of profit opportunities. Thus MOFA and JV sales are going to 
be encouraged. U.S. MNCs may also shy away from JVs since their familiarity with a 
country will allow them to work alone, hence the effect of this variable on MOFA sales 
will be stronger. Thus we would expect that familiarity with a country would increase 
MOFA and JV sales, but it will have a greater positive impact on MOFA sales, while 
having a negative impact on sales to unaffiliated parties. 
Exports to MOFAs and JVs will increase and exports to unaffiliated parties will 
decrease. 
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Hypothesis 12 (SA). An increase in the destination country's physical distance from the 
U.S. will have a positive effect on affiliate production and a negative effect on sales to 
affiliates. 
Hypothesis 12 (EX). An increase in the destination country's physical distance from the 
U.S. will increase exports to affiliates, and decrease the share of exports to unaffiliated 
parties. 
The physical distance between the capitals of the U.S. and the destination country, 
in kilometers, is used as a measure of distance between the two countries. 
As the physical distance between the U.S. and the destination country increases, 
there is an increase in the cost of transportation of goods from the U.S. to that country. In 
this case it might be profitable for U.S. MNCs to set up local affiliates that manufacture 
goods for the domestic markets locally. This will result in an increase in affiliate sales 
and a decline in the sales to unaffiliated parties. 
With an increase in affiliate sales, there will also be an increase in exports of the 
intermediate inputs needed to support affiliate production.20 Hence it is hypothesized that 
there will be a decline in the share of exports to unaffiliated parties and an increase in the 
share of exports to affiliates. 
Hypothesis 13 (SA). A destination country's governmental restrictions on the formation 
of MOFAs will have a negative impact on sales by MOFAs. It will have a positive effect 
on sales to unaffiliated parties and sales by JVs. 
20 An assumption underlying this hypothesis is that freight charges for the intermediate inputs are lower 
than for the finished manufactured goods. 
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Hypothesis 13 (EX). A destination country's governmental restrictions on the formation 
of MOFAs will have a negative impact on exports to MOFAs. It will have a positive 
effect on exports to unaffiliated parties and exports to JVs. 
The ratio of the number of MOFAs to the total number of affiliates in the country 
served as a proxy for the strength of governmental restrictions on MOFA formation.21 
If a country has restrictions on majority equity ownership by foreign MNCs, then 
the MNCs might have to rely on JVs or on sales to unaffiliated parties to supply the 
market. This kind of restriction is thus hypothesized to increases the sales share of JVs 
and the share of sales to unaffiliated parties. 
A country's restriction on equity ownership by U.S. MNCs will result in a lower 
level of exports to MOFAs and an increase in the export share of JVs and unaffiliated 
parties. 
21 Gatignon and Anderson ( 1984) used a dummy variable which took a value of 1 for the countries with 
restrictions on foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. The countries in this group were: India, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, Mexico, Spain, and Japan. This variable was not used in this dissertation, since it was not 
considered to reflect present regulations. As an example, India dismantled all restriction on foreign 
ownership for most industries starting in 1991. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
5.1. The Method of Estimation 
Estimation requires an econometric specification suitable for modeling a vector of 
three shares: Yl, Y2, and F3The simplest approach specifies each share as a linear 
function of explanatory variables plus an additive disturbance term: 
Yx  = X/3x  + s l  
Y2  = X/32  + s2  
Y 3  = À"/?3  + 
Where X is a vector of regressors; /?,, /?2, and /?3 are vectors of parameters to be 
estimated; and £,, s2, and s3  are jointly normally distributed random errors. There 
would be three problems with this "linear share model." First, the above specification 
would not confine each share to the meaningful range of [0,1]. Second, it would not 
allow for a "pile-up" of probability at the share values of 0 and 1.23 Third, it would not 
impose the adding up condition, Yx  + Y2  + Y3  = 1. 
As a solution to these problems, Wales and Woodland (1983) proposed a 
procedure which builds on Tobin's (1958) limited dependent variable model and 
~ In our application, these will be the sales shares of MOFAs, JVs, and unaffiliated parties 
( sjm, s'Jjy, s'JUF ) or the export shares of MOFAs, JVs, and unaffiliated parties ( e'Jm, e'Jjy, e'JUF ). In 
this discussion, we refer to these share vectors genetically as Yx, Y2, Y3. 
23 The data used in our application contain numerous instances in which one or two of the shares are zero 
for a given observation.^ 
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Amemiya's (1974) extension of Tobin's model to a multivariate setting. Start with a 
vector of latent variables thought of as "notional" shares: yx, y," and }r3* where 
y;+y;+y; =i. 
Because of the adding up condition, the joint distribution is fully characterized by the 
distribution of any two. Let 
r '=k ' ,y , i  
we assume that the latent variables are distributed as follows: 
y' = 
y; ~ MVN Mi ) 
°"i2 
0*i2 (T ii 
i.e., a multivariate normal distribution with mean ^ =(//,, //2 ) and covariance matrix 
Z = °"l2 
The distribution of K/ is implied by the adding up condition K,* = 1 - yx - y'. In our 
application //, and will be specified as parametric functions of the explanatory 
variables: 
Mi = 
Mi ~ Xfiz • 
The elements of and /?2 will be the main objects of estimation and hypothesis testing. 
Of course, there is no assurance that the elements of the vector ( y', y' ) will be 
confined to the unit simplex: 
s  = {y;, y:-, y;, y;>o ,  r ;+K<i}.  
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Wales and Woodland's contribution is the following trick for mapping the density that 
falls outside of the unit simplex onto the boundary: Given notional shares Y', Y' and 
y/, define observed shares as follows: For i = 1,2, and 3, 
% = 0 if Y' < 0 
i f  f > o  
2-ijd j 
where J = {j: Yj > 0}. 
The p and <r parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood in Wales and 
Woodland's "Amemiya-Tobin" approach. Share vectors for different observations are 
assumed to be independently distributed. It remains to specify the form of the likelihood 
factor for the typical observation. Suppose we observe the vector of shares 
r= fc .K.r , ] ' .  
Let k = 1, 2 or 3 be the number of strictly positive shares. For notational simplicity we 
will assume that the strictly positive shares occupy the first elements of the vector. The 
possibilities are: 
Y = (1, 0, 0) i.e. k = 1 
Y=(r„ n, 0)' 
where Y{, Yz  >0 and Yx  + Y2  = 1 i.e. k = 2 
Y=(y„ n, Y,i 
where Y l  + Y2  + y3 = 1 and Yx, Y2, Y3  >0 i.e. k = 3. 
We now evaluate the density for each of the cases. 
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Case 1; k = 3. In this case all the shares are strictly positive. Each "latent" 
variable is positive and equal to the corresponding observed share. The density for the 
observation is: 
where n l2  ( y', y\ ) is the joint density function for a multivariate normal with mean, fj 
and variance-covariance matrix Z, i.e. 
Case 2; k= 2. In this case, observed share K3 = 0, hence latent variable 73* < 0, 
while Y' and Y' are positive. The observed values of latent variables Y', Y' are 
implicitly determined by: 
Solving yields: 
which implies that the latent values ( Y', Y' ) lie on the ray labeled A in figure 1. The 
density in this case is an accumulation of the density along the ray A: 




Figure 6. Two Positive Shares 
Where J(Y) = 1 + is a measure of distance along ray A. Figure 6. 24 
Dealing with cases in which the positive shares are not the first elements of the 
vector can be handled by simply working in an alternate 2-dimensional space. For 
example 
/< k„ o, n ) - K (i',', if £> joo <. 
24 See footnote 6 in Wales and Woodland. Note that the J(Y) factors depend only on the data, not on the 
parameters of the model, hence they can be omitted from the likelihood function. 
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where J(Y) = 1 + V and nn  (•) is the joint density for ( Y', K3" ) where 
r; 
y; ~ MVN 
Mi - C r i l  - C r !2  
.V ' / ' l  ~^2 J 1  1 - < 7 I1  a \ \  + 2 < 7 12 + C7 22 y 
Case 3; k = 1. In this case, observed share Yl > 0 and Y-, and Y3 = 0. So the latent 
variables Y', y3* are less than or equal to zero. This means that ( Y', Y'_ ) falls in the 
shaded region in figure 7. The density (probability) for this case is given by the integral 
of nl2 (•) over the region. 
/ (1 ,0 ,0)=J  jMC rOdKdr/ .  
i I-K; 
If the only non-zero share is one other than 7,, the density can be calculated by 
working in an alternate ^-dimensional space. For example 
f(0, 1,0)= J  J/I23 (  Yl, Y', )d Y2 'd K 
i i-r. 
Once the form of the likelihood factor is determined for each observation, the 
likelihood function is formed by taking a product: 
L ( A» A, <r„, <r,2, *221 Yn  i ~ 1, 2,..., n) = \\f{Yu, Y2i, Y3i), 
i=l 
where we have added "i" subscripts to index observations. As usual, it is easier to work 
with the log-likelihood function. 
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Figure 7. One Positive Share 
lnL(#,  p,, au, crn, cr^l  1% /  =  l ,  2 ,n)  = £ln/ (y„ . ,  Yv, K3(). 
i=i 
Letting 0 = (/?,, (3-,, <xM, cru, a^) denote the parameter vector and letting 0 
denote the maximum likelihood estimator of 0, we have the following properties.25 
( 1 )  ©  i s  c o n s i s t e n t ,  i . e .  p l i m  0 = 0  
(2) © is asymptotically normal; in particular, © —2—> N [0, {!(©)} ] where 
1(0 )= -E ô
2 In 1(0)" 
6060' 
25 It is well known that these properties of maximum likelihood estimators follow given certain regularity 
conditions. See Greene pg. 129 - 40. for example. 
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Our estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix is 
~a2lnI(é)T'. 
cQdQ' J ' 
that is, the negative of the inverse of the Hessian of the log-likelihood function evaluated 
at the maximum likelihood estimate.26 
5.2. Interpretation of Parameter Estimates 
The interpretation of the parameter estimates for Wales and Woodland's 
Amemiya-Tobin (A-T) model described in the above section requires further discussion. 
These interpretations are illustrated below for the 2 explanatory variable model, but the 
discussion can be easily extended to a k explanatory variable framework. We begin by 
reviewing the calculation of marginal effects and elasticities in the linear share model. 
Linear Share Model 
A linear model of a three-share system with the adding-up condition ( y, + 
r2 + Z3 =1) imposed can be written as. 
Yt =6,q + blixl + bi2x2 
^2 = ^20 ^2\X\ ^22X2 ^2 
and y3 = (1 -610  -b20)-(b n  +6 21)x, -(b l2  +b22)x2  -(f, +£2) 
The marginal effects are: 
26 The second derivatives in the covariance estimator are approximated using discrete (centered) difference 
quotients. 
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^-=4, ,  #= &2, ,  
dx, cx, or, 
and the elasticities are : 
Point estimates and standard errors of marginal effects and elasticities (evaluated at 
sample means, for example) can be calculated from point estimates and the estimated 
variance-covariance matrix of the estimates of the "bs" . 
Wales and Woodland's Amemiya-Tobin model 
For the Amemiya-Tobin model of Wales and Woodland, the form of marginal 
effects and élasticités depends on the number of strictly positive shares. We can write the 
3 share equations as follows. 
= b\o bnx2 A 
Yj = b20  + b2xxx  + b22x2  + e2  
and Y3  = (1 — 6,o — b2Q ) — (b l, + b2l  )x, — (b l2  + 622 )x2  — (£, + ) 
Fori  =  1 ,2 ,3 :  % =  0  i f  Y,' <0 
i f  Y
'
> 0  
2~èjd j 
where J = (j: Y J > 0}. 
If y,, Y2, y3 >0 then Yx  = Yj, Y2  = Y2, and Y3  = Y]. The marginal effects in 
this case are: 
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#=6, , ,  #-=-(6 , ,+^)  
ox, ox, ôx l  
The elasticities will be: 
Sir-4-
When these formulas are used to estimate elasticities "evaluated at sample means," the 
means of xx, Yx, etc. should be taken over only those observations for which Yt, Y2, and 
y3 >0. 
When there is only one positive share, of course, marginal effects and elasticities 
are zero. There are three additional cases, each with 2 positive shares. One of them is 
illustrated below. The others are similar. 
I f  Yx, Y2  >0and Y3  = 0:  
v  _ Yx  _ 610  +6,,jc, + bX2x2  + 
' "FTrT (f>,0 (^l l **" ^21 )-^t (^12 + 6,, )x 2  + £,+£,  
-n"  >U +^J  
&1 [K + Yl 2 
_ On -
k '+t f  
YA> - r,621 
Similarly, 
SK _ sr, 
ex, [y,*+n"] &, 
The elasticities are given by: 
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&L £l=MLzlèiL *.(y.'+n) 




aX: z, _y^,-% 
—— — —: x. 
&, ^ y; 
ZM*l 
When evaluating these expressions "at sample means," one can take the means of 
Yx, y,, and x, over those observations for which Yt and Y2 are greater than zero and 
y3 =0. Y' and Y'_ pose a greater problem because the values of these variables are latent. 
Ideally, one would like to use the expected values of these random variables conditional 
on Y' > 0, Y' > 0 and 1 - Y' - K* < 0. An acceptable approximation might be to calculate 
sample means for these variables assuming the conditional means of sx and s2 are zero. 
That is, estimate the sample mean of Y' (for example) by b]0 + bnxx + bX2x2 where x, and 
x, are set at their mean values within the sub-sample defined by Yx, Y2 > 0 and Y3 = 0. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
In chapter 4, we developed two sets of hypotheses: one for the sales shares of U.S. 
MNCs, and the other regarding exports from the U.S. The Amemiya-Tobin estimation 
procedure, outlined in the previous chapter, was used to test both of these sets of 
hypotheses. The data were compiled mainly from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
1994 "Benchmark Survey" (See Appendix A for more details.). 
The data set used for the estimation of the sales share model covered 35 countries 
(Appendix A, Table 4) and 63 manufacturing and primary industries; aggregated to the 2 
or 3 digit ISI level.27 (See Appendix A for more details.) Each observation in this data 
set corresponds to a country-industry pair at the lowest degree of industry aggregation 
available. (See Appendix A, Table 2, for a complete list of all observations.) There were 
191 usable observations; i.e., observations for which data were available on the three 
sales shares and on all of the 15 independent variables used in the estimation. The export 
share model covered 35 countries (Appendix A, Table 5) and 63 manufacturing and 
primary industries, at a similar level of aggregation as in the sales share model. The 
number of usable observations in this case was 284. (See Appendix A, Table 3, for a 
complete list of all observations.) 
2/ The SIC is a more frequently used classification system. Its relationship to the ISI is explained in Table 
4 in Appendix A. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the Amemiya-Tobin procedure models 
notional shares, for a three share case, using the following system of equations. 
Y\= fr.o + y, ^ 1 jxj+£i » j 
~ + y, 6,yXy + £2  ,  
j 
and y3 = (1 -610 ~620)-^(6ly +62>)xy -e2, 
j 
where e{  and s2  are jointly normally distributed random errors; Y' = unaffiliated share, 
Y2  = MOFA share, Y^ = joint venture share; and the x j 's are the independent variables 
described in Table 6.28 
The observed shares are obtained from the notional shares using the following 
mapping: 
For i  =  1 ,2 ,3 :  Y (  =0 if  <0 
i-, = vV if y;>o 
j 
where J = {j: Yj > 0}. 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the above mapping implies that the marginal 
effects of independent variables depend on the number of strictly positive shares. From 
that discussion, we know that the observed shares and the notional shares are equal when 
all three observed shares are strictly positive. In this case the marginal effects on 
observed shares will be the same as on notional shares, and given, simply, by 
28 Following Brainard ( 1997), this study expresses most of the independent variables in log form. 
Preliminary regression results also indicated that the variables were more significant in log form. 
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Table 6. Independent Variables1 
Name and (Symbol) Definition Hypothesis 
Number 
Intercept ( x0 ) 
Research and 
Development ( x, ) 
Patent ( x, ) 
Tar i f f  (Xj)  
Adjacency (xj 
Culture (x5) 
Restrictions ( x6 ) 
Country Research and 
Development 
Expenditure ( x,A ) 
GDP Growth Rate ( x7S ) 
Average Size of 
Affiliates (•%) 
Cost of Labor (^ 4) 
Foreign Cost of Labor 
(*9fi) 
Scale Economy ( x,0 ) 
Foreign Tax (x,,) 
Country Familiarity ( xI2 ) 
Distance (x,,) 
Log (ratio of industry j R&D expenditure by 
U.S. MNCs to industry j exports by U.S. 
MNCs, both in millions of U.S. Dollars). 
Log (number of patent applications filed in 
country i by the residents of country i in 
1995). 
Log (average tariff rate (percent) imposed on 
imports of manufactures by country i). 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if country i is 
Canada or Mexico and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if country i is 
classified as an Anglo country and 0 
otherwise. 
Ratio of the number of MOFAs of U.S. MNCs 
in country i to the total number of affiliates of 
U.S. MNCs in country i. 
Log (ratio of R&D expenditures in millions of 
U.S. Dollars by MOFAs of U.S. MNCs in 
country i to the total number of affiliates in 
country i). 
Log (growth rate of GDP of country i). 
Log (average value of assets of an affiliate in 
industry j in millions of U.S. Dollars). 
Log (per-hour wage rate of a U.S. parent 
production worker in industry j in U.S. 
Dollars). 
Log (hourly wage rate of the employees of 
affiliates of U.S. MNCs in country i, in U.S. 
Dollars). 
Log (average number of production workers in 
industry j plants in the U.S., which employ 
more than 20 workers). 
Log(corporate tax rate (percent) for country i). 
Log (number of U.S. affiliates in country i). 
Log (physical distance between the capitals of 

















1 Each observation corresponds to a country (i) - industry (j) pair. All data is for 1994 unless otherwise 
stated. 
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the corresponding regression parameters. The maximum likelihood estimates of the 
parameters are presented in Table 2 for the sales share model and Table 4 for the export 
share model. The Tables show the parameter estimates, standard errors, and the p-values 
for a two-tailed test of the hypothesis that the parameter is equal to zero. At the bottom 
of the two Tables, 2 and 4, we also provide the likelihood ratio test statistic. The null 
hypothesis for this test is that all the slope coefficients are jointly equal to zero versus the 
alternative that they are not jointly equal to zero. It can be shown that the test statistic: 
-2 In 
x'u J 
where L is the likelihood of the restricted model, and /,, is the likelihood of 
the unrestricted model, is chi-square, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
restrictions imposed.29 
The interpretation of the regression results for cases in which only two of the 
observed shares are positive is more complex. As shown in the previous chapter, if only 
two of the shares, and K (say), are strictly positive, then the marginal effect for x, 
(the others are similar) is calculated as follows: 
29 Greene 3rd edition pg. 161. 
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dY2  % -% _ dYx  
&i [Y;+Y;] dxx  '  
Our estimate of this marginal effect, evaluated at sample means, is 
Yxkx-ÏÀx 
y;-*; 
where bu  and b21  are maximum likelihood estimates; ^ and Y2  are the sample means of 
Yx and Y2 over the subset of observations for which Yx and Y2 > 0 and Y. = 0; and 
»;'-»»+1 
i 
Yi = b20 + ^ b2jXj ; 
where the 6,. 's are maximum likelihood estimates and the .ty ' s are the means of the 
independent variables over the appropriate subset of observations. The variance of the 






rW " 2brbi) bHM 
There are three possible cases in which only two shares are strictly positive: 
unaffiliated and MOFA share strictly greater than zero (JV share equal to zero); 
unaffiliated and JV share strictly greater than zero (MOFA share equal to zero); and 
MOFA and JV share strictly greater than zero (unaffiliated share equal to zero). 
However, not all of the three cases have a significant number of observations (Appendix 
rr \ Ï7 \ f Ï7 
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A, Table 6). Tables 3, 5, and 6 report marginal effects, their standard errors, and p-values 
when only two of the shares are strictly positive. The results when only unaffiliated and 
MOFA sales share are strictly positive are described in Table 3.30 Tables 5 and 6 
describe the case for the export share model. Table 5 is for the case in which, unaffiliated 
and MOFA export shares are the only ones strictly greater than zero. Table 6, is for the 
case in which, the unaffiliated and JV shares are greater than zero. There were no 
observations with only the MOFA and JV shares strictly greater than zero for the export 
share model. 
6.1. Results of the Sales Share Model 
This study used fifteen independent variables to explain the share of sales 
attributable to MOFAs, JVs, and unaffiliated firms. These independent variables are 
described in Table 1 above, and the results of estimation are given in Tables 2 and 3 
below. In the discussion that follows, attention will focus on the implications of the 
results for the three-positive share case (Table 7).31 For the most part, these are 
consistent with findings for the case in which only unaffiliated and MOFA sales are 
greater than zero (Table 8). 
The results support our hypothesis 1 concerning the effect of specialized 
knowledge on the organizational decisions made by U.S. MNCs. The results indicate that 
30 There were two additional cases of only two strictly positive shares for the sales share model: 
unaffiliated and joint venture share strictly greater than zero, and MOFA and joint venture share strictly 
greater than zero. But the number of observations in each of the two cases was 2 and 1 respectively, hence 
these results were not considered to convey anything significant and are not reported. 
31 For what follows, a parameter estimate is considered to be "significant" if it is statistically significant at 
the 10% level for a two-tail test 
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as R&D expenditure increases, the sales to unaffiliated firms decrease significantly, the 
sales of MOFAs increase significantly, and the effect on joint venture sales is positive but 
not significant. The results therefore show that an increase in proprietary knowledge 
gradually moves MNCs away from no control toward full control. 
In the case of sales to unaffiliated firms (firms over which MNCs have no 
control), the coefficient was significantly negative. For JVs (firms over which MNCs 
have intermediate control), the result was not significantly different from zero, while for 
MOFAs (firms over which MNCs have complete control), specialized knowledge had a 
significantly positive impact. 
Compared to specialized knowledge, the importance of a local firm's investment 
should have the opposite effect on the organizational form of MNCs, as claimed by 
hypothesis 2. Patent applications (xz ) by the residents of a foreign country were used to 
measure the importance of a local firm's investment. The results show that patent 
applications had a significantly positive impact on joint venture formation and a negative 
impact on MOFA formation. Patent applications also had a positive effect on sales to 
unaffiliated firms, though not significant. Thus our hypothesis was supported by the 
results of the regression. 
The imposition of tariffs had its expected effect, as stated in hypothesis 3; it was 
positively related to the share of sales of MOFAs, and negatively related to sales to 
unaffiliated firms. Tariffs also had a negative effect on the sales share of JVs. All the 
results were statistically significant. The result thus supports our hypothesis 3. 
Table 7. Maximum Likel ihood Est imat ion of  the  Sales  Shares  Model 8  
Description Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
Estimate SE P-Value Estimate SE P-Value Estimate SE P-Value 
•*o 0.815 0.833 (0.3275) 2.268 0.886 (0.0105) -2.084 0.607 (0.0006) 
-0.118 0.032 (0.0002) 0.097 0.034 (0.0042) 0.021 0.023 (0.3627) 
*2 0.012 0.019 (0.5246) -0.038 0.020 (0.0589) 0.026 0.013 (0.0443) 
*1 -0.118 0.038 (0.0017) 0.165 0.040 (0.0000) -0.047 0.026 (0.0740) 
*4 0.239 0.167 (0.1518) -0.542 0.180 (0.0025) 0.303 0.115 (0.0086) 
*5 -0.040 0.080 (0.6125) 0.070 0.086 (0.4144) -0.030 0.059 (0.6135) 
*6 0.293 0.141 (0.0384) -0.051 0.154 (0.7390) -0.242 0.099 (0.0149) 
X 1A  -0.052 0.022 (0.0170) 0.034 0.023 (0.1358) 0.019 0.015 (0.2300) 
X 7H -0.015 0.055 (0.7867) 0.017 0.058 (0.7669) -0.002 0.039 (0.9498) 
-0.184 0.025 (0.0000) 0.091 0.027 (0.0006) 0.093 0.019 (0.0000) 
X 9A  0.342 0.101 (0.0007) -0.416 0.110 (0.0002) 0.074 0.075 (0.3221) 
•*90 -0.050 0.106 (0.6352) 0.166 0.114 (0.1454) -0.116 0.076 (0.1265) 
*•0 0.381 0.074 (0.0000) -0.377 0.079 (0.0000) -0.004 0.051 (0.9397) 
*11 0.129 0.086 (0.1356) -0.330 0.096 (0.0006) 0.201 0.069 (0.0033) 
*12 -0.301 0.040 (0.0000) 0.254 0.042 (0.0000) 0.047 0.028 (0.0985) 
*13 -0.037 0.058 (0.5189) -0.017 0.062 (0.7840) 0.054 0.041 (0.1905) 
Value of log likelihood function = -93.03 x]» ~ 299.76b 
* The numbers in parenthesis are the p-values for a two-tailed test of the hypothesis: //„ : />y - 0 vs. //, : bj * 0. 
b The Likelihood Ratio test was carried out to test the hypothesis that all 30 "slope" coefficients arc jointly equal to zero versus the alternative that they are not 
jointly equal to zero. The critical value of , at a 1% significance level, is 50.89. Hence we reject the null hypothesis that all the "slope" coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero. 
Table 8. Marginal Effects in the Sales Share Model with Unaffiliated and MOFA share > 0 and Joint Venture share 
Description Unaffiliated MOFA 
Estimates SE P-Value Estimates SE P-Value 
-0.096 0.027 (0.0004) 0.096 0.027 (0.0004) 
x2 0.020 0.016 (0.2177) -0.020 0.016 (0.2177) 
*3 -0.120 0.032 (0.0002) 0.120 0032 (0.0002) 
*4 0.318 0.143 (0.0259) -0.318 0.143 (0.0259) 
*5 -0.046 0.068 (0.4958) 0.046 0.068 (0.4958) 
*6 0.171 0.121 (0.1590) -0.171 0.121 (0.1590) 
*7 A -0.039 0.018 (0.0320) 0.039 0.018 (0.0320) 
X1 tt -0.014 0.046 (0.7643) 0.014 0.046 (0.7643) 
*8 -0.128 0.021 (0.0000) 0.128 0.021 (0.0000) 
*9 A 0.326 0.086 (0.0001) -0.326 0.086 (0.0001) 
*9« -0.085 0.090 (0.3435) 0.085 0.090 (0.3435) 
*10 0.333 0.063 (0.0000) -0.333 0.063 (0.0000) 
*11 0.185 0.074 (0.0122) 0.185 0.074 (0.0122) 
*12 
0.247 0.034 (0.0000) 0.247 0.034 (0.0000) 
*13 -0.013 0.049 (0.7849) 0.013 0.049 (0.7849) 
' The numbers in parenthesis are the p-values for a two-tailed test of the hypothesis: /70 : b. - 0 vs. //, : b; * 0. 
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In chapter 4 we hypothesized that adjacency would increase the share of sales to 
unaffiliated parties. The regression results did not support this hypothesis. The dummy 
variable serving as a proxy for adjacency was not statistically significant in explaining 
the share of sales to unaffiliated parties. The regression results suggest, however, that 
adjacency of the host country discourages MOFA sales, but increases the sales by joint 
ventures. These results were statistically significant. A possible reason for the increase in 
JV sales and decline in MOFA sales could be that geographic proximity facilitates greater 
understanding between MNCs and local firms, hence full control may not be required. 
Cultural similarity to the U.S. promoted MOFA sales and discouraged JV sales, 
and sales to unaffiliated firms, but the results were not significant. Thus the regression 
results did not support hypothesis 5. 
Restrictions on the formation of MOFAs did not significantly effect the MOFA 
share, however it significantly increased the share of sales to unaffiliated firms and 
decreased the share of sales by joint ventures. The impact on unaffiliated firms was as 
hypothesized in hypothesis 6, but the impact on the joint venture share was not as 
predicted. This could be because MNCs completely shy away from countries which have 
restrictions on MOFAs. Thus support for hypothesis 6 was mixed. 
The size and profitability of markets play an important role in the choice of the 
organizational form preferred by U.S. MNCs. Two independent variables capture these 
characteristics: GDP growth rate and country R&D. GDP growth rate, a proxy for 
profitability, had a positive impact on the sales of MOFAs, and a negative impact on the 
sales shares of JVs and unaffiliated firms, but the results were not significant. A second 
independent variable, used to capture the strategic importance of a market, country R&D, 
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had a marginally significant positive impact on MOFA sales and a significantly negative 
impact on sales to unaffiliated firms, as hypothesized (hypothesis 7). The effect on JV 
sales, however, did not turn out to be significant. The results thus find conditional 
support for the hypothesis that U.S. MNCs prefer MOFAs to unaffiliated firms or JVs, if 
the market is strategically important or profitable. This result supports the hypothesis 
developed by Horstman and Markusen (1996). 
The coefficient for average size of foreign affiliates was significantly negative for 
sales to unaffiliated foreign firms, and was significantly positive for both MOFA and JV 
sales. This result was as hypothesized in hypothesis 8. 
The results suggest that the cost of U.S. labor had a positive impact on sales to 
unaffiliated firms and a negative impact on the sales by MOFAs. These results, though 
counter intuitive, could be explained on the basis of the efficiency wage hypothesis; that 
is, there is a positive relationship between wages and worker productivity. The higher 
productivity of the workers may effectively decrease labor cost. This saving in labor cost 
could then make exports from the U.S. a cheaper option, promoting exports from the U.S. 
and decreasing foreign production. U.S. labor cost also had a positive impact on JV sales 
but it was not significant. As the cost of labor abroad increases, the share of JV and 
unaffiliated firm sales decrease, while that of MOFA increases. These results, while not 
statistically significant, were generally inconsistent with hypothesis 9. Thus our 
hypothesis 9 was not supported by the results of this estimation. 
The presence of scale economies had the expected positive effect on the share of 
sales to unaffiliated firms, and a negative effect on the sales share of MOFAs. However, 
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the negative effect on joint venture sales was not significant. This result was as 
hypothesized in hypothesis 10. 
The foreign tax variable had a positive effect on the share of sales to unaffiliated 
firms, but it was only marginally significant. The effect of foreign tax on the share of 
sales of JVs was positive, and it was negative for MOFAs, both being statistically 
significant. The effect of foreign tax on JVs was not as hypothesized. Thus the 
regression results only provide partial support for our hypothesis 11. 
An important explanatory variable in the estimation procedure was country 
familiarity. Country familiarity increased the sales share of both MOFAs and JVs and 
decreased the share of sales to unaffiliated firms. The results provide support for 
hypothesis 12. 
The variable used to measure physical distance did not significantly explain the 
share of sales to unaffiliated parties, JVs, or MOFAs. Thus we do not find support for our 
hypothesis 13. 
To summarize, the following conclusions can be drawn: Research and 
development expenditure promotes a more integrated structure, as does profitability and 
strategic importance of a market. Joint ventures are promoted by greater innovativeness 
of the residents of a country, as well as by size of foreign affiliates. Thus the dissertation 
finds support for the hypotheses developed by Grossman and Hart (1987), Hart and 
Moore (1990), and Horstman and Markusen (1987). 
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6.2. Results for the Export Share Model 
U.S. MNCs' strategies for serving foreign markets have implications about export 
shares as well as sales shares. The internalization hypothesis predicts that U.S. MNCs 
would not export specialized products (products with a high proprietary content) to firms 
over which they have little or no control. In addition to the need to internalize 
transactions, U.S. MNCs may also find it profitable to manipulate transfer prices of intra-
firm exports, moving profits out of high tax countries to low tax countries (Grubert and 
Mutti (1991), Clausing (1998)). This section analyses the results relating to MNC 
exports based on the estimation procedure outlined in chapter 5. As before, commentary 
will focus on the results for the three-positive-share case (Table 9).32 The marginal 
effects reported (in Tables 10 and 11) for the two two-positive-share cases are generally 
consistent. 
As the internalization hypothesis would predict, R&D expenditures significantly 
increase the share of exports to MOFAs, and decrease exports to unaffiliated firms. The 
effect of R&D expenditures on joint ventures was positive but only marginally 
significant. This again shows the importance of the internalization hypothesis in 
explaining a firm's decisions in the presence of specialized knowledge. Thus hypothesis 
1 is supported. 
Patent applications by the residents of a country were not very significant 
in explaining the share of exports from the U.S. to various affiliates of U.S. MNCs. It 
had a positive impact on the share of exports to unaffiliated firms and a negative effect on 
32 For what follows, a variable is considered to be "significant" if it was statistically significant at the 10% 
level for a two tail test. 
I l l  
the share of exports to MOFAs, but it was not significant. In the case of JV's it had a 
positive impact though again it was not significant. Thus hypothesis 2 was not supported 
by the results of the regression. 
Tariffs did not significantly effect the export shares of either MOFAs or 
unaffiliated firms. However it did significantly decrease the export share of JVs. The 
result was not as hypothesized in hypothesis 3. 
Adjacency to the U.S. did not significantly effect the export shares of unaffiliated 
firms or exports to MOFAs. The share of exports to JVs though, was significantly 
positive. Thus hypothesis 4 was not supported. 
The results from the estimation procedure did not support hypothesis 5; regarding 
the coefficient of the dummy variable serving as a proxy for the culture of the 
host country. From the results we can see that none of the coefficients were significant. 
Restrictions on foreign ownership of assets did not have significant explanatory 
power in the model. This implies that we did not find significant support for hypothesis 
6. 
The importance of markets, as proxied by research and development expenditures 
performed by U.S. MNC's in their MOFAs, had a significantly negative impact on 
exports to unaffiliated firms, and a positive effect on exports to MOFAs. The impact on 
JVs was negative though it was not significant. GDP growth rate did not have a 
significant effect on the share of exports to either unaffiliated firms or to MOFAs and 
JVs. Thus the importance of markets promotes affiliate sales, as claimed by hypothesis 7 
Table 9. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Export Shares Model" 
Description Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
list i mate SK P-Value Estimate SE P-Value Estimate SE P-Value 
*0 1.622 0.858 (0.059) -0.014 0.828 (0.987) -0.608 0.225 (0.007) 
-0.095 0.031 (0.002) 0.083 0.030 (0.005) 0.012 0.009 (0.147) 
*2 0.007 0.020 (0.740) -0.013 0.019 (0.507) 0.006 0.005 (0.212) 
*3 0.004 0.046 (0.927) 0.023 0.045 (0.604) -0.027 0.011 (0.013) 
*4 -0.060 0.204 (0.770) -0.085 0.198 (0.668) 0.145 0.049 (0.003) 
*5 -0.105 0.085 (0.214) 0.093 0.082 (0.257) 0.012 0.022 (0.570) 
*6 0.021 0.136 (0.880) 0.013 0.131 (0.921) -0.034 0.040 (0.400) 
*1A -0.049 0.027 (0.075) 0.051 0.027 (0.054) -0.002 0.007 (0.726) 
X IB 0.010 0.068 (0.880) 0.003 0.066 (0.968) -0.013 0.016 (0.429) 
X» -0.057 0.026 (0.027) 0.015 0.025 (0.552) 0.042 0.008 (0.000) 
X , )A -0.051 0.112 (0.650) 0.049 0.108 (0.653) 0.002 0.029 (0.944) 
X9H 0.062 0.127 (0.627) -0.038 0.124 (0.761) -0.024 0.031 (0.430) 
XW 0.181 0.076 (0.018) -0.144 0.074 (0.050) -0.036 0.020 (0.070) 
*11 0.198 0.104 (0.057) -0.176 0.101 (0.082) -0.022 0.026 (0.403) 
*12 -0.211 0.048 (0.000) 0.180 0.046 (0.000) 0.031 0.012 (0.010) 
*,3 -0.055 0.068 (0.422) 0.004 0.066 (0.947) 0.050 0.017 (0.004) 
Value of Log Likelihood Function = -124.18 xlu ~ ' 57.861* 
' The numbers in parenthesis are the p-values for a two-tailed test of the hypothesis: //„ : />, = 0 vs. //, : />y * 0. 
b The Likelihood Kalio lest was carried out to test the hypothesis that all 30 "slope" coefficients are jointly equal to zero versus the alternative that they are not 
jointly equal to zero. The critical value of Xio al significance level, is 50.89. Hence we reject the null hypothesis that all the "slope" coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero. 
Table 10. Marginal Effects in the Export Share Model with Unaffiliated and MOFA Share > 0 and Joint Venture Share 
Description Unaffiliated MOFA 
Estimate SE P-Value Estimate SE P Value 
-0.079 0.029 (0.006) 0.079 0.029 (0.006) 
*2 0.011 0.019 (0.555) -0.011 0.019 (0.555) 
-0.018 0.043 (0.686) 0.018 0.043 (0.686) 
X
* 
0.057 0.192 (0.764) -0.057 0.192 (0.764) 
x$ -0.089 0.080 (0.265) 0.089 0.080 (0.265) 
X6 -0.007 0.127 (0.956) 0.007 0.127 (0.956) 
X1.i -0.047 0.026 (0.066) 0.047 0.026 (0.066) 
xTH -0.001 0.064 (0.993) 0.001 0.064 (0.993) 
x* -0.020 0.024 (0.401) 0.020 0.024 (0.401) 
X9A -0.046 0.105 (0.662) 0.046 0.105 (0.662) 
X0B 0.039 0.120 (0.746) -0.039 0.120 (0.746) 
X\o 0.140 0.071 (0.049) -0.140 0.071 (0.049) 
XU 0.168 0.098 (0.087) -0.168 0.098 (0.087) 
xn -0.173 0.045 (0.000) 0.173 0.045 (0.000) 
X» 0.012 0.064 (0.855) 0.012 0.064 (0.855) 
* The numbers in parenthesis are the p-values for a two-tailed test of the hypothesis: //„ : bj - 0 vs. //, : />y * 0. 
Table 11. Marginal Effects in the Export Share Model with Unaffiliated Share > 0, MOFA Share = 0 and Joint Venture Share > 0". 
Description Unaffiliated Joint Venture 
Estimate SE V-Value Estimate SE l'-Value 
-0.017 0.008 (0.035) 0.017 0.008 (0.035) 
-0.005 0.005 (0.310) 0.005 0.005 (0.310) 
0.023 0.010 (0.026) -0.023 0.010 (0.026) 
-0.125 0.047 (0.007) 0.125 0.047 (0.007) 
-0.017 0.020 (0.390) 0.017 0.020 (0.390) 
*6 0.030 0.037 (0.425) -0.030 0.037 (0.425) 
X1A -0.001 0.007 (0.849) 0.001 0.007 (0.849) 
X10 0.012 0.016 (0.455) -0.012 0.016 (0.455) 
** 
-0.039 0.007 (0.000) 0.039 0.007 (0.000) 
X
' iA  -0.005 0.027 (0.850) 0.005 0.027 (0.850) 
X
')H 0.024 0.029 (0.399) -0.024 0.029 (0.399) 
X\Q 0.043 0.019 (0.023) -0.043 0.019 (0.023) 
xn 0.032 0.024 (0.195) -0.032 0.024 (0.195) 
X\2 -0.040 0.011 (0.000) 0.040 0.011 (0.000) 
x\i -0.046 0.016 (0.005) 0.046 0.016 (0.005) 
' The numbers in parenthesis are the p-values for a two-tailed test of the hypothesis: //0 : bj - 0 vs. //, : bj 0. 
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As hypothesized, an increase in the average size of foreign affiliates increased 
exports to MOFAs and joint ventures, and decreased exports to unaffiliated firms. 
However the effect of foreign affiliate size on MOFA share was not significant. Thus we 
found partial support for hypothesis 8. 
The cost of labor in the U.S. had no impact on any of the export shares. Foreign 
labor cost also did not significantly impact any of the shares. Hypothesis 9, thus, was not 
supported. 
One independent variable that can significantly explain export shares, is scale 
economies. Scale economies had a negative impact on the share of exports to affiliates of 
U.S. MNCs, both JVs and MOFAs, and it had a positive effect on exports to unaffiliated 
firms. All the results were as hypothesized in hypothesis 10. 
The estimation shows that the destination country's tax rate significantly effects 
the export shares. With an increase in foreign taxes the share of exports to unaffiliated 
firms increases while the share of exports to MOFAs and JVs declines. The effect on 
joint venture firms however was not significant. Thus, the results indicate that increases 
in foreign taxes increase U.S. production at the expense of foreign production as was 
claimed in hypothesis 11. 
The results of the estimation support hypothesis 12, regarding country familiarity. 
Exports to affiliates of U.S. MNCs increased while the exports to unaffiliated firms 
decreased. 
Physical distance from the U.S. significantly increased the export share of JVs but 
it did not have a significant impact on the export share of either unaffiliated firms or 
MOFAs. Thus hypothesis 13 was only partially supported. 
116 
The export share model again showed the importance of R&D expenditure and 
country familiarity in promoting a more integrated organizational form. Scale economies 
and foreign taxes increased exports to unaffiliated firms while country R&D expenditure 
and country familiarity discouraged sales to unaffiliated firms. As hypothesized average 
size of foreign affiliates promoted exports to JVs. 
6.3. Conclusions 
In this dissertation we undertook a study of the marketing strategies, used by U.S. 
MNCs in manufacturing industries, to supply foreign markets. Under what 
circumstances do they chose to establish an affiliate in the destination country as opposed 
to producing at home for export? If an affiliate is used to supply the market, what degree 
of ownership/control does the U.S. parent retain? The objective of the study was to 
determine whether the theory of the firm can help illuminate these issues. This literature 
emphasizes the importance of knowledge in the optimal organizational form of a firm. 
As was discussed in chapter 2, specialized knowledge possessed by a U.S. parent will 
encourage complete control or "internalization" of all transactions; that is, the 
transactions will be moved away from the market into the firm. The discussion also 
showed why complementary knowledge possessed by foreign enterprises would promote 
joint ventures. 
The varying degree of control a U.S. MNC possesses over its affiliates translates 
to a varying degree of control it retains over a transaction. A transaction with an 
unaffiliated firm represents a transaction over which the U.S. MNC has no control; while 
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a transaction with a MOFA represents one over which it has complete control. 
Transactions with JVs fall in between. Using the shares for unaffiliated parties, MOFAs, 
and JVs as the three dependent variables, this study tested the empirical relevance of the 
internalization hypotheses, using both the sales share and the export share model. 
The "Amemiya-Tobin" approach of Wales and Woodland was used to estimate 
the system of share equations. This procedure explicitly builds in the adding-up 
restriction on shares and allows for the occurrence of zero values for one or two shares in 
a three-share system. The log likelihood function for the Amemiya-Tobin model was 
maximized by numerical methods. A copy of the Gauss program is attached as Appendix 
B. 
Multinational data of U.S. MNCs are available from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. Data was also collected from the Bureau of Census, the World Bank and the 
Internet (http://www.eiit.org). The final data set was for country-industry pairs, at the 
lowest level of industry aggregation available. There were 191 observations for the sales 
share model and 284 observations for the export share model. The study used 15 
independent variables to test 13 hypothesis listed in chapter 4 of this dissertation. R&D 
expenditures of U.S. MNCs and the patent applications of residents of foreign countries 
represent the key variables used to test the internalization hypothesis. Other important 
control variables include physical distance, GDP growth rate, scale economies, and the 
cost of labor. 
The results for the sales share model show the importance of the internalization 
hypothesis: Complementary knowledge of foreign enterprises, which was measured by 
the number of patent applications filed by the residents of a country, was positively 
118 
related to the share of sales by joint ventures, and negatively related to the share of sales 
by MOFAs. R&D expenditure, which served as a proxy for the specialized knowledge of 
U.S. parent, had a significantly positive impact on MOFA sales and negative impact on 
the sales to unaffiliated parties. While there have been empirical papers, discussed in 
chapter 3, which also found support for the internalization hypotheses in the form of a 
positive relationship between specialized knowledge and MOFA sales, no previous 
papers found evidence of the positive relationship between patent applications and joint 
ventures sales. Importantly, these two results together show the influence of the 
"ownership of knowledge" in determining the organizational form chosen by U.S. MNCs. 
The results of the export share model were similar. Here too, the importance of 
specialized knowledge was evident. Specialized knowledge increased the share of 
exports to MOFAs at the expense of unaffiliated parties, thereby moving transactions out 
of the market to within a firm. However, patent applications did not play a significant 
role in this model. 
Some of the hypotheses we developed in chapter 4, especially for the export share 
model, were not supported by our results. Research on multinational firms has always 
suffered from a lack of data. This study was no different. The data set used in this 
dissertation contained observations on relatively highly-aggregated industries: industries 
defined at the 2 or 3 digit ISI level. Furthermore, due to confidentiality requirements, 
many observations had data that were suppressed. A more disaggregated data set 
containing more observations will allow us to perform a more powerful test of the role of 
the internalization hypothesis in determining the foreign marketing strategies of U.S. 
MNCs. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES AND DATA SET 
PREPARATION 
A.1 Introduction 
The data for this dissertation were gathered from numerous sources. All data 
regarding affiliates of U.S. MNCs and their parent companies are from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). U.S. export data are from the Bureau of Census (BoC) and 
country indicators are from a World Bank publication called Development Indicators. 
Below we discuss the specific details of the data. 
Table Al. Source of Independent Variables. 
Variable 




Culture ( x5 ) 
Restrictions (x6) 
Country Research and Development 
Expenditure (x^) 
GDP Growth Rate (x7fl ) 
Average Size of Affiliates ( % ) 
Cost of Labor (^) 
Foreign Cost of Labor (Xgg) 
Scale Economy ( x10 ) 
Foreign Tax(x11) 




World Bank Development Indicators 
World Bank Development Indicators 
Obvious Classification 













A.2 The BEA Data33 
The BEA collects U.S. MNCs' data in a periodic survey called the Benchmark 
Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad. Reporting in the survey is mandatory for U.S. 
MNCs under the International Investment and Trade in Services Act. All U.S. parent 
companies have to provide information about themselves, and about any affiliates that 
had assets, sales, or net income above S3 million, or owned another affiliate that satisfied 
the above condition. The data used in this dissertation are from the 1994 Benchmark 
Survey. Benchmark surveys cover the universe of MNCs and are conducted every 5 
years; 1994 is the latest available year. Below we define some of the commonly used 
terms. 
Direct Investment: Direct investment is defined as the ownership of at least 10% of the 
voting securities in a foreign establishment. Ownership of 10% or more of the voting 
securities is also considered to be an indication of lasting management control, or degree 
of influence, over an enterprise. 
U.S. Parent: A U.S. parent is defined as a U.S. "person" who has an investment of 10% 
or more in a foreign business enterprise. A U.S. person" could be a religious 
organization, charitable trust, government or business enterprise. Most U.S. parents, 
however, are business enterprises that exist for the purpose of profit or securing some 
other economic advantage. 
Foreign Affiliates. A foreign affiliate is a foreign (located outside the U.S.) business 
33 The explanations below are to give the reader a general understanding of the data set and the definition 
and coverage of the variables. Some details are omitted. For complete definitions, see U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad 1994 Benchmark Survey Final Result, May 1998 (hereafter referred to as USDIA); U S. 
Department of Commerce, pg. M1-M27. 
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enterprise in which U.S. interests have more than 10% of the voting securities. Affiliates 
generally have the following characteristics: They have "substantial" physical presence 
abroad, in terms of employees or plant and equipment, and pay foreign taxes. If the 
foreign presence were "limited" in terms of physical assets abroad then the enterprise 
probably would not be considered an affiliate. Thus, an enterprise involved only in 
public relations or sales promotion probably would not be considered an affiliate. A 
majority owned foreign affiliate, or MOFA, is a foreign affiliate in which the combined 
U.S. interests exceed 50%. For the purpose of this dissertation, joint ventures are defined 
as affiliates in which combined U.S. interests total more than 10% but less than 50%. 
A.2.1. Industry and Country Classification of Data 
The BEA reports data for U.S. parents and its affiliates - by industry and by 
country. Country classification of data is on the basis of the physical presence of the 
assets of the affiliates. Industry classification, done by the BEA, is more complex and is 
described below. 
Industry classification of the data is based on a three-stage process. At the first 
stage, an enterprise (either a U.S. parent or an affiliate) is classified into the major 
industry that accounted for the largest percentage of its sales. The major industries are 
agriculture; forestry and fishing; mining; petroleum; construction; manufacturing; 
transportation, communication, and public utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance, 
insurance and real estate; and services. After the major industry is identified, the 
enterprise is placed in the two-digit ISI industry classification, in which its sales were the 
highest. At the third stage, the enterprise is classified in the three digit ISI category in 
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which it had the maximum sales. The following example (pg. M-l 1-12, USDIA) 
illustrates this three-stage process. 
Industry Code Description Percentage of Sales 
All Industries 100 
Manufacturing 55 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 30 
351 Engines and turbines 5 
352 Farm and garden machinery 10 
353 Construction mining and materials 
handling machinery 15 
36 Electronic and other electric equipment 25 
367 Electronic components and accessories 25 
Wholesale trade 45 
50 Durable goods 45 
508 Machinery, equipment, and supplies 45 
In the above example the enterprise's major industry is manufacturing since 55% 
of its sales were in manufacturing, as compared to 45% in wholesale trade. Within the 
manufacturing industry, the enterprise had the highest sales in industrial machinery and 
equipment (35). Within the two digit industry 35, the sub-industry in which the 
enterprise had the largest sales was 353. Thus the enterprise was classified in the 3-digit 
sub-industry 353, even though it had larger sales in 3-digit sub-industries 508 and 367. 
The BEA groups all affiliates by its major industry and country by this process. 
Affiliate sales and U.S. exports to affiliates are reported, by the BEA, for each 
industry and for each country, separately for all U.S. affiliates combined and MOFAs 
alone. The corresponding differences between the figures for MOFAs and for all 
affiliates equals JV sales (= sales by all affiliates - sales by MOFAs) and exports to JVs 
(= exports to all affiliates - exports to MOFAs). The derivation of the third component, 
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sales (= exports) to unaffiliated parties is done utilizing the BoC data and is described 
below. 
A.3. Bureau of Census Data. 
To complete the computation of the models' sales and export shares we also need 
U.S. firms direct sales (= exports) to unaffiliated foreign parties, for each industry, 
country pair. To get this, we start with the BoC data on total exports, by industry, by 
country. Since total exports include exports to affiliates, we subtract exports to affiliates 
(using the BEA data) to get sales (= export) to unaffiliated parties. 
The Bureau of Census, U.S. export data is organized by 10 digit Harmonized 
Trade Classification (HTC). To perform the above calculations; that is, to make the data 
conformable to the BEA data; we need to translate the HTC into ISI classification of the 
BEA. The BoC data was thus converted into ISI classification, first, by converting it into 
SIC code using a concordance file provided by the BoC. The converted data then was 
summed to the relevant ISI code using the description provided by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. The relation between ISI and the SIC code is summarized in Table 4 
below. 
A.3. World Bank Country Data and other Data. 
The data for average manufacturing tariff rate and number of patent applications 
are from a World Bank Publication called Development Indicators. Part of this data is 
also available on the World Bank home page. Data for foreign taxes are from a Price 
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Waterhouse publication called Corporate taxes - A World-Wide Summary.Vas data for 
distance from the U.S. to the destination country was from the Internet website 
http://www.eiit.org. Dr. Jon Haveman of Purdue University maintains the web site. 
A 4. Data Set Preparation and Descriptive Statistics. 
The data from the BEA, the World Bank, and the BoC were combined to create a 
data set with observations corresponding to destination country/parent industry pairs. 
Observations with missing data were dropped. This resulted in different numbers of 
useable observations for the sales share and export share models. The dependent 
variables, the industry description and the associated countries are provided in Tables A2 
and A3. Table A4 provides the concordance between three digit SIC and ISI data along 
with the description of the ISI category. Descriptive statistics for the data sets are 
provided below: for the sales share model in Tables A7-A13 and for the export share 
model in Tables A14-A18. 
Table A2. Classification of Observations and Values of the Dependent Variables for the 

















Grain mill and bakery products 
Agricultural chemicals 
Electronic components and 
accessories 
Electronic and other electric 
equipment, nec 
Other manufacturing 
Textile products and apparel 
Printing and publishing 

























1 See Table A4. 
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Table A2. (continued) 
Country Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
ISI Description Share Share Share 
Australia Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic 
mineral products 0.446 0.554 0.000 
Austria Chemicals and allied products 0.296 0.587 0.116 
Austria Primary and fabricated metals 0.334 0.666 0.000 
Austria Industrial machinery and equipment 0.670 0.330 0.000 
Austria Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.329 0.671 0.000 
Belgium Petroleum 0.019 0.969 0.012 
Belgium Chemicals and allied products 0.130 0.802 0.067 
Belgium Transportation equipment 0.309 0.691 0.000 
Belgium Other manufacturing 0.307 0.675 0.017 
Brazil Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.250 0.590 0.161 
Brazil Drugs 0.070 0.816 0.113 
Brazil Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.039 0.961 0.000 
Brazil Electronic components and 
accessories 0.732 0.268 0.000 
Brazil Electronic and other electric 
equipment, nec 0.349 0.651 0.000 
Brazil Textile products and apparel 0.402 0.598 0.000 
Brazil Instruments and related products 0.108 0.892 0.000 
Canada Grain mill and bakery products 0.177 0.717 0.106 
Canada Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.404 0.556 0.040 
Canada Drugs 0.292 0.704 0.003 
Canada Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.184 0.816 0.000 
Canada Agricultural chemicals 0.487 0.335 0.178 
Canada Chemical products, nec 0.269 0.726 0.005 
Canada Ferrous 0.753 0.221 0.026 
Canada Nonferrous 0.547 0.446 0.007 
Canada Fabricated metal products 0.543 0.453 0.004 
Canada Electronic components and 
accessories 0.846 0.152 0.002 
Canada Motor vehicles and equipment 0.341 0.639 0.021 
Canada Crude petroleum extraction (no 
refining) and natural gas 0.026 0.923 0.051 
Canada Textile products and apparel 0.601 0.355 0.044 
Canada Paper and allied products 0.263 0.535 0.202 
Canada Printing and publishing 0.387 0.613 0.000 
Canada Rubber products 0.325 0.657 0.018 
Canada Miscellaneous plastics products 0.597 0.396 0.007 
Canada Glass products 0.804 0.196 0.000 
Canada Oil and gas field services 0.000 0.969 0.031 
Canada Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic 
mineral products 0.199 0.801 0.000 
Canada Instruments and related products 0.759 0.239 0.001 
Canada Mining 0.362 0.525 0.113 
Chile Food and kindred products 0.166 0.834 0.000 
Chile Chemicals and allied products 0.473 0.493 0.034 
Chile Other manufacturing 0.190 0.400 0.410 
China Chemicals and allied products 0.737 0.213 0.049 
China Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.535 0.436 0.029 
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Table A2. (continued) 
Country Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
ISI Description Share Share Share 
Colombia Food and kindred products 0.159 0.841 o.ooo 
Colombia Chemicals and allied products 0.366 0.605 0.028 
Colombia Industrial machinery and equipment 0.995 0.005 0.000 
Colombia Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.866 0.134 0.000 
Colombia Other Industry 0.348 0.652 0.000 
Ecuador Food and kindred products 0.194 0.806 0.000 
Ecuador Chemicals and allied products 0.678 0.304 0.017 
Ecuador Industrial machinery and equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Ecuador Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.976 0.024 0.000 
Ecuador Transportation equipment 0.433 0.000 0.567 
Ecuador Other Industry 0.149 0.851 0.000 
Finland Chemicals and allied products 0.151 0.849 0.000 
Finland Industrial machinery and equipment 0.919 0.081 0.000 
Finland Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Finland Other manufacturing 0.213 0.787 0.000 
France Drugs 0.049 0.918 0.034 
France Agricultural chemicals 0.030 0.970 0.000 
France Nonferrous 0.529 0.471 0.000 
France Electronic components and 
accessories 0.213 0.787 0.000 
France Rubber products 0.043 0.957 0.000 
France Glass products 0.050 0.927 0.023 
France Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic 
mineral products 0.239 0.761 0.000 
France Instruments and related products 0.207 0.787 0.006 
Germany Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.063 0.876 0.062 
Germany Agricultural chemicals 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Germany Rubber products 0.045 0.955 0.000 
Germany Glass products 0.327 0.370 0.304 
Germany Instruments and related products 0.332 0.654 0.014 
Guatemala Chemicals and allied products 0.707 0.293 0.000 
Guatemala Industrial machinery and equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Guatemala Electronic and other electric 
equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Guatemala Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Hong Kong Petroleum 0.007 0.991 0.002 
Hong Kong Chemicals and allied products 0.555 0.393 0.053 
Hong Kong Primary and fabricated metals 0.803 0.198 0.000 
Hong Kong Industrial machinery and equipment 0.566 0.434 0.000 
Hong Kong Other manufacturing 0.324 0.633 0.043 
Hong Kong Other Industry 0.161 0.755 0.084 
India Petroleum 0.363 0.075 0.562 
India Chemicals and allied products 0.326 0.265 0.409 
India Industrial machinery and equipment OJOO 0.159 0.341 
Ireland Petroleum 0.017 0.983 0.000 
Ireland. Food and kindred products 0.064 0.936 0.000 
Ireland Chemicals and allied products 0.082 0.903 0.015 
Ireland Primary and fabricated metals 0.221 0.779 0.000 
Ireland Industrial machinery and equipment 0.200 0.800 0.000 
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Table A2. (continued) 
Country Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
ISI Description Share Share Share 
Ireland Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.158 0.842 0.000 
Italy Chemicals and allied products 0.067 0.835 0.098 
Italy Primary and fabricated metals 0.209 0.791 0.000 
Italy Industrial machinery and equipment 0.087 0.865 0.048 
Italy Other manufacturing 0.119 0.739 0.142 
Jamaica Petroleum 0.369 0.631 0.000 
Jamaica Food and kindred products 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Jamaica Primary and fabricated metals 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Jamaica Industrial machinery and equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Jamaica Electronic and other electric 
equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Jamaica Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Jamaica Other manufacturing 0.774 0.226 0.000 
Japan Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.302 0.095 0.604 
Japan Other 0.360 0.162 0.478 
Japan Oil and gas field services 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Korea, Republic Food and kindred products 
of 0.497 0.165 0.338 
Korea, Republic Chemicals and allied products 
of 0.576 0.163 0.261 
Korea, Republic Electronic and other electric 
of equipment 0.722 0.220 0.059 
Malaysia Petroleum 0.003 0.981 0.016 
Malaysia Primary and fabricated metals 0.732 0.268 0.000 
Malaysia Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.296 0.704 0.000 
Malaysia Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Mexico Food and kindred products 0.263 0.527 0.210 
Mexico Chemicals and allied products 0.289 0.507 0.204 
Mexico Primary and fabricated metals 0.862 0.117 0.021 
Mexico Industrial machinery and equipment 0.763 0.203 0.034 
Mexico Other Industry 0.131 0.113 0.756 
Netherlands Grain mill and bakery products 0.235 0.765 0.000 
Netherlands Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.128 0.673 0.199 
Netherlands Chemical products, nec 0.129 0.862 0.009 
Netherlands Ferrous 0.461 0.539 0.000 
Netherlands Nonferrous 0.206 0.794 0.000 
Netherlands Fabricated metal products 0.208 0.792 0.000 
Netherlands Electronic components and 
accessories 0.516 0.484 0.000 
Netherlands Textile products and apparel 0.494 0.506 0.000 
Netherlands Paper and allied products 0.427 0.573 0.000 
Netherlands Printing and publishing 0.065 0.935 0.000 
Netherlands Rubber products 0.794 0.206 0.000 
Netherlands Mining 1.000 0.000 0.000 
New Zealand Chemicals and allied products 0.410 0.555 0.035 
New Zealand Industrial machinery and equipment 0.863 0.137 0.000 
Norway Petroleum 0.002 0.840 0.158 
Norway Food and kindred products 0.114 0.886 0.000 
Norway Chemicals and allied products 0.263 0.729 0.007 
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Table A2. (continued) 
Country Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
ISI Description Share Share Share 
Norway Industrial machinery and equipment 0.624 0.376 0.000 
Norway Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.640 0.360 0.000 
Norway Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Panama Chemicals and allied products 0.649 0.351 0.000 
Panama Industrial machinery and equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Panama Electronic and other electric 
equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Panama Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Panama Other Industry 0.149 0.823 0.028 
Portugal Food and kindred products 0.118 0.833 0.049 
Portugal Chemicals and allied products 0.069 0.840 0.091 
Portugal Other Industry 0.874 0.126 0.000 
Saudi Arabia Chemicals and allied products 0.124 0.016 0.860 
Saudi Arabia Other manufacturing 0.648 0.000 0.352 
Singapore Petroleum 0.025 0.952 0.022 
Singapore Chemicals and allied products 0.456 0.429 0.115 
Singapore Industrial machinery and equipment 0.105 0.893 0.002 
Singapore Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.350 0.650 0.000 
South Africa Food and kindred products 0.151 0.849 0.000 
South Africa Chemicals and allied products 0.260 0.666 0.075 
Sweden Chemicals and allied products 0.192 0.808 0.000 
Sweden Primary and fabricated metals 0.692 0.097 0.211 
Sweden Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.475 0.525 0.000 
Switzerland Food and kindred products 0.145 0.639 0.215 
Switzerland Chemicals and allied products 0.442 0.379 0.179 
Switzerland Primary and fabricated metals 0.837 0.163 0.000 
Switzerland Industrial machinery and equipment 0.562 0.438 0.000 
Switzerland Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.357 0.643 0.000 
Switzerland Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Switzerland Other manufacturing 0.030 0.968 0.002 
Switzerland Other Industry 0.135 0.865 0.000 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Petroleum 0.019 0.974 0.007 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Food and kindred products 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Primary and fabricated metals 0.924 0.076 0.000 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Industrial machinery and equipment 0.982 0.018 0.000 
Trinidad and Electronic and other electric 
Tobago equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Turkey Chemicals and allied products 0.299 0.388 0.313 
Turkey Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.632 0.368 0.000 
United Kingdom Grain mill and bakery products 0.048 0.751 0201 
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Table A2(continued) 
Country Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
ISI Description Share Share Share 
United Kingdom Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.090 0.893 0.017 
United Kingdom Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.023 0.977 0.000 
United Kingdom Ferrous 0.216 0.784 0.000 
United Kingdom Paper and allied products 0.109 0.889 0.001 
United Kingdom Rubber products 0.094 0.906 0.000 
United Kingdom Glass products 0.085 0.789 0.126 
United Kingdom Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic 
mineral products 0.143 0.857 0.000 
United Kingdom Instruments and related products 0.147 0.785 0.068 
United Kingdom Mining 0.978 0.022 0.000 
Table A3. Classification of Observations and Values of the Dependent Variables for the 
Export Share Model. 
Country Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
ISI Description1 Share Share Share 
Australia Grain mill and bakery products 0.801 0.199 0.000 
Australia Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.540 0.460 0.000 
Australia Drugs 0.850 0.150 0.000 
Australia Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.796 0.204 0.000 
Australia Ferrous 0.893 0.107 0.000 
Australia Nonferrous 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Australia Fabricated metal products 0.786 0.214 0.000 
Australia Other manufacturing 0.810 0.190 0.000 
Australia Electronic components and 
accessories 0.960 0.040 0.000 
Australia Electronic and other electric 
equipment, nec 0.948 0.052 0.000 
Australia Other 0.998 0.002 0.000 
Australia Textile products and apparel 0.940 0.060 0.000 
Australia Printing and publishing 0.192 0.809 0.000 
Australia Rubber products 0.970 0.030 0.000 
Australia Miscellaneous plastics products 0.875 0.117 0.007 
Australia Glass products 0.880 0.000 0.120 
Australia Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic 
mineral products 0.898 0.102 0.000 
Australia Instruments and related products 0.643 0.357 0.000 
Austria Chemical and allied Products 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Austria Primary and fabricated metals 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Austria Industrial machinery and equipment 0.984 0.016 0.000 
Austria Other manufacturing 0.821 0.179 0.000 
Austria Other Industries 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Belgium Food and kindred products 0.852 0.136 0.012 
Belgium Chemical and allied Products 0.544 0.355 0.101 
Belgium Primary and fabricated metals 0.933 0.067 0.000 
Belgium Industrial machinery and equipment 0.907 0.093 0.000 
* See Table A4. 
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Table A3, (continued) 
Country Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
ISI Description Share Share Share 
Belgium Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.930 0.068 0.002 
Belgium Transportation equipment 0.966 0.016 0.018 
Belgium Other manufacturing 0.890 0.092 0.018 
Belgium Other Industries 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Brazil Grain mill and bakery products 0.928 0.072 0.000 
Brazil Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.867 0.130 0.003 
Brazil Drugs 0.685 0.315 0.000 
Brazil Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.631 0.369 0.000 
Brazil Agricultural chemicals 0.521 0.479 0.000 
Brazil Ferrous 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Brazil Other 0.880 0.118 0.002 
Brazil Electronic components and 
accessories 0.980 0.020 0.000 
Brazil Motor vehicles and equipment 0.529 0.340 0.132 
Brazil Crude petroleum extraction (no 
refining) and natural gas 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Brazil Other 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Brazil Textile products and apparel 0.954 0.046 0.000 
Brazil Paper and allied products 0.531 0.469 0.000 
Brazil Printing and publishing 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Brazil Glass products 0.737 0.263 0.000 
Brazil Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic 
mineral products 0.968 0.032 0.000 
Brazil Instruments and related products 0.401 0.599 0.000 
Brazil Mining 0.996 0.000 0.004 
Canada Grain mill and bakery products 0.840 0.158 0.001 
Canada Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.728 0.272 0.000 
Canada Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.477 0.523 0.000 
Canada Ferrous 0.958 0.041 0.001 
Canada Nonferrous 0.899 0.100 0.001 
Canada Fabricated metal products 0.857 0.142 0.001 
Canada Other 0.766 0.234 0.000 
Canada Textile products and apparel 0.904 0.095 0.001 
Canada Printing and publishing 0.830 0.170 0.000 
Canada Rubber products 0.611 0.389 0.000 
Canada Miscellaneous plastics products 0.902 0.098 0.000 
Canada Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic 
mineral products 0.731 0.269 0.000 
Canada Instruments and related products 0.871 0.129 0.000 
Chile Chemical and allied Products 0.909 0.085 0.006 
Chile Primary and fabricated metals 0.879 0.043 0.078 
Chile Industrial machinery and equipment 0.999 0.000 0.001 
Chile Electronic and other electric 
equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
China Food and kindred products 0.983 0.017 0.000 
Colombia Chemical and allied Products 0.817 0.151 0.031 
Colombia Primary and fabricated metals 0.959 0.041 0.000 
Colombia Industrial machinery and equipment 0.999 0.001 0.000 
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Table A3, (continued) 
Country Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
ISI Description Share Share Share 
Colombia Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.993 0.007 o.ooo 
Ecuador Food and kindred products 0.814 0.186 0.000 
Ecuador Chemical and allied Products 0.966 0.034 o.ooo 
Ecuador Primary and fabricated metals 0.912 0.088 0.000 
Ecuador Industrial machinery and equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Ecuador Electronic and other electric 
equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Ecuador Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Ecuador Other manufacturing 0.975 0.025 0.000 
Ecuador Other Industries 0.940 0.000 0.060 
Finland Petroleum 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Finland Food and kindred products 0.983 0.017 0.000 
Finland Chemical and allied Products 0.904 0.096 0.000 
Finland Primary and fabricated metals 1.000 0.000 o.ooo 
Finland Industrial machinery and equipment 0.994 0.006 0.000 
Finland Electronic and other electric 
equipment 1.000 0.000 o.ooo 
Finland Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Finland Other manufacturing 0.875 0.125 o.ooo 
Finland Other Industries 1.000 0.000 0.000 
France Grain mill and bakery products 0.774 0.226 0.000 
France Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.641 0.359 0.000 
France Drugs 0.606 0.394 0.000 
France Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.801 0.199 0.000 
France Agricultural chemicals 0.284 0.716 0.000 
France Ferrous 1.000 0.000 0.000 
France Nonferrous 0.981 0.019 0.000 
France Fabricated metal products 0.734 0.225 0.041 
France Other manufacturing 0.858 0.142 0.000 
France Electronic and other electric 
equipment, nec 0.919 0.081 0.000 
France Crude petroleum extraction (no 
refining) and natural gas 1.000 0.000 0.000 
France Textile products and apparel 0.984 0.016 0.000 
France Paper and allied products 0.671 0.329 o.ooo 
France Printing and publishing 0.769 0.231 0.000 
France Miscellaneous plastics products 0.748 0.252 0.000 
France Glass products 0.886 0.114 0.000 
France Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic 
mineral products 0.965 0.035 0.000 
France Instruments and related products 0.660 0.339 0.001 
France Mining 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Germany Grain mill and bakery products 0.989 0.011 0.000 
Germany Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.540 0.459 0.001 
Germany Drugs 0.776 0.224 0.000 
Germany Agricultural chemicals 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Germany Ferrous 0.953 0.047 0.000 
Germany Other manufacturing 0.870 0.130 0.000 
Germany Electronic components and 
accessories 0.698 0.302 0.000 
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Table A3, (continued) 
Country Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
ISI Description Share Share Share 
Germany Crude petroleum extraction (no 
refining) and natural gas 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Germany Other 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Germany Paper and allied products 0.649 0.351 0.000 
Germany Printing and publishing 0.952 0.048 0.000 
Germany Rubber products 0.574 0.426 0.000 
Germany Miscellaneous plastics products 0.893 0.107 0.000 
Germany Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic 
mineral products 0.952 0.048 0.000 
Germany Instruments and related products 0.795 0.203 0.002 
Germany Mining 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Guatemala Food and kindred products 0.966 0.025 0.008 
Guatemala Chemical and allied Products 0.952 0.048 0.000 
Guatemala Industrial machinery and equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Guatemala Electronic and other electric 
equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Guatemala Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Hong Kong Petroleum 0.500 0.000 0.500 
Hong Kong Food and kindred products 0.988 0.012 0.000 
Hong Kong Primary and fabricated metals 0.954 0.039 0.008 
Hong Kong Industrial machinery and equipment 0.898 0.102 0.000 
Hong Kong Other Industries 0.899 0.000 0.101 
India Petroleum 0.975 0.000 0.025 
India Food and kindred products 0.957 0.032 0.011 
India Chemical and allied Products 0.960 0.009 0.030 
India Primary and fabricated metals 1.000 0.000 0.000 
India Industrial machinery and equipment 0.982 0.014 0.004 
India Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.983 0.006 0.011 
India Transportation equipment 0.997 0.000 0.003 
India Other Industries 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Ireland Petroleum 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Ireland Chemical and allied Products 0.811 0.149 0.039 
Ireland Primary and fabricated metals 0.699 0.252 0.048 
Ireland Industrial machinery and equipment 0.694 0.306 0.000 
Ireland Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.569 0.431 0.000 
Ireland Transportation equipment 0.973 0.027 0.000 
Ireland Other Industries 0.972 0.000 0.028 
Italy Petroleum 0.957 0.000 0.043 
Italy Food and kindred products 0.885 0.110 0.005 
Italy Chemical and allied Products 0.776 0.193 0.031 
Italy Primary and fabricated metals 0.982 0.018 0.000 
Italy Industrial machinery and equipment 0.635 0.354 0.011 
Italy Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.879 0.121 0.000 
Italy Other Industries 0.985 0.000 0.015 
Jamaica Petroleum 0.980 0.000 0.020 
Jamaica Food and kindred products 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Jamaica Primary and fabricated metals 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Jamaica Industrial machinery and equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table A3, (continued) 
Country ISI Description Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
Share Share Share 
Jamaica Electronic and other electric 
equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Jamaica Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Japan Grain mill and bakery products 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Japan Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.922 0.044 0.034 
Japan Drugs 0.780 0.220 0.000 
Japan Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.922 0.067 0.011 
Japan Agricultural chemicals 0.993 0.007 0.000 
Japan Chemical products, nec 0.535 0.371 0.094 
Japan Ferrous 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Japan Electronic components and 
accessories 0.637 0.361 0.003 
Japan Electronic and other electric 
equipment, nec 0.998 0.001 0.001 
Japan Motor vehicles and equipment 0.988 0.003 0.009 
Japan Crude petroleum extraction (no 
refining) and natural gas 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Japan Other 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Japan Rubber products 0.992 0.003 0.005 
Japan Glass products 0.976 0.024 0.000 
Japan Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic 
mineral products 0.950 0.036 0.014 
Japan Instruments and related products 0.859 0.113 0.028 
Japan Mining 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Korea, Republic Petroleum 
of 0.998 0.000 0.002 
Korea, Republic Chemical and allied Products 
of 0.905 0.050 0.045 
Korea, Republic Primary and fabricated metals 
of 0.997 0.001 0.001 
Korea, Republic Electronic and other electric 
of equipment 0.904 0.088 0.009 
Malaysia Food and kindred products 0.980 0.020 0.000 
Malaysia Primary and fabricated metals 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Malaysia Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.524 0.463 0.013 
Malaysia Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Malaysia Other Industries 0.986 0.000 0.014 
Mexico Food and kindred products 0.935 0.046 0.020 
Mexico Chemical and allied Products 0.795 0.119 0.085 
Mexico Primary and fabricated metals 0.961 0.034 0.005 
Mexico Industrial machinery and equipment 0.885 0.105 0.010 
Mexico Other Industries 0.886 0.004 0.110 
Netherlands Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Netherlands Agricultural chemicals 0.969 0.031 0.000 
Netherlands Ferrous 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Netherlands Motor vehicles and equipment 0.997 0.003 0.000 
Netherlands Crude petroleum extraction (no 
refining) and natural gas 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Netherlands Other manufacturing 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Netherlands Textile products and apparel 1.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table A3, (continued) 
Country Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
ISI Description Share Share Share 
Netherlands Paper and allied products 0.869 0.131 0.000 
Netherlands Printing and publishing 0.890 0.110 0.000 
Netherlands Rubber products 0.988 0.012 0.000 
Netherlands Glass products 0.959 0.041 0.000 
Netherlands Instruments and related products 0.676 0.324 0.001 
Netherlands Mining 1.000 0.000 0.000 
New Zealand Petroleum 1.000 0.000 0.000 
New Zealand Food and kindred products 0.984 0.000 0.016 
New Zealand Chemical and allied Products 0.918 0.082 0.000 
New Zealand Primary and fabricated metals 0.974 0.026 0.000 
New Zealand Industrial machinery and equipment 0.993 0.007 0.000 
New Zealand Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.985 0.015 o.ooo 
New Zealand Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
New Zealand Other manufacturing 0.722 0.278 0.000 
New Zealand Other Industries 0.679 0.080 0.241 
Norway Chemical and allied Products 0.802 0.198 0.000 
Norway Primary and fabricated metals 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Norway Electronic and other electric 
equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Norway Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Norway Other manufacturing 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Norway Other Industries 0.977 0.000 0.023 
Panama Chemical and allied Products 0.904 0.096 0.000 
Panama Primary and fabricated metals 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Panama Industrial machinery and equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Panama Electronic and other electric 
equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Panama Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Panama Other manufacturing 0.872 0.128 0.000 
Portugal Petroleum 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Portugal Food and kindred products 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Portugal Chemical and allied Products 0.897 0.103 o.ooo 
Portugal Primary and fabricated metals 0.935 0.065 0.000 
Portugal Industrial machinery and equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Portugal Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Portugal Other Industries 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Saudi Arabia Petroleum 0.777 0.000 0.223 
Saudi Arabia Food and kindred products 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Saudi Arabia Industrial machinery and equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Saudi Arabia Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Singapore Petroleum 0.760 0.017 0.223 
Singapore Food and kindred products 0.954 0.005 0.041 
Singapore Chemical and allied Products 0.886 0.111 0.003 
Singapore Industrial machinery and equipment 0.587 0.408 0.005 
Singapore Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.672 0.317 0.010 
Singapore Transportation equipment 0.963 0.037 0.000 
South Africa Petroleum 0.845 0.000 0.155 
South Africa Food and kindred products 1.000 0.000 0.000 
South Africa Industrial machinery and equipment 0.931 0.064 0.005 
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Table A3, (continued) 
Country Unaffiliated MOFA JV 
ISI Description Share Share Share 
South Africa Transportation equipment 0.986 0.014 0.000 
South Africa Other Industries 0.991 0.000 0.009 
Sweden Petroleum 0.447 0.442 0.111 
Sweden Food and kindred products 0.992 0.008 0.000 
Sweden Primary and fabricated metals 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Sweden Industrial machinery and equipment 0.978 0.022 0.000 
Sweden Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Sweden Other manufacturing 0.487 0.363 0.150 
Sweden Other Industries 1.000 0.000 o.ooo 
Switzerland Food and kindred products 0.991 0.009 0.000 
Switzerland Chemical and allied Products 0.987 0.012 0.001 
Switzerland Primary and fabricated metals 0.994 0.006 0.000 
Switzerland Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.878 0.123 0.000 
Switzerland Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Switzerland Other Industries 0.822 0.000 0.178 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Food and kindred products 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Industrial machinery and equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Trinidad and Electronic and other electric 
Tobago equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Transportation equipment 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Other Industries 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Turkey Petroleum 0.784 0.036 0.180 
Turkey Primary and fabricated metals 0.977 0.000 0.023 
Turkey Electronic and other electric 
equipment 0.994 0.006 0.000 
Turkey Other Industries 1.000 0.000 0.000 
United Kingdom Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.690 0.310 0.000 
United Kingdom Drugs 0.324 0.676 0.000 
United Kingdom Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.524 0.476 0.000 
United Kingdom Ferrous 0.963 0.037 0.000 
United Kingdom Fabricated metal products 
Crude petroleum extraction (no 
0.567 0.422 0.011 
United Kingdom refining) and natural gas 0.673 0.327 0.000 
United Kingdom Textile products and apparel 0.838 0.162 0.000 
United Kingdom Paper and allied products 0.660 0.340 0.000 
United Kingdom Rubber products 0.843 0.157 0.000 
United Kingdom Miscellaneous plastics products 0.882 0.111 0.007 
United Kingdom Glass products 
Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic 
0.790 0.157 0.052 
United Kingdom mineral products 0.863 0.137 0.000 
United Kingdom Instruments and related products 0.549 0.448 0.003 
United Kingdom Mining 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Table A4. Concordance of ISI and SIC. 
ISI Category ISI Description 
Petroleum 
Oil and Gas Extraction 
133 Crude Petroleum Extraction (no refining) and natural gas 
138 Oil and Gas field Services 
Petroleum and Coal Products 
291 Integrated petroleum refining and extraction 
292 Petroleum refining without extraction 
299 Petroleum and Coal Products nec. 
517 Petroleum wholesale trade 
Other 
441 Petroleum tanker trade 
461 Petroleum and natural gas pipeline 
470 Petroleum storage for higher 
554 Gasoline Service Stations 
Manufacturing 
Food and Kindred Products 
Grain Mill and Bakery Product 
204 Grain Mill Products 
205 Bakery Products 
208 Beverage 
Other 
201 Meat Products 
202 Dairy Products 
203 Preserved fruits and vegetables 
209 Other food and kindred products 
Chemical and Allied Products 
281 Industrial Chemical and Synthetic 
283 Drugs 
284 Soap, Cleaners and toilet Goods 
287 Agricultural Chemicals 
289 Chemical products, nec 
Primary and fabricated metals 
Primary metal Industry 
331 Ferrous 
335 Nonferrous 



















Table A4, (continued) 
ISI Category ISI Description 
Fabricated metal products 
341 Metal cans, forging and stampings 
342 Cutlery, hand tools, and screw products 
343 Heating and plumbing equipment and structural metal 
products 
349 Fabricated metal products, nec , ordinance and services 
Industrial machinery and equipment 
352 Farms and garden machinery 
353 Construction, mining and material handling machinery 
357 Computer and office equipment 
Other 
351 Engines and turbines 
354 Metalworking machinery 
355 Special industry machinery 
356 General industry machinery and equipment 
358 Refrigeration and service industry machinery 
359 Industrial machinery and equipment nec. 
Electronic and other electric equipment 
363 Household appliances 
366 Household audio and video equipment and communication 
equipment 
367 Electronic components and accessories 
369 Electronic and other electric equipment, nec 
Transportation equipment 
371 Motor vehicle and equipment 
379 Other 
Other manufacturing 
210 Tobacco products 
Textile products and apparel 
220 Textile mill products 
230 Apparel and other textile products 
Lumber, wood, furniture and fixtures 
240 Lumber and wood products 
250 Furniture and fixtures 
Paper and allied products 

























Table A4, (continued) 
ISI Category ISI Description 1987 SIC Category 
262 Pulp, paper and board mills 26H 262+263 
265 Other paper and allied products 265+267 
Printing and Publishing 
271 Newspaper 271 
272 Misc. publishing 272+273+274+277 
275 Commercial printing and services 275+276+278+279 
305 Rubber products 301+302+305+306 
308 Misc. plastic products 308 
321 Glass products 321+322+323 
329 Stone, clay and other non metallic mineral products 324+325+326+327+328+329 
Instruments and related products 
381 Measuring, scientific, and optical instruments 38l+382+387 
384 Medical instrument and supplies and ophthalmic goods 384+385 
386 Photgraphic equipment and supplies 386 
Other 
310 Leather and leather products 31 
390 Misc. manufacturing industry 39 
Wholesale trade 
Durable goods 
501 Motor vehicles and equipment 
503 Lumber and construction materials 
504 Professional and commercial equipment and supplies 
505 Metals and minerals 
506 Electric goods 
507 Hardware, plumbing and heating equipment and supplies 
508 Machinery equipment and supplies, nec 
509 Durable goods, nec 
Nondurable goods 
511 Paper and paper products 
512 Drugs, proprietaries and sundries 
513 Apparel, pieces goods, and notions 
514 Groceries and related products 
515 Farm products raw materials 
519 Nondurable goods ncc 
Finance ( except depository institutions), Insurance and real estate 
Table A4, (continued) 
ISI Category IS! Description 









Non-business entities except Government 
Services 
700 Hotels and other lodging places 
Business franchising 
731 Advertising 
735 Equipment rental (ex automobile and computers) 
Computer processing and data preparation services 
741 Computer processing and data preparation 
742 Information retrieval service 
743 Computer related service, nec 
Business services, nec 
734 Sevices to buildings 
736 Personnel supply services 
74 9 Other 
751 Automotive rental and leasing 
780 Motion pictures, including television tape and film 
800 Health service 
871 Engineering, architectural and surveying services 
874 Management and public relations services 
Other 
752 Automotive parking, repair and other service 
760 Misc. repair services 
790 Amusement and recreation service 
810 Legal Service 
820 Education services 









1987 SIC Category 
w 
VO 
Table A4, (continued) 
1SI Category ISI Description 
873 Research and development and testing services 
890 Other services provided on a commercial basis 
Other Industry 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
010 Agricultural production crops 
020 Agricultural production- livestock 
070 Agricultural services 
080 Forestry 
090 Fishing, hunting and trapping 
Mining 
Metal mining 
101 Iron ores 
102 Copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver ores 
107 Other metallic ores 
108 Metal mining services 
Nonmctalic minerals 
120 Coal 
124 Coal mining services 
140 Nonmctalic mineral, except fuels 




449 Water transportation 
450 Transportation by air 
462 Pipeline, except petroleum and natural gas 
472 Passenger transportation arrangements 
477 Transportation and related services, nec 
Communications 
481 Telephone and telegraph communication 
483 Other communications service 
490 Electric, gas, and sanitary service 
Retail trade 
530 General merchandise stores 
540 Food stores 












14 except 148 o 
148 
15+16+17 
Table A4, (continued) 
ISI Category ISI Description 1987 SIC Category 
560 Apparel and accessory stores 
580 Eating and drinking places 
590 Retail trade, nec 
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New Zealand 2 
Norway 6 
Panama 5 
i Portugal 3 
Saudi Arabia 2 
Singapore 4 
South Africa 2 
Sweden 3 
Switzerland 8 
Trinidad and Tobago 6 
Turkey 2 
United Kingdom 11 
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Saudi Arabia 4 
Singapore 6 
South Africa 5 
Sweden 7 
Switzerland 6 
Trinidad and Tobago 5 
Turkey 4 
United Kingdom 14 
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Table A7. Frequency of Types of Observations. 
Description Sales Share Export Share 
Unaffiliated, MOFA, and Joint Venture > 0. 81 67 
Unaffiliated, MOFA > 0, and Joint Venture = 0. 84 117 
Unaffiliated > 0, MOFA=0, and Joint Venture > 0. 2 21 
Unaffiliated = 0, MOFA and Joint Venture > 0. 1 0 
Unaffiliated > 0, MOFA and Joint Venture = 0. 21 79 
Unaffiliated = 0, MOFA > 0 and Joint Venture = 0. 2 0 
Unaffiliated = 0, MOFA = 0 and Joint Venture > 0. 0 0 
Total # of Observations 191 284 
Table A8. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Sales Share Model: All 
Observations. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
r, 191 0.422 0.329 0.000 1.000 
r2 191 0.520 0.335 0.000 1.000 
% 191 0.058 0.135 0.000 0.860 
-v. 191 -0.031 0.791 -2.694 2.214 
*2 191 6.933 2.741 1.609 12.722 
*3 191 1.879 0.957 -0.511 4.432 
*4 191 0.141 0.349 0.000 1.000 
*5 191 0.272 0.446 0.000 1.000 
*6 191 0.826 0.174 0.143 0.964 
*7.4 191 -1.218 1.303 -4.754 0.726 
*7fi 191 8.419 1.070 5.724 10.168 
*S 191 8.833 1.324 5.566 11.202 
X9A 191 3.883 0.227 3.291 4.283 
191 3.303 0.649 1.413 4.312 
*10 191 4.625 0.324 3.799 5.568 
*11 191 3.439 0.286 2.303 4.094 
*12 
191 5.993 1.274 3.466 7.796 
*13 191 8.540 0.846 6.598 9.678 
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Table A9. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Sales Share Model: 
Observations for which Unaffiliated, MOFA, and JV share > 0. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
YX 81 0.301 0.232 0.002 0.862 
Y3 81 0.575 0.281 0.016 0.991 
% 81 0.125 0.172 0.001 0.860 
Industry Specific 
Variables3: 
*i 28 -0.34894 1.023985 -2.694 1.705547 
*8 28 8.317306 1.265598 5.586815 10.80302 
X9A 28 3.86784 0.238127 3.290767 4.282761 
*10 28 4.604465 0.361128 3.799303 5.56804 
Country Specific 
Variables6: 
*2 31 6.864827 2.747334 2.079442 12.72207 
*3 31 2.012103 1.016931 -0.51083 4.432007 
*4 31 0.064516 0.249731 0 1 
*5 31 0.16129 0.373878 0 1 
*6 31 0.796251 0.179954 0.143423 0.953177 
*7j 31 -1.55113 1.516814 -4.75359 0.726335 
*78 31 8.242095 0.982599 6.047494 10.16818 
*98 31 3.185805 0.746681 1.412908 4.311533 
*., 31 3.464123 0.31055 2.302585 4.094345 
*12 31 5.726155 1.054924 3.465736 7.796058 
*13 31 8.832892 0.613138 6.598365 9.652527 
1 The means are calculated based on the unique number of industries, represented in this subset of the data. 
b The means are calculated based on the unique number of countries, represented in this subset of the data. 
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Table A10. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Sales Share Model: 
Observations for which Unaffiliated and MOFA > 0, and JV = 0. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
YI 84 0.406 0.300 0.005 0.995 
Y2 84 0.594 0.300 0.005 0.995 
Y] 84 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Specific 
Variables3: 
4 26 -0.15585 0.992315 -2.4998 2.214197 
*8 26 8.14867 1.418002 5.686358 10.7067 
X9A 26 3.847431 0.221497 3.290767 4.180883 
*10 26 4.64008 0.356109 3.80436 5.438099 
Country Specific 
Variables": 
*2 29 6.333154 2.712382 1.609438 10.858 
*3 29 1.802989 0.945326 -0.51083 3.054001 
*4 29 0.034483 0.185695 0 1 
*5 29 0.206897 0.412251 0 1 
*6 29 0.845386 0.149438 0.143423 0.963964 
*7 A 29 -1.53406 1.522474 -4.75359 0.726335 
X1B 29 8.306862 1.049787 5.724369 10.16818 
*9 B 29 3.264815 0.626909 2.096986 4.311533 
*11 29 3.410686 0.291887 2.302585 3.806663 
*12 29 5.607925 1.170522 3.465736 7.796058 
*13 29 8.741014 0.645246 6.598365 9.677719 
1 The means are calculated based on the unique number of industries, represented in this subset of the data. 
b The means are calculated based on the unique number of countries, represented in this subset of the data. 
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Table All. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Sales Share Model: 
Observations for which Unaffiliated > 0, MOFA = 0, and JV > 0. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
% 2 0.540 0.152 0.433 0.648 
r2 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Y, 2 0.460 0.152 0.352 0.567 
Industry Specific 
Variables3: 
4 2 -0.2622 0.357284 -0.51484 -0.00956 
*8 2 10.2704 0.043169 10.23987 10.30092 
X 9A 2 3.982622 0.280383 3.784362 4.180883 
*10 2 4.9796 0.648415 4.521102 5.438099 
Country Specific 
Variables": 
*2 2 2.705823 0.885837 2.079442 3.332205 
*3 2 1.229794 1.739192 0 2.459589 
*4 2 0 0 0 0 
*S 2 0 0 0 0 
*6 2 0.665839 0.308609 0.447619 0.884058 
*7.4 2 0 0 0 0 
*78 2 7.554836 1.34982 6.600369 8.509303 
*98 2 2.868812 0.989607 2.169054 3.56857 
*11 2 3.512769 0.415628 3.218876 3.806663 
*12 2 4.427118 0.293606 4.219508 4.634729 
*13 2 8.836006 0.645657 8.379457 9.292554 
1 The means are calculated based on the unique number of industries, represented in this subset of the data. 
b The means are calculated based on the unique number of countries, represented in this subset of the data. 
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Table Al2. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Sales Share Model: 
Observations for which Unaffiliated = 0, MOFA > 0, and JV > 0. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
% 1 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 
r2 1 0.969 . 0.969 0.969 
% 1 0.031 . 0.031 0.031 
Industry Specific 
Variables3: 
4 1 -0.77909 . -0.77909 -0.77909 
*s 1 7.337337 . 7.337337 7.337337 
*9.4 1 3.807984 . 3.807984 3.807984 
*10 1 4.346156 . 4.346156 4.346156 
Country Specific 
Variables": 
*2 1 8.019284 . 8.019284 8.019284 
*3 1 2.272126 . 2.272126 2.272126 
*4 1 1 . 1 1 
*5 1 1 . 1 1 
*6 1 0.925979 . 0.925979 0.925979 
*7 A 1 -0.90764 . -0.90764 -0.90764 
*78 1 9.849243 . 9.849243 9.849243 
*98 1 3.515968 . 3.515968 3.515968 
*1, 1 3.433987 . 3.433987 3.433987 
*12 1 7.63627 . 7.63627 7.63627 
*13 1 6.598365 . 6.598365 6.598365 
1 The means are calculated based on the unique number of industries, represented in this subset of the data. 
b The means are calculated based on the unique number of countries, represented in this subset of the data. 
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Table Al3. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Sales Share Model: 
Observations for which Unaffiliated > 0, MOFA and JV = 0. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
r, 21 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
rz 21 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% 21 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Specific 
Variables3: 
-v. 7 -0.67663 1.244218 -2.4998 0.784148 
*8 7 8.847438 1.319693 6.322016 10.17085 
*9.4 7 3.906958 0.22425 3.456097 4.180883 
*10 7 4.679754 0.379415 4.341586 5.438099 
Country Specific 
Variables6: 
*2 11 5.393221 3.271837 1.609438 10.858 
*3 11 1.64009 1.099849 0 2.85647 
*4 11 0 0 0 0 
*5 11 0 0 0 0 
*6 11 0.8685 0.05896 0.757576 0.963964 
*7 A 11 -1.40447 1.700232 -4.75359 0.726335 
*78 11 8.008421 1.354687 5.724369 10.16818 
*98 11 3.131803 0.855748 2.096986 4.311533 
*11 11 3.476996 0.211716 3.218876 3.806663 
*12 11 5.034962 1.303672 3.465736 7.228389 
*13 11 8.542116 0.520801 7.752024 9.638857 
1 The means are calculated based on the unique number of industries, represented in this subset of the data. 
b The means are calculated based on the unique number of countries, represented in this subset of the data. 
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Table A14. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Sales Share Model: 
Observations for which Unaffiliated = 0, MOFA > 0, and JV - 0. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
r, 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Y2 2 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
% 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Specific 
Variables3: 
1 -0.77909 . -0.77909 -0.77909 
*8 1 7.462636 . 7.462636 7.462636 
1 3.807984 . 3.807984 3.807984 
X\0 1 4.346156 . 4.346156 4.346156 
Country Specific 
Variables6: 
XZ 2 10.93126 2.532583 9.140454 12.72207 
*3 2 2.063648 0.559945 1.667707 2.459589 
*4 2 0 0 0 0 
*5 2 0.5 0.707107 0 1 
*6 2 0.747946 0.171497 0.62668 0.869213 
X 1A 2 -0.59381 0.997138 -1.29889 0.111278 
X 7B 2 9.043276 0.142599 8.942444 9.144108 
X 9B 2 3.798901 0.384007 3.527367 4.070435 
XU 2 3.560424 0.090392 3.496508 3.624341 
X12 2 6.827831 0.128501 6.736967 6.918695 
xn 2 9.487589 0.268884 9.29746 9.677719 
1 The means are calculated based on the unique number of industries, represented in this subset of the data. 
b The means are calculated based on the unique number of countries, represented in this subset of the data. 
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Table Al 5. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Export Share Model: All 
Observations. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
r, 284 0.885 0.155 0.191 1.000 
n 284 0.102 0.149 0.000 0.809 
n 284 0.013 0.046 0.000 0.500 
*1 284 -0.066 0.924 -2.694 2.214 
X2 284 7.537 2.849 1.609 12.722 
*3 284 1.965 0.887 -0.511 4.432 
*4 284 0.063 0.244 0.000 1.000 
*5 284 0.232 0.423 0.000 1.000 
X6 284 0.790 0.211 0.143 0.964 
X1A 284 -1.139 1.365 -4.754 0.726 
X1B 284 8.410 0.998 5.724 10.168 
X% 284 8.751 1.358 5.566 11.193 
X9A 284 3.872 0.235 3.291 4.283 
X9B 284 3.352 0.659 1.413 4.312 
*10 284 4.640 0.371 3.799 5.568 
XU 284 3.469 0.278 2.303 4.094 
xn 284 6.009 1.162 3.466 7.796 
*13 284 8.789 0.665 6.598 9.678 
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Table Al6. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Export Share model: 
Observations for which Unaffiliated, MOFA, and JV > 0. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
% 67 0.819 0.153 0.447 0.998 
y2 67 0.149 0.141 0.001 0.463 
% 67 0.033 0.053 0.000 0.241 
Industry Specific 
Variables3: 
4 26 -0.13325 0.648893 -1.75052 0.951316 
*s 26 8.328023 1.316454 5.586815 10.7079 
*9 A 26 3.844713 0.242441 3.290767 4.282761 
*10 26 4.648364 0.38298 3.863168 5.56804 
Country Specific 
Variables": 
*2 25 7.338872 2.709023 1.609438 12.72207 
*3 25 1.908832 1.067859 -0.51083 4.432007 
*4 25 0.08 0.276888 0 1 
*5 25 0.24 0.43589 0 1 
*6 25 0.801352 0.184096 0.143423 0.953177 
*7X 25 -1.5583 1 438338 -4.46591 0.726335 
*75 25 8.254224 1.033681 5.724369 9.849243 
*93 25 3.225163 0.705824 1.412908 4.311533 
*11 25 3.436054 0.328923 2.302585 4.094345 
*12 25 6.00479 1.028488 3.850148 7.796058 
*13 25 8.880288 0.67381 6.598365 9.677719 
1 The means are calculated based on the unique number of industries, represented in this subset of the data. 
b The means are calculated based on the unique number of countries, represented in this subset of the data. 
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Table Al 7. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Export Share model: 
Observations for which Unaffiliated and MOFA > 0, and JV = 0. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
% 117 0.838 0.170 0.191 0.999 
r2 117 0.162 0.170 0.001 0.809 
yi 117 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Specific 
Variables3: 
*i 29 -0.20459 1.02483 -2.694 2.214197 
*s 29 8.093176 1.274012 5.566106 10.39478 
X9A 29 3.872149 0.229007 3.290767 4.282761 
*10 29 4.650551 0.420489 3.799303 5.56804 
Country Specific 
Variables": 
*2 28 6.974214 2.809599 1.609438 12.72207 
*3 28 1.869149 0.93375 -0.51083 3.627004 
*4 28 0.035714 0.188982 0 1 
*5 28 0.214286 0.417855 0 1 
*6 28 0 845157 0.15411 0.143423 0.963964 
28 -1.54931 1.466272 -4.75359 0.726335 
*78 28 8.360419 1.072232 5.724369 10.16818 
*98 28 3.282863 0.718922 1.525957 4.311533 
*11 28 3.395249 0.287886 2.302585 3.73767 
*12 28 5.815833 1.048092 3.850148 7.796058 
*13 28 8.828448 0.629745 6.598365 9.677719 
1 The means are calculated based on the unique number of industries, represented in this subset of the data. 
b The means are calculated based on the unique number of countries, represented in this subset of the data. 
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Table Al8. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Export Share model: 
Observations for which Unaffiliated > 0, MOFA = 0, and JV > 0. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
r, 21 0.926 0.117 0.500 0.999 
y2 21 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% 21 0.074 0.117 0.001 0.500 
Industry Specific 
Variables3: 
*i 8 -0.14489 1.088138 -2.4998 0.951316 
*s 8 9.18322 1.26773 6.821949 10.55518 
*9.4 8 3.855089 0.270253 3.456097 4.180883 
*10 8 4.716651 0.390487 4.346369 5.438099 
Country Specific 
Variables": 
*2 17 6.303505 2.58461 1.94591 10.9895 
*3 17 1.898813 1.238376 0 4.432007 
*4 17 0 0 0 0 
*5 17 0.235294 0.437237 0 1 
*6 17 0.785063 0.154482 0.421569 0.953177 
*7.4 17 -1.70943 1.455967 -4.46591 0.294439 
*75 17 8.066502 1.065726 6.047494 10.16818 
*96 17 3.062801 0.731213 1.412908 4.311533 
*11 17 3.402334 0.390496 2.302585 4.094345 
*12 17 5.310275 0.88323 3.496508 6.736967 
*13 17 9.050895 0.510682 7.752024 9.677719 
1 The means are calculated based on the unique number of industries, represented in this subset of the data. 
b The means are calculated based on the unique number of countries, represented in this subset of the data. 
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Table A19. Descriptive Statistics for Data used in Estimating Export Share model: 
Observations for which Unaffiliated > 0, MOFA = 0, and JV = 0. 
Description N MEAN S.D MIN MAX 
y, 79 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
r2 79 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% 79 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Specific 
Variables3: 
19 -0.31572 1.242808 -2.694 2.214197 
*s 19 8.46862 1.568199 5.686358 10.7067 
X9A 19 3.852819 0.256843 3.290767 4.180883 
*10 19 4.593221 0.414029 3.799303 5.438099 
Country Specific 
Variables": 
*2 27 6.713302 2.91273 1.609438 12.72207 
*3 27 1.934592 0.989617 0 4.432007 
*4 27 0 0 0 0 
*5 27 0.185185 0.395847 0 1 
*6 27 0.800501 0.190888 0.143423 0.963964 
*7.4 27 -1.46128 1.616414 -4.75359 0.726335 
*78 27 8.220056 1.110455 5.724369 10.16818 
*98 27 3.237403 0.749461 1.412908 4.311533 
*11 27 3.476241 0.315913 2.302585 4.094345 
*12 27 5.448632 1.163166 3.465736 7.796058 
*13 27 8.837317 0.48904 7.752024 9.677719 
1 The means are calculated based on the unique number of industries, represented in this subset of the data. 
b The means are calculated based on the unique number of countries, represented in this subset of the data. 
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APPENDIX B: COMPUTER PROGRAMS USED FOR 
ESTIMATION 
Program 1: Maximum Likelihood Estimation. 
/* maxlikl.gss */ 
/* Program to calculate maximum likelihood estimates */ 
/* of regression coefficients and variance parameters */ 
/* Uses share data and exogenous variable data read in from 
gdata2.txt */ 
library optmum ; 
optset ; 
_opstmth = "bfgs brent" ; 
_opmdmth = "newton stepbt" ; 
clear _n,_yl,_y2,_y3,_muvec,_yvec,_ivsig,_dsig ; 
/* */ 
/* Read in data */ 
/* */ 
output file = d:\thesis\sic\runl\sales\run3\maxlik3.out reset ; 
n = 191 ; 
_n = n ; 
load data[] = d:\thesis\sic\runl\sales\run3\sales3.txt ; 
data = reshape(data, 191, 18) ; 
_yl = data[.,1]; 
_y2 = data[.,2]; 
_y3 = data [.,3] ; 
_xl = data [.,4] ,• 
_x2 = data[.,5] ; 
_x3 = data[.,6] ; 
_x4 = data[.,7] ; 
_x5 = data [. , 8 ] ; 
_x6 = data[.,9] ; 
_x7 = data[.,10] ; 
_x8 = data[.,11] ; 
_x9 = data[.,12] ; 
_xl0 = data[.,13] ; 
_xll = data[.,14] ; 
_xl2 = data[.,15] ; 
_xl3 = data[.,16]; 
_xl4 = data[.,17]; 
_xl5 = data[.,18]; 
/* Set initial values for parameter vector */ 





































/* Call optmum */ 
{ xx, ff, gg, retcode } = optmum(ifct, xxO) ; 
print xx ; 
print ff ; 
print gg ,-
print retcode ; 
/* */ 
/* Procedure to evaluate likelihood function */ 
/ *  */ 
proc fct(xx) ; 
local mul, mu2, sigll, sig22, sigl2, yl, y2, y3, tl, t2, t3, 
n, cl, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, muvec, obstype, sigl3, 
sig23, sig33, mu3, yvec, dsigl2, dsig23, dsig31, ivsigl2, 
ivsig23, ivsig31, ulim, i, fcttmp, fac, 
xl, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, xlO, xll, xl2,xl3,xl4, xl5, 
blO, bll, bl2, bl3, bl4, bl5, bl6, bl7, bl8, bl9, bllO, bill, 
bll2,bll3,bll4, 
bllS, 
b20, b21, b22, b23, b24, b25, b26, b27, b28, b29, b210, b211, 
b212,b213,b214, 
b215 ; 
ulim = 5.0 ; 
intord =40 ; 
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xl = Xl ; 
x2 = X2 ; 
x3 = 
_X3 ; 
x4 = x4 ; 
x5 = 
_X5 ; 
x6 = X6 ; 





xlO = _xl0 
xll = _xll 
xl2 = _xl2 
xl3 = _xl3 
Xl4 = _xl4 
xlS = xl5 ; 
Cl = yl .GT zeros(n, 1) ; 
t2 = y2 .GT zeros (n, 1) ; 
t3 = y3 .GT zeros(n, 1) ; 
cl = tl .* t2 . * t3 ; 
c2 = tl .* C2 .* (ones(n, 1) - t3) ; 
c3 = tl .* (ones(n ,1) - t2) .* (ones(n, 1) - t3) ; 
c4 = (ones(n, 1) - tl) .* t2 .* t3 ; 
c5 = (ones(n, 1) - tl) . * t2 .* (ones(n, 1) - t3) ; 
c6 = (ones(n, 1) - tl) . * (ones(n, 1) - t2) .* t3 ; 
c7 = tl . * (ones (n, 1) - t2) . * t3 ; 
obstype = cl + 2.0*c2 + 3.0*c3 + 4.0*c4 + 
5.0*c5 + 6.0*c6 + 7.0*c7 ; 
blO = xx[1] ; 
bll = xx[2] ; 
bl2 = xx[3] ; 
bl3 = xx[4] ; 
bl4 = xx[5] ; 
bl5 = xx[6] ; 
bl6 = XX[7] ; 
bl7 = XX[8] ; 
bl8 = XX[9] ; 
bl9 = XX[10] ; 
bllO = XX[11]; 
bill = XX[12]; 
bll2 = xx[13]; 
bll3 = XX [14] ; 
bll4 = XX[15] ; 
bllS =xx[16]; 
b20 = xx[17] ; 
b21 = xx[18] ; 
b22 = xx[19] ; 
b23 = XX [20] ; 
b24 = xx [21] ; 
b25 = xx[22] ; 
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b26 = XX[23] ; 
b27 = xx[24] ; 
b28 = xx[25]; 
b29 = xx [26] ; 
b210 = XX [27] ; 
b211 = xx[28] ; 
b212 = XX [29] ; 
b213 = xx[30]; 
b214 = xx[31]; 
b215 = XX[32]; 
mul = blO.*ones(n, 1) +bll.*xl+bl2.*x2+bl3.*x3+bl4.*x4+bl5.*x5+ 
bl6.*x6+b!7.*x7+bl8.*x8+bl9.*x9 
+bll0.*xl0+blll.*xll+bll2.*xl2+bll3.*xl3+bll4.*xl4+bll5.*xl5 




sigll = xx[33] 
sig22 = xx[34] 
sigl2 = xx[35] 
sigl3 = -sigll - sigl2 ; 
sig23 = -sigl2 - sig22 ; 
sig33 = sigll + 2.0*sigl2 + sig22 ; 
mu3 =1.0 - mul - mu2 ; 
dsigl2 = sigll*sig22 - sigl2*sigl2 ; 
dsig23 = sig22*sig33 - sig23*sig23 ; 
dsig31 = sig33*sigll - sigl3*sigl3 ; 
ivsigl2 = inv(((sigll - sigl2) | (sigl2 - sig22))) 
ivsig23 = inv(((sig22 - sig23) j (sig23 - sig33))) 
ivsig31 = inv(((sig33 - sigl3) j (sigl3 - sigll))) 
fcttmp = 0.0 ; 
i = 1 ; 
do while i LE n ; 
if obscype[i] EQ 1 ; 
yvec = yl [i] | y2[i] ; 
muvec = mul[i] | mu2[i] ; 
fac = (exp(-0.5*(yvec-muvec)' * ivsigl2 * 
(yvec-muvec)))/2.0/pi/dsigl2A0.5 ; 
endif ; 
if obstype[i] EQ 2 ; 
_muvec = mul[i] | mu2 [i] ; 
_yvec = yl[i] | y2[i] ; 
_ivsig = ivsigl2 ; 
_dsig = dsigl2 ; 
fac = intquadl(&fl, ulim | yl[i]) ; 
endif ; 
if obstype[i] EQ 3 ; 
_muvec = mul[i] | mu2[i] ; 
_ivsig = ivsigl2 ; 
_dsig = dsigl2 ; 
fac = intgrat2(&f2, ulim | 1, &gl | &g2) ; 
endif ; 
if obstype[i] EQ 4 ; 
muvec = mu2[i] I mu3[i] ; 
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_yvec = y2 [i] | y3 [i] ; 
_ivsig = ivsig23 ; 
_dsig = dsig23 ; 
fac = intquadl(&fl, ulim | y2[i]) ; 
endif ; 
if obstype[i] EQ 5 ; 
_muvec = mu2 [i] | mu3 [i] ; 
_ivsig = ivsig23 ; 
_dsig = dsig23 ; 
fac = intgrat2(&f2, ulim | 1, &gl | &g2) ; 
endif ; 
if obstype [i] EQ 6 ; 
_muvec = mu3 [i] | mul[i] ,-
_ivsig = ivsig31 ; 
_dsig = dsig31 ; 
fac = intgrat2(&f2, ulim | 1, &gl | &g2) ; 
endif ; 
if obstype [i] EQ 7 ; 
_muvec = mu3 [i] | mul [i] ; 
_yvec = y3[i] | yl[i] ; 
_ivsig = ivsig31 ; 
_dsig = dsig31 ; 
fac = intquadl(if1, ulim I y3[i]) ; 
endif ; 
fcttmp = fcttmp - In(fac) ; 





/* Procedure to evaluate integrand required for */ 
/* likelihood factor in k = 2 - type observations */ 
/* */ 
proc f1(x) ; 
local ya, yb, mua, mub ; 
ya = _yvec[1] ; 
yb = _yvec[2] ; 
mua = _muvec[1] ; 
mub = _muvec[2] ; 
retp((exp(-0.5 .* (_ivsig[l,1] .* (x - mua)^2 
+ 2.0 .* _ivsig[l,2] .* (x - mua) .* (x .* yb ./ ya - mub) 
+ _ivsig [2,2] .* (x .* yb ./ ya - mub) *2) ) ) 
.» ((1 + (yb ./ ya)*2)*0.5) 
./ 2.0 ./ pi ./ _dsigA0.5 ) ; 
endp ; 
/* */ 
/* Procedure to evaluate integrand required for */ 
/* likelihood factor in k = 3 - type observations */ 
/* */ 
proc f2(x,y) ; 
local mua, mub ; 
mua = _muvec[1] ; 
mub = _muvec[2] ; 
retp ((exp (-0.5 . * (_ivsig[1,1] .* (x - mua) A2 
+ 2.0 . * _ivsig [1,2] . * (x - mua) . * (y - mub) 
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+ _ivsig[2,2] .* (y - mub)x2))) 
./ 2.0 ./ pi ./ _dsig~0.5) ; 
endp ; 
/* */ 
/* Procedures to set limits of integration */ 
/* for calls to intgrat2 */ 
/* */ 
proc gl(x) ; 
retp (0) ; 
endp ; 
proc g2(x) ; 
retp(1 - x) ; 
endp ; 
Program 2 : Variance of Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates. 
/* hesnl.gss */ 
/* Program to calculate numerical Hessian */ 
/* of likelihood function using centered differences */ 
/* Likelihood function corresponds to maxlikl.gss estimation program 
*/ 
/* Uses share data and exogenous variable data read in from 
gdata2.txt */ 
clear _n,_y1,_v2,_y3,_muvec,_yvec,_ivsig,_dsig ; 
/* */ 
/* Read in data */ 
/* */ 
output file = d:\thesis\sic\runl\sales\run3\hesn3.out reset ; 
n = 191 ; 
_n = n ; 
load data[] = d:\thesis\sic\runl\sales\run3\sales3.txt ; 
data = reshape(data, 191, 18) ; 
_yl = data[.,1]; 
_y2 = data [.,2]; 
_y3 = data [.,3] ; 
_xl = data [.,4] ; 
_x2 = data [.,5] ; 
_x3 = data[.,6] ; 
_x4 = data [.,7] ; 
_x5 = data [.,8] ; 
_x6 = data[.,9] ; 
_x7 = data[.,10] ; 
_x8 = data [.,11] ,-
_x9 = data[.,12] ; 
_xlO = data[.,13] ; 
_xll = data[.,14] ; 
_xl2 = data[.,15] ; 
_xl3 = data [.,16] ,-
xl4 = data[.,17] ; 
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_xl5 = data[.,18] ; 
print "Done reading data" ; 
/* Set parameter values at 




































print xx ; 
loglik = fct(xx) ; 
print loglik ; 
np = 35 ; 
hesn = zeros(np,np) ; 
del = 0.001 ; 
ic = 1 ; 
do while ic <= np ; 
je = 1 ; 
do while jc <= np ; 
print ic jc ; 
xxl = xx ; 
xx2 = xx ; 
xx3 = xx ; 
xx4 = xx ; 
which Hessian is to be evaluated 
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xxl [ic] = (1.0 + del/2 0)*xxl[ic] 
xxl [jc] = (1.0 + del/2 0) *xxl [jc] 
xx2[ic] = (1.0 - del/2 0) *xx2 [ic] 
xx2 [jc] = (1.0 + del/2 0) *xx2 [jc] 
xx3[ic] = (1.0 + del/2 0)*xx3[ic] 
xx3 [jc] = (1.0 - del/2 0) *xx3 [jc] 
xx4 [ic] = (1.0 - del/2 0)*xx4[ic] 
xx4 [jc] = (1.0 - del/2 0) *xx4 [jc] 
loglikl = -fct(xxl) ; 
loglik2 = -fct(xx2) ; 
loglik3 = -fct(xx3) ; 
loglik4 = -fct(XX4) ; 
hesn[ic,jc] = (loglikl - loglik2 - loglik3 + loglik4)/xx[ic]/xx [jc] 
/del/del ; 
jc = jc + 1 ; 
endo ; 
ic = ic + 1 ; 
endo ; 
covmat = inv ( -hesn) ,-
pcovmat= (covmat[1,1]-covmat[1,2]-covmat[1,3]); 
print covmat; 
j = 1 ; 
do while j <= np ; 
stderr = covmat[j,j]A0.5 ; 
/* print covmat ; */ 
j = j + 1 ; 
endo ; 
/* */ 
/* Procedure to evaluate likelihood function »/ 
/* */ 
proc fct(xx) ; 
local mul, mu2, sigll, sig22, sigl2, yl, y2, y3, tl, t2, t3, 
n, cl, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, muvec, obstype, sigl3, 
sig23, sig33, mu3, yvec, dsigl2, dsig23, dsig31, ivsigl2, 
ivsig23, ivsig31, ulim, i, fcttmp, fac, 
xl, x2, x3, X4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, xlO, xll, xl2,xl3,xl4,xl5, 
blO, bll, bl2, bl3, bl4, bl5, bl6, bl7, bl8, bl9, bllO, bill, 
bll2,bll3,bll4, 
bllS, 
b20, b21, b22, b23, b24, b25, b26, b27, b28, b29, b210, b211, 
b212,b213,b214, 
b215 ; 
ulim = 5.0 ; 
intord = 40 ,-
n = n ; 
yi = _yi 
y2 = _y2 
y3 = _y3 
xl = _xl 
x2 = _x2 
x3 = _x3 
x4 = x4 
x5 = _x5 








xlO = _xl0 
xll = _xll 
xl2 = _xl2 
xl3 = _xl3; 
Xl4 = _Xl4; 
xlS = XlS ; 
tl = yl .GT zeros(n, 1) ; 
t2 = v2 .GT zeros(n, 1) ; 
t3 = y3 .GT zeros(n, 1) ; 
cl = tl .* t2 .* t3 ; 
c2 = tl .* t2 .* (ones(n, 1) - t3) ; 
c3 = tl .* (ones(n ,1) - t2i .* (ones(n, 1) - t3) ; 
c4 = (ones (n, 1) - tl) . * t2 . * t3 ; 
c5 = (ones (n, 1) - tl) . * t2 . * (ones (n, 1) - t3) ; 
c6 = (ones (n, 1) - tl) . * (ones (n, 1) - t2) . * t3 ; 
c7 = tl .* (ones(n, 1) - t2) .* t3 ; 
obstype = cl + 2.0*c2 + 3 . 0*c3 + 4. 0*c4 + 
5.0*c5 + 6.0*c6 + 7.0*c7 ; 
blO = xx [1] 
bll = xx [2] 
bl2 = xx [3] 
bl3 = xx [4] 
bl4 = xx[5] 
bl2 = xx [6] 
bl6 = xx [7] ; 
bl7 = xx [8] 
bl8 = xx[9] ; 
bl9 = xx[10] ; 
bllO = XX[11]; 
bill = XX [12] 
bll2 = XX [13] 
bll3 = XX [14] 
bll4 = XX [15] 
bus = XX[16]; 
b20 = XX [17] 
b21 xx [18] 
b22 xx [19] 
b23 XX [20] 
b24 xx [21] 
b25 xx[22] 
b26 xx [23] 
b27 xx[24] 
b28 xx[25] 
b2 9 xx [26] 
b210 = xx [27] 
b211 = xx [28] 
b212 = xx [29] 
b213 = xx [30] 
b214 = xx [31] 
b215 = xx[32] 
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mul = blO.*ones(n, 1) +bll.*xl+bl2.*x2+bl3.*x3+bl4.*x4+bl5.*x5 + 
bl6.*x6+bl7.*x7+b!8.*x8+bl9.*x9+b!10.*xlO+blll.*xll+bll2.*x!2+bll3.*xl3 
+bll4.*xl4+bll5.*xl5; 




sigll = xx[33] ; 
sig22 = xx[34] ; 
sigl2 = xx [35] ; 
sigl3 = -sigll - sig!2 ; 
sig23 = -sig!2 - sig22 ; 
sig33 = sigll + 2.0*sigl2 + sig22 ; 
mu3 = 1.0 - mul - mu2 ; 
dsigl2 = sigll*sig22 - sigl2*sigl2 ; 
dsig23 = sig22*sig33 - sig23*sig23 ; 
dsig31 = sig33*sigll - sigl3*sigl3 ; 
ivsigl2 = inv(((sigll - sigl2) | (sigl2 - sig22))) ; 
ivsig23 = inv(((sig22 - sig23) | (sig23 - sig33))) ; 
ivsig31 = inv(((sig3 3 - sigl3) j (sigl3 - sigll))) ; 
fcttmp = 0.0 ; 
i = 1 ; 
do while i LE n ; 
if obstype [i] EQ 1 ; 
yvec = yl[i] | y2[i] ; 
muvec = mul[i] | mu2[i] ; 
fac = (exp(-0.5*(yvec-muvec)' * ivsigl2 * 
(yvec-muvec)))/2.0/pi/dsigl2A0.5 ; 
endif ; 
if obstype [i] EQ 2 ; 
_muvec = mul[i] | mu2[i] ; 
_yvec = yl [i] | y2[i] ; 
_ivsig = ivsigl2 ; 
_dsig = dsigl2 ; 
fac = intquadl(&fl, ulim | yl[i]) ; 
endif ; 
if obstype[i] EQ 3 ; 
_muvec = mul[i] | mu2[i] ; 
_ivsig = ivsigl2 ; 
_dsig = dsigl2 ; 
fac = intgrat2(&f2, ulim | 1, &gl | ig2) ; 
endif ; 
if obstype[i] EQ 4 ; 
_muvec = mu2[i] | mu3 [i] ; 
_yvec = y2[i] | y3[i] ; 
_ivsig = ivsig23 ; 
_dsig = dsig23 ; 
fac = intquadl(&fl, ulim | y2[i]) ; 
endif ; 
if obstype[i] EQ 5 ; 
_muvec = mu2[i] | mu3[i] ; 
_ivsig = ivsig23 ; 
_dsig = dsig23 ; 
fac = intgrat2(&f2, ulim | l, &gl | &g2) ; 
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endif ; 
if obstype [i] EQ 6 ; 
_muvec = mu3[i] | mul[i] ; 
_ivsig = ivsig31 ; 
_dsig = dsig31 ; 
fac = intgrat2(&f2, ulim | 1, &gl | &g2) ; 
endif ; 
if obstype [i] EQ 7 ; 
_muvec = mu3[i] | mul[i] ; 
_yvec = y3 [i] | yl Ci] ; 
_ivsig = ivsig31 ; 
_dsig = dsig31 ; 
fac = intquadl(&fl, ulim | y3[i] ) ; 
endif ; 
fcttmp = fcttmp - ln(fac) ; 




/* * /  
/* Procedure to evaluate integrand required for */ 
/* likelihood factor in k = 2 - type observations */ 
/* */ 
proc f1(x) ; 
local ya, yb, mua, mub ; 
ya = _yvec[l] ; 
yb = _yvec [2] ; 
mua = _muvec [1] ; 
mub = _muvec [2] ; 
retp((exp(-0.5 . * (_ivsig[1,1] .* (x - mua)A2 
+ 2.0 .* _ivsig [1,2] .* (x - mua) .* (x .* yb ./ ya - mub) 
+ _ivsig [2,2] . * (x . * yb . / ya - mub) *2) ) ) 
.* ((1 + (yb ./ ya)A2)*0.5) 
./ 2.0 ./ pi ./ _dsigA0.5 ) ; 
endp ; 
/* */ 
/* Procedure to evaluate integrand required for */ 
/* likelihood factor in k = 3 - type observations */ 
/* */ 
proc f2 (x,y) ; 
local mua, mub ; 
mua = _muvec [1] ; 
mub = _muvec [2] ; 
retp((exp(-0.5 . * (_ivsig[1,1] .* (x - mua)A2 
+ 2.0 . * _ivsig[1,2] .* (x - mua) .* ( y - mub) 
+ _ivsig [2,2] .* (y - mub)A2))) 
./ 2.0 ./ pi ./ _dsigA0.5) ; 
endp ; 
/* */ 
/* Procedures to set limits of integration */ 
/* for calls to intgrat2 */ 
/* */ 




proc g2(x) ; 
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